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ABSTRACT 
 
Land policy in South Africa prior to 1994 was used as a political instrument to discriminate against the 
black population by preventing them from accessing land. The National Party government promulgated 
various laws that allowed the government to forcefully removed millions of black people from their 
original land to the so-called reserves. These removals resulted in extensive landlessness, 
homelessness, poverty, unemployment and economic disempowerment of blacks in South Africa.  
 
Prior to 1994 the explosive issue of land reform was the subject of debates between the different 
political parties, with diverse viewpoints on what should be done. Following much debate, when the 
African National Congress (ANC)-led government took over in 1994, a market approach of “willing-
buyer, willing-seller” (WBWS) was adopted, with as goal the redistribution of 30% of farmland to 
blacks by 2015. A land reform programme was instituted, consisting of three programmes, namely land 
restitution, land redistribution and land tenure reform. The ANC government originally regarded land 
reform as a key programme to address unequal patterns of resource distribution, but there seems to be a 
broad consensus that land reform has changed its originally objectives. By December 2004, all aspects 
of the land reform programme had only transferred an area equal to 4, 3 % of commercial agricultural 
land to blacks. At the National Land Summit of July 2005, the majority of delegates agreed that the 
WBWS principle in the land redistribution process is no longer appropriate and called for alternative 
policies, such as expropriation to fast track the process of redistribution in South Africa. 
 
This integrated assignment focuses on the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
sub-programme of the land redistribution programme in South Africa. It gives an overview of the 
history of land issues and land reform in South Africa. The study then evaluates the sustainability of 
the LRAD programme and investigates the many problems and challenges that still face the 
programme. The research is mainly literature based, and combines primary and secondary sources. The 
study concluded that the LRAD programme will not meet its well-known objective of transferring 30% 
of farmland to blacks by 2015, unless radical steps are taken to change the policy.  A section on 
proposed policy changes is included. It is felt that if sustainable development principles and resolutions 
that were taken on the recent Land Summit are taken seriously and implemented successfully, the 
LRAD programme may achieve its target by 2015.   
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OPSOMMING 
 
Voor 1994 is die Grondbeleid in Suid Afrika gebruik as ŉ politieke instrument om teen die swart 
bevolking te diskrimineer, deur hulle daarvan te weerhou om grond te bekom. Die Nasionale Party 
regering het verskeie wette gepromulgeer wat die regering toegelaat het om miljoene swart mense van 
hul oorspronklike grond te verwyder, na die sogenaamde reservate. Hierdie verskuiwings is die oorsaak 
van grootskaalse grondloosheid, dakloosheid, armoede, werkloosheid en ekonomiese ontmagtiging van 
swart mense in Suid Afrika.  
 
Voor 1994 was die eksplosiewe aspek van grondhervorming die onderwerp van debatte tussen die 
verskillende politieke partye, met uiteenlopende sienings oor wat gedoen moes word. Na baie debat, 
toe die ‘African National Congress’ (ANC) regering in 1994 oorneem, is ŉ gewillige koper, gewillige 
verkoper’ beleid aanvaar, met as doel die herverdeling van 30% van plaasgrond aan swartes teen 2015. 
ŉ Grondhervormingsbeleid in ingestel wat bestaan uit drie programme, naamlik grondrestitusie, 
grondherverdeling en grondeienaarskap hervorming. Die ANC regering het grondhervorming 
oorspronklik as ŉ sleutel program beskou om die ongelyke patroon van hulpbron verspreiding aan te 
spreek, maar daar is tans ŉ breë konsensus dat grondhervorming se oorspronklike doelwitte verander 
het. Teen Desember 2004, was daar, ingevolge alle aspekte van die grondhervormingsbeleid, slegs ŉ 
gebied gelyk aan 4,3% van kommersiële landbougrond oorgedra aan swart mense. By die Nasionale 
Grond Spitsberaad van Julie 2005 het die meerderheid van die deelnemers saamgestem dat die 
‘gewillige koper, gewillige verkoper’ beleid nie langer geskik was nie, en is daar vir alternatiewe 
beleide gevra, soos onteiening  om die proses van grondherverdeling te bespoedig. 
 
Hierdie geïntegreerde werkstuk fokus op die Grondherverdeling vir Landbou Ontwikkeling sub-
program van die grondherverdeling program in Suid-Afrika. Daar word ŉ oorsig gegee van die 
geskiedenis van grondaangeleenthede en grondhervorming  in Suid Afrika. Die studie evalueer die 
volhoubaarheid van die program en stel ondersoek in na die baie probleme en uitdagings wat die 
program nog in die gesig staar.  Die studie is meestal literatuur-gebaseerd en kombineer primêre en 
sekondêre bronne. Die studie lei af dat die program nie sy welbekende doelwit van die oordra van 30% 
van plaasgrond na swart mense teen 2015 sal bereik nie, tensy radikale stappe geneem word om die 
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beleid te wysig nie. Die studie sluit ŉ afdeling met voorgestelde beleidsveranderinge in. Daar word 
gevoel dat as volhoubare ontwikkelings-beginsels en besluite wat by die Grond Spitsberaad ernstig 
opgeneem en suksesvol geïmplementeer word, die program sy doelwitte teen 2015 mag bereik. 
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CHAPTER 1: LAND REFORM PROGRAMME IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Land is an important resource, which affects the food security and livelihoods of millions of poor 
people in South Africa. Since the establishment of colonialism and subsequently throughout the 
apartheid period, black people in South Africa have been systematically and discriminatorily been 
deprived of their land. The result is highly inequitable land ownership patterns and extensive poverty. 
In 1994 when the apartheid regime ended, the new democratic South Africa was born and the African 
National Congress (ANC) government came into power as part of a Government of National Unity 
(Kariuki 2004: 6). The ANC-led government adopted a land reform programme to address the 
problems inherited from the apartheid system and the challenge of development in rural areas. The 
post-apartheid land reform programme in South Africa has been established with three elements: land 
restitution, land tenure reform and land redistribution. Land restitution deals specifically with 
correcting historical rights in land, tenure reform with the upgrading of inferior forms of land holding 
and redistribution is specifically aimed at transforming the racial patterns of land ownership (Jacobs, 
Lahiff & Hall 2003a: 1). The national democratic government under the ANC party originally regarded 
land reform as a key programme to redress unequal patterns of resource distribution (ibid 2003a).  
 
According to Jacobs et al (2003a: 1) “[t]he primary purpose of land reform is to redistribute 
agricultural and other land in order to address the racially skewed patterns of landholding and promote 
development”. In August 2001 the ANC-led government with the help of the World Bank adopted a 
market-assisted land reform programme to correct the unequal distribution of land (Kariuki 2004: 6-7). 
This was part of a series of policies designed to control public spending and minimalise intervention in 
the economy (ibid 8). Levin (2000: 68) asserts that “[t] he Constitution and the present neo-liberal 
macroeconomic framework in South Africa has given rise to a market-driven land reform programme 
which has inherited limitations in addressing the legacy of unequal land redistribution and widespread 
rural poverty and suffering which this has given rise to.” Land appropriation was set aside as a policy 
by the government and the ‘willing-buyer, willing-seller’ (WBWS) way of redistributing agricultural 
land took over in South Africa. Due to this, agricultural land remains largely under white ownership. 
Researchers of the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the 
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Western Cape, (Jacobs et al.  2003a: 1) contend that, “millions of poor people continue to eke out an 
existence from agriculture and other land-based activities in overcrowded and often degraded 
environments in the former homelands”.  
 
Recently, South Africa celebrated ten years of freedom since 1994, but the land reform programme is 
still facing several problems. Since 1994, relatively little land has been redistributed in South Africa. 
For example, according to one source, only about 2 % of agricultural land has been redistributed (CDE 
2005: 12). The land reform policy has also evolved considerably over the past ten years, but not 
necessarily always for the better. There are broad consensuses amongst academics and experts that land 
reform in South Africa is no longer about a rapid reversal of past dispossession, but rather a gradual 
and modest redistribution of land through consensual, market-based methods (People’s Budget 
Campaign 2005: 19). The problems of shortage of land and insecure land rights remain critically 
unsettled (People’s Budget Campaign 2005).  
 
According to DLA’s LRAD policy document (DLA 2001a), “LRAD as new sub-programme is 
designed to provide grants to black South African citizens (blacks, Indians and coloureds) to access 
land specifically for agricultural purposes. The strategic objectives of the sub-programme include: 
contributing to the redistribution of 30% of the country’s farmland over 15 years; improving nutrition 
and incomes of the rural poor who want to farm on any scale; decongesting congested former 
homeland areas; and expanding opportunities for women and young people who stay in rural areas to 
own land to maintain agriculture” (DLA 2001a: 5). According to the People’s Budget Campaign (2004: 
9) the total amount of land transferred to the hands of black ownership through the land reform 
programme over the first ten years of democracy will probably not amount to more than 3% of total 
agricultural land – one-tenths of the official target”  
 
1.2 Research Methodology 
In this integrated assignment, an overview of the history relating to land issues and land reform in 
South Africa is given, focussing on land restitution and more specifically on Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development (LRAD) as one of the aspect of the land reform programme in South Africa. 
The problems that face the Land Reform Programmes, particularly LRAD, were identified and the 
sustainability of the LRAD programme were evaluated, based on certain sustainability criteria. Land 
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redistribution’s main purpose originally was, “the redistribution of land to the landless poor, labour 
tenants, farm workers and emerging farmers for residential and productive use, to improve their 
livelihoods and quality of life” (DLA 1997: 36). It was also investigated whether this was still true 
today.  The study recommended policy changes relating to land redistribution. 
 
The research is mostly literature based, which combine primary and secondary sources. Primary 
sources is when researchers collect their own data, while secondary sources is when researchers utilise 
data collected by other researchers (Brynard & Hanekom 1997: 28). Relevant books, journals, official 
publications, newspapers clippings, reports and seminar papers were utilised to present the facts and to 
substantiate arguments. Qualitative and quantitative methods were utilised. Quantitative data on 
progress with land reform and land delivery were gathered from different sources and analysed to 
evaluate the land redistribution programme in South Africa.  
 
The researcher interviewed Dr Edward Lahiff of the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies 
(PLAAS) at the University of the Western Cape for background information on land reform. The 
researcher also interviewed officials of the Department of Land Affairs (Cape Town District Office) 
but they refused to be quoted in this assignment.  
 
1.3 Sustainable development and Land Reform  
In this section the concept of sustainable development and the requirements for sustainability are 
analysed, which will later be used to evaluate whether the land redistribution programme conforms to 
the requirements for sustainable development. Specific aspects of sustainability relating to 
development projects, such as public participation, empowerment, capacity-building, and education, a 
bottom-up approach, delegation and decentralisation, co-ordination, partnerships and the monitoring 
and evaluation of projects, were investigated. 
 
The Brundtland Commission’s definition of sustainable development is as follows: “development, 
which meets the needs of the present without sacrificing the ability of future generations to meet their 
needs” (Dresner, 2002: 6). The Brundtland Commission’s definition of sustainable development also 
lead to the view that sustainability should not focus on only one aspect of development (such as the 
social or economic) but must integrate all factors, including the very important aspect of environmental 
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development. In other words, environmental planning must be considered and included in development 
planning to produce viable results. In support of the above statement, the OECD has defined 
sustainable development, “as development that integrates the economic, social and environmental 
objectives of societies, in order to maximize human well-being in the present without compromising 
the ability of future generations to meet their needs” (OECD 2001: 11).  
 
Sustainable development is also defined in terms of equity, in that it should meet the needs of all 
people living now and the future in an equitable manner. Barrow (1995: 372) point out 
that,“sustainable development is based on the moral principles of inter – generational (‘… bequesting 
the same or an improved resource endowment to the future’), inter – species and inter-group equity”. 
Furthermore, according to Dresner (2002: 37), “Brundtland seems to be identifying the crucial 
elements of sustainable development as meeting basic needs, recognizing environmental limits, and the 
principles of intergenerational and intragenerational equity”.  
 
Sustainable development should reinforce equity in development. There should therefore be equal 
distribution of resources between the present and the future generations in any development 
programme, as well as between various groups within the present generation. Therefore, the radical 
redistribution of under-utilised white-owned commercial agricultural land to black people might be 
essential to promote sustainable development in South Africa. The World Food Programme of the 
United Nations (WFP) states that for development to be successful, “the starting point is the 
recognition that poor, marginalized and hunger people are the least able to benefit from mainstream 
development” (Hussein 2002: 29). The redistribution programme in South Africa does not seem to be 
sustainable in the sense that it does not recognise the special interests and needs of the poverty-stricken, 
who, in order for development to be successful, must be the main beneficiaries of that particular 
development.   
 
The inclusion of environmental management in land reform is an important requirement to ensure 
sustainable results in projects. Turner (1997: 6) declares, “environmental concern in land reform is 
about the preservation of people and the enhancement of their standard of living”. It must be clear that 
development is not about improving infrastructure and facilities alone, but to develop and empower 
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people through training and skills for future generations. In other words, for sustainable development to 
take place, development must consider the environment and social development (empowerment of the 
people, particularly poor people) as well as economic development, which the researcher believes our 
present land reform system does not do adequately. For example, the DLA (2001c: 98) make a case 
that, “project proposals often have unintended or unforeseen environmental implications. For this 
reason, certain environmental planning interventions need to be made at appropriate points”. However, 
it is clear that in practice the land reform programme is not adequately incorporating environmental 
planning in its projects in order to achieve its objectives of sustainable land reform.  
 
According to Rosenberg (2004: 230), “a first principle for sustainable development is that any 
development activity should help to sustain (and not harm) our natural resources”. In the past, 
exploitation of farmland, industrial waste, and a smoking chimney were seen as signs of progress and 
development. Recently that changed, and genuine concern for the (near) future of natural resources and 
preservation of those resources became an issue (Dekker 2003: 15). A sustainable livelihood approach 
(SLA) should be enshrined in land redistribution policies with the purpose to serve the needs of the 
beneficiaries, especially the marginalised. According to the SLA, “the public must be at the centre of 
development” (DFID 1999: 1.3) and any project should leave people better-off, and not negatively 
effect their livelihoods. However, because of many changes in land redistribution policies, the 
impoverished no longer seems to be a priority in development planning and it seems to be the more 
well-off black farmers who are presently benefiting from the new land redistribution policy (People’s 
Budget Campaign 2005: 19). Hussein (2002:6) says that the SLA promotes programmes that support 
poor people’s strategies and opportunities in a sustainable way. Therefore, in order for South Africa’s 
redistribution programme to achieve its objectives, sustainability principles must be carefully promoted 
in its projects.  
 
Monitoring and evaluation of policy programmes must be promoted, as stated by Turner (1997: 6) in 
the following quote: “Environmental sustainability and impact issues must be monitored over time”. So 
should social and economic impacts also be monitored. It is also essential that any “sustainable 
development strategy must be fully integrated in existing budget processes to ensure that plans have 
financial resources to achieve their objectives” (OECD 2001: 68). Partnerships and collaboration 
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between spheres of government and departments in policy and budgetary processes in the land reform 
process must be promoted in order to achieve its objectives, which the land reform policy does not 
presently do effectively.  
 
The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (DEAT, 2002:5) claims that, “[e]nvironmental 
management tools can be used to enhance integration of sustainability principles in decision-making, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation so as to move towards sustainable development”. 
Environmental planning in land reform can improve the quality of people’s lives (DLA 2001c: 2). 
According to another policy document (DLA 2001b: 7), the land that is redistributed to beneficiaries, 
grazing woodlots and water sources must be carefully preserved in order to continue producing, so that 
the next generation can also benefit.  
 
There are those who contend that ecological concerns have played an important role in seeing 
development and the environment as an integral concept and not as separate entities (Ahmed & Mlay 
1998: 67). Most of the time, development in the past only focused on social and economic development 
at the expense of the environment. Turner (1997: 5) claims that, “[e]nvironmental impacts of 
developments connected with land reform may also be significant, and highlight the needs to address 
land reform planning in a broader context”. According to the DLA (2001c: 1), the lack of sufficient 
environmental planning and practices have aggravated the unsustainable land reform projects in South 
Africa. According to a study conducted by the DLA on land reform and environmental aspects, “there 
has been little attention to any of these concerns in the land reform project planning process” (Turner 
1997). According to the DLA (2001c: 1) various land reform projects have had a negative effect on the 
biological environment. The DLA (2001c: 1) further states that even where environmental concerns 
have been included in project planning, development, delivery, and business issues have frequently 
been given higher priority. This document identifies the importance of integrating environmental 
planning in the land reform programme in order to achieve its goals by 2015.  
 
“DEAT identified three components to sustainable development: environmental, social and economic 
sustainability. This means a form of development that sustain the natural environment; looks after 
people; and ensures that economic welfare can be maintain” (Khan 2004: 230). When development 
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programmes consider the importance of environmental sustainability, economic growth and social 
development simultaneously, sustainable development is more likely to be achieved. The DLA (2001c: 
1) asserts that, “land reform projects, which lead to deteriorating natural resources, impact negatively 
on the livelihoods of people and they are by definition unsustainable development”. In addition, the 
DLA (2001c: 2) suggests that, “a synergistic relationship between land rights and environmental rights 
needs to be created to ensure better chances of long-term sustainability”. Environmental sustainability 
is achievable when all sectors get involve in development programmes. In this regard, public awareness 
and participation is the core to environmental sustainability. 
 
Bartelmus (1994: 6) agrees that, “consequently, environmental goals would provide a new dimension 
to the development concept itself, requiring an integrated approach to environment and development”. 
The researcher believes that integrated development in South Africa can help the government to meet 
social development (education, health, empowerment), as well as economic and environmental 
development goals. According to Rosenberg (2004: 232), “people’s well-being is not only about jobs 
or income – social sustainability also involves education, health and healthy environment, security, 
opportunities for relaxation and spiritual renewal, and people’s right to participate in decisions which 
affect them. This includes the right to information about the environmental health impacts of 
development activities, and the right to legal action if such activities prove to be harmful”. 
Development that is sustainable needs to be holistic in a sense that people must be socially, 
economically and environmentally empowered.  
 
In addition, Conway et al (2002: 1) states, “rooting access to resource-based opportunity or to a 
minimum of state-provided social services and livelihood security in a framework of rights may also 
increase the social and political sustainability of pro-poor interventions”. This is an important point and 
it will ensure that the poor in particular have a right to benefit from any development programme. In 
addition, when people have secure rights over their own resources, environmental sustainability can 
more easily be maintained.  
 
Integration of environmental planning in land reform can ensure that beneficiaries are economically, 
socially and environmentally enhanced, and that poverty alleviation and employment opportunities will 
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more likely result from the programme. Sustainable land reform can only be achieved if beneficiaries 
are given a mandate to participate fully in managing their projects. Sustainability also requires that 
sufficient post-transfer support is provided to beneficiaries. “Land reform South Africa needs to 
address major aspects of development such as increase crop production, improved nutrition and 
improve social status for poor households” (David 2005: 1). It can be the foundation for a sustained 
contribution to economic growth, reduced social unrest and instability. David (2005: 1) challenges that, 
“land reform can provide better environmental management, reducing the flow of desperate rural 
families to the cities, and improve access to credit for the new farmers. Successful land reform in South 
Africa can play an important part in promoting sustainability in a sense that it can help strengthen food 
security, reduce poverty and correct the inequality in land ownership”.  
 
The following additional elements are required for sustainable development programmes: 
 
1.3.1 Public Participation and a bottom-up approach  
People’s participation (in particular of marginalised groups such as women and youth) in development 
is essential and must be a transforming act. Such participation must give power to the poor people to 
access and control their resources (Thwala 2003: 17-18). Therefore, poor people can conserve their 
natural resources if they are given a chance to control their resources through a participation process. 
The land reform programme can play a pivotal role in assisting those who have HIV/AIDS to 
participate in planning and decision-making. The land reform policy, especially LRAD, must also 
make sure that these people (with HIV/AIDS) acquire agricultural land in order to feed themselves. 
The government, DLA and NDA must provide enough support for beneficiaries so that they can work 
towards sustainable production to feed themselves and to market additional production.  
 
“Broad participation help to open up debate to new ideas and sources of information; depict issues that 
need to be addressed; enables problems, needs and preferences to be expressed, identify the capabilities 
required to address them; and develop a consensus on the need for action that leads to better 
implementation” (OECD 2001:27). Mutual learning, better understanding between different 
stakeholders and support are all possible results in this regard. Poor people particularly must participate 
throughout the development process so that they can influence the project. Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs) and Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) that deal with land related issues, 
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the private sector, landless people and agricultural organisations (such as Agri-SA and NAFU) must 
also participate in the land reform programme.  
 
Participatory approaches can motivate local people to propose solutions that will address the full range 
of land needs in a holistic fashion in South Africa. “Central government must be involved in order to 
provide leadership, shape incentive structures and allocate financial resources, but multi-stakeholder 
processes are also required. These should involve decentralised authorities, the private sector and civil 
society, as well as marginalized groups” (OECD 2001: 27). It is important to note that many 
community-based and civil society organisations are often better aware than line ministries of social, 
economic and environmental consequences of decisions taken by central government (OECD 2001: 
21).  
 
The involvement of the private sector is essential to stabilise sustainability in land reform programmes. 
The private sector can provide training for beneficiaries of the land reform programme. This requires 
good communication and information mechanisms with an emphasis placed on transparency and 
accountability (OECD 2001: 21). The private sector can play a meaningful role to ensure that 
“accelerated restitution; successful urban land release and housing; and the deracialisation of 
commercial agriculture and normalisation of the countryside, [as proposed by the CDE] are successful 
in land reform programmes” (CDE 2005: 25). According to this CDE report, the private sector could 
also make an essential contribution to resolve the broader development issues the report identified by 
developing and then sharing with government practical proposals with respect to an urbanisation and 
urban management strategy; a rural development strategy; and a strategy to reduce urban and rural 
unemployment (ibid). However, “as the private sector operates in a competitive environment, the key 
challenge is to create an environment in which competition is not just about lowest price of goods and 
services but is also concerned with improving social, economic and environmental conditions” (OECD 
2001: 37). 
 
According to Drijiver (1992, as cited in Carswell & Jones 2004: 93), a participatory approach is very 
important to the success of environmental (conservation) projects, particularly through use of local 
knowledge to develop locally appropriate solutions. Indigenous knowledge is critical to ensure the 
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success of any development project, especially at the lower levels of development planning. For 
development to achieve sustainability, indigenous or local skills/knowledge must not be 
underestimated, as a participatory approach is beneficial for any development programme in order to 
achieve long-term results. For sustainable development to be achieved, people, especially the poor 
must participate in all aspects of a development programme which include decision-making, 
implementation, monitoring, evaluation and sharing the benefits of development. 
 
According to Kok & Gelderbloem (1994: 62), “When people begin to participate in all aspects of the 
development process, namely decision-making, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, they also 
start sharing in the benefits of development projects, which bring in the equity and self-reliance 
objectives of development”. Participation by people can motivate communities to accept responsibility 
for their own development. In addition, participation of people in all aspects of development will 
motivate people to own their development. Participation can also lead to capacity building of all 
government departments and spheres of government. Although public participation is important in 
development planning, it can be very time-consuming and costly; it can delay project start-up; it can 
increases the demands on project personnel and managers; it can increase pressures to raise the levels 
and range of services; it can bring latent conflicts to the surface, and runs the risk of the project being 
co-opted by certain groups or interests (Kok & Gelderbloem 1994: 47). These negative aspects of 
participation need to be resolved before the process starts.  
 
A bottom-up approach in development planning is important to ensure sustainable development in 
decision-making. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2001: 38) 
maintains that, “it is important to learn from successful local sustainable development initiatives and 
promote replication where relevant”. However, these programmes have usually been most successful 
when they have supported local capacity utilisation and development, stakeholder organisation, 
information and education (OECD 2001: 38). The inclusiveness of local people in development 
planning will enhance sustainability in development objectives. Sustainable development can more 
easily be achieved successfully when planning and projects are driven by people at the grass roots 
instead of by those who at the top (OECD 2001: 42).  
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The top-down approach in development planning has been shown to fail and create unsustainable 
results. A bottom-up approach in development is needed and will encourage a strong partnership 
between those on grass roots and higher levels. “It is often only at the level of a district that people-
centred approaches to sustainable development becomes truly evident. It is at this level that decisions 
are taken daily by individuals and groups of people, which affect their livelihoods, health and often 
their survival” (OECD 2001: 41). 
 
Balancing top-down and bottom-up approaches will encourage decentralisation, transparency and 
accountability among government officials. This balance needs to be accompanied and supported by 
mechanisms, which ensure good dialogue, continuous monitoring, and learning within and between all 
levels. In addition, the trend towards decentralisation offers an opportunity to link national strategy 
processes to community-based participatory approaches (OECD 2001: 38). Bottom-up development 
programmes have the greatest potential to affect positively the lives of the marginalized groups (the 
poor, women, unemployed and the youth).   
 
1.3.2 Empowerment, capacity-building and education  
Empowerment is crucial in any development programme in any country. It is a process through which 
people, particularly the poverty-stricken, are enabled to take more control over their own lives, and 
secure a better livelihood with ownership of productive assets as one key element (Chambers, 1993: 11, 
as cited in Carswell & Jones 2004: 105). Empowerment of marginalized groups can promote 
democratic rights, which encourages these people to conserve their own natural resources for future 
generations. The poor, who tend to be illiterate, need to be empowered through education, training 
skills programme and information. When people, particularly those who were previously marginalized 
are empowered to take the responsibilities of managing their natural resources or development in their 
areas, sustainable development can more easily be achieved.  
 
Capacity building is a holistic approach that strengthens sustainability in development planning. 
Capacity building needs to be systematically built into the programmes and the donors need to be 
willing to admit programmes as a required investment and as a prerequisite for enhancing sustainable 
growth (Turnham 1992: 7). It can also promote the sharing of ideas and responsibility between the 
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different levels of government, departments, NGOs, private sectors, civil society organisations and 
work towards a common goal.  
 
“Human resource development for upgrading and developing new skills may be required for 
facilitating development partnerships through local stakeholder participation and integrated 
relationships with other ministries” (Chilisa, Mafela & Preece 2003: 189). Our Land Reform 
Programme is still struggling to do so. Capacity building in development can also help to facilitate 
skills, such as coordinating, communicating, mediating, teambuilding, skills sharing and decision 
making. Advisory skills, such as knowledge acquisition and management, listening guiding and 
supporting are also included. Skills transferred from central government to lower government spheres 
are also necessary for the benefit of the marginalized groups.  
 
“In earlier stages of any development project, it is essential to identify what skills or capacities will be 
required for the various mechanisms, what exists already, what can be achieved using them and then 
identifying training options and seeking support where needed” (OECD 2001: 56). This is a good 
policy for our government to use local skills to achieve sustainability in our development activities. 
Local capacity is important and must be strengthened in our legislation and policies. However, 
technical, human, organizational as well as financial resources must also be available in national, 
provincial and local government.  
 
Education is another important instrument that can lead to sustainable development. Some authors 
argue that education is the foundation for sustainable development and should be used to judge 
progress (Chilisa, Mafela & Preece 2003: 118). They also argue that, “unequal distribution and 
utilization of knowledge is a barrier to peaceful and sustainable development. Only if there is equitable 
ownership of access to knowledge will [it] be possible in the long term to balance different needs, 
interest and viewpoints” (Chilisa et al 2003: 58).  
 
Environmental awareness raising has not figured very prominently in Africa, partly because of the 
limited development and influence of local environmental NGOs and partly due to the limited 
environmental education in the school (Turnham 1992: 4). Environmental education is crucial not only 
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for local people but also for government officials to promote environmental sustainability in 
development planning. In addition, environmental education of officials will help to reinforce the 
communication with and listening to the local communities. Children in school, male and female adult 
member of the community, leaders and various levels of officials are potential audiences.  
 
An informed and enlightened local leadership is important in securing an effective partnership between 
the local community and government officials. According to DEAT (2003: 38), “improving 
environmental education or awareness, developing environmental capacity and promoting an 
understanding of sustainable development within local government, are important ways of enhancing 
sustainability, and might usefully be cast as projects within the IDP”. In order to achieve sustainable 
development, people on the ground must be empowered and provided with skills. Government officials 
must therefore obtain adequate education about the importance of incorporating sustainable 
development criteria in development activities and integrating or incorporating sustainability criteria 
and principles into policy making and planning. Education for the poor is also essential so that they can 
be more aware and informed. Peaceful and sustainable development will only be achieved when 
equitable ownership of access to knowledge is taking place.  
 
1.3.3 Delegation and decentralisation  
Delegation of power to the lower spheres of government is essential in South Africa where inequality 
still prevails. Decentralisation of powers from the centre to local levels is required for sustainability in 
land reform projects. Decentralisation of authority from above to local government institution is a vital 
link in the participatory process and an essential means of expediting action (Turnham 1992: 13). 
Delegation can motivate local people to mobilize themselves to participate in all phases of integrated 
development planning. This can necessitate the reinforcement of local capacity and devolution of 
financial resources. Decentralisation can bring spheres and departments of government closer to 
marginalized people. It can enhance people’s control over their resources, which they are entitled.  
 
Decentralisation of power from central government to provincial and local levels can contribute to 
strengthen democratic rights of people, especially local poor people to have a say in strategic planning, 
decision-making and implementation. By strengthening the rights of the local people to manage their 
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own natural resources or development projects, sustainable development has a better chance to be 
successful.   
 
“Successful decentralisation depends on a clear definition of the respective roles of local, regional and 
national-level authorities and the development of effective local level institutions for planning and 
decision-making” (OECD 2002: 20). Strong partnership between the national, provincial and local 
government’s policy developments and strategic planning will be useful to achieve sustainable 
development. Decentralisation has been undertaken in South Africa, but it has not worked properly. For 
example, Khan (2004: 5) argues that, “the move to decentralisation of political and administrative 
power to local and regional levels to strengthen participation, intensify accountability and rationalise 
service delivery has worsen the organisational crisis of the public sector as local and state governments 
are loaded with responsibilities that they are incapable to execute properly”. However, 
“decentralisation can foster development policies and strategies appropriate to local social, economic 
and environmental conditions” (OECD 2001: 20). The underlying principles of decentralisation in 
South Africa seem to be weakly understood and capacities for managing the process are inadequate.  
 
Decentralisation can also have negative implications, especially in cases where powers are 
decentralised without the necessary funding (unfunded mandates) or available skills. Duplication of 
power, mistrust among sectors and lack of resources can easily occur when the decentralisation process 
is not well managed. Lack of significant progress in development may also result when the 
decentralisation process is not appropriate. 
 
1.3.4 Co-ordination and Integration  
Adequate co-ordination, particularly between government departments, is important to ensure that 
policies are successfully implemented at the lower level. Co-ordination will ensure sustainable 
development in basic service delivery such as clean water, electricity, health care, education and land 
to people. Adequate co-ordination can be helped by establishing co-operative structures from various 
government departments and spheres of government to facilitate the development and integrated land 
use planning systems involving national, provincial and local government. There has been a lack of 
adequate co-ordination between the Department of Land Affairs and the National Department of 
Agriculture in South Africa since 1994. The Strategic Plan of the Department of Land Affairs for 2005 
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to 2010 (DLA 2005a: 13) has acknowledged this and states, “it clear that one of the challenges facing 
government is to ensure adequate co-ordination and integration of efforts of the different institutions of 
service delivery”. 
 
The DLA has been especially tasked with the responsibility of developing a framework for mutual 
support to land reform projects, whereby roles of different players are to be defined. Ensuring an 
integrated approach in the conception and planning of land reform projects for sustainability is one of 
the Department’s strategic priorities (DLA 2005a). In order to achieve an integrated approach, “the 
DLA is presently developing a Post Settlement Support Framework geared to achieving synergies 
through local level capacity and commitment. Initiatives to function within a common planning context 
would be central to this framework” (DLA 2005a). This is a vital “Strategic Plan” by DLA and if it 
implements these promises, it may eventually achieve its target by 2015. Good co-ordination between 
the government sectors, departments and spheres of governments will promote a holistic approach in 
development planning.  
 
1.3.5 Partnerships  
The partnership between spheres of government, departments, the private sector and communities is 
crucial in achieving positive results in development. This partnership will ensure economic, social and 
environmental viability in development programmes. In order to achieve these objectives in 
development, strong alignment between different stakeholders is important. This partnership in 
development will ensure transfer of resources (such as human and financial resources) and encourage 
sharing of ideas between stakeholders. According to the Decentralized Development Planning Task 
Team (DDPTT), “sharing responsibilities for the same area of jurisdiction requires cooperation, rather 
than operating in isolation in different fields” (DDPTT 2002). 
 
Institutions such as NGOs, CBOs, the private and public sector, church organizations and all other 
stakeholders will help to facilitate and innovate the implementation of integrated legislation or 
development in South Africa. According to the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), their mission is to enable the rural poor to overcome their poverty. IFAD believes that this can 
be achieved only through partnerships with the shared purpose of promoting conditions in which the 
poor can use their own skills and talents to work their way out of poverty (Hussein 2002: 22).  
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1.3.6 Monitoring and Evaluation  
Constant monitoring must be built in to allow the facts relating to success and failure to be confronted 
and to permit problems to be addressed before it is too late. Although the need for monitoring and 
evaluation is clearly stated within the LRAD policy document (DLA 2001a: 14), it does not practically 
always take place. Monitoring and evaluation of government programmes is important and will help to 
lead to sustainability in development programmes. Monitoring and evaluation will promote an 
integrated approach to development planning. Monitoring and evaluation will play a pivotal role “for 
improving strategic processes” (OECD 2001: 58). 
 
It can also enable countries to track progress and to distil and learn lessons, and so react to emerging 
challenges (OECD 2001: 58). However, for the Department of Land Affairs to achieve its target by 
2015, it needs to monitor and evaluate its policy progresses in an integrated manner. Yadav (1980: 92, 
as cited in Kok & Gelderbloem 1994: 82) argues that people’s participation in monitoring and 
evaluation is necessary to identify not only how but who benefits from a particular project. People’s 
direct participation in monitoring and evaluation is also likely to reduce mismanagement of resources.  
 
1.4 Policy Context (RDP and GEAR) 
In order to understand South Africa’s land reform policy, it is necessary to investigate the wider policy 
context of which it forms part. The most important influence is often seen as the “Reconstruction and 
Development Programme” (RDP) of 1994, which, although it is still a policy, in practice seem to have 
been replaced by the later “Growth, Equity and Redistribution” strategy (GEAR). 
 
Ngwane et al (2002: 545) claim that, “[t]he first democratic government in South Africa committed 
itself to improve the quality of life of all its citizens”. According to the discussion document prepared 
by Isandla Institute for SANGOCO (Isandla 2000: 3), “[t]he anti-poverty strategy of the fist democratic 
government is embodied in the ‘Reconstruction and Development Programme’, which views poverty as 
a multi-dimensional issue”. The strategy to address poverty and inequality rested on the four pillars of 
the RDP, namely, building the economy, meeting basic needs, developing human resources, and 
democratising the state.  
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According to Simon (2003: 7), “The RDP enunciated basic principles, some mechanisms and a set of 
ambitious targets in every sector, ranging from new home construction and electricity connections, to 
land restitution and redistribution, equalisation of access to health, education and other social services, 
and sustainable development”. According to Cousins (2005: 1), South Africa’s new democracy has 
made strides in its first decade, as a host of ten-year reviews have pointed out. But Cousins (2005: 1) 
also declare that “continuing poverty and inequality undermine these gains; some see it as “a crisis, and 
perhaps even a threat to survival”. It is clear that now that South Africa has reached ten years of 
democracy, poor black people still face several problems in terms of accessing basic services such as 
clean water and adequate sanitation, basic education, basic health care and a healthy environment, 
electricity, land and adequate housing.  
 
The People’s Budget Campaign (2004: 3) also states that, “[d]uring the last ten years, government has 
vastly improved services for the poor”. In addition, Cousins (2005: 2) agrees that there have been 
significant improvements in the provision of infrastructure and social services, such as clean water for 
8 million people, electricity for 1.5 million households, and free medical services to all pregnant 
women and children under the age of seven. The provision of grants (e.g. old age pensions, child 
support grants) has risen steadily, and more people would be below the poverty line without them. 
Access to basic services such as water and electricity improved steadily, especially after total 
government spending began to grow from 2000 onwards. However, improved government services, 
including services through the social wage in poor communities, only went part of the way in 
alleviating the effects of higher unemployment and falling incomes (People’s Budget Campaign (2005: 
6). The government has acknowledged “similar improvements in access to housing. The share of 
people living in subsidised (so-called “RDP”) housing rose from 13 % in 1996 to 26 % in September 
2003”.  
 
However, backlogs for housing continue to grow, as indicated by the growth of informal settlements.  
Access to social grants improved significantly and by 2003, over a third of the people had access to a 
social pension, compared to well under a fifth in 1996. Regardless of these achievements by the 
government, there is compelling evidence that structural poverty is worsening (Cousins 2005: 3). 
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Unemployment has risen rapidly, from 16 % in 1995, escalating to 29 % in 2002, but if those who are 
too discouraged to continue to actively seek work are included, the figure probably rises to over 40 %.  
 
Poverty and unemployment are the most critical problems that face the South African government at 
the moment. According to the People’s Budget Campaign (2005: 13) between 45 and 55 % of all South 
Africans presently live in poverty and the formal sector does not provide sufficient jobs, while the 
unemployed do not have the resources, skills or services they need to get jobs or support themselves. 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is also contributing to continued vulnerability and impoverishment in South 
Africa and the rest of the region (Cousins 2005: 3).  
 
Simon (2003: 7) contends that [t] he RDP was replaced by the basically neo-liberal Growth with Equity 
and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy, drawn up by a group of predominately senior white civil servants 
and World Bank officials. Khan (2004: 17) maintains that for some of the commentators, the 
displacement of the social democratic vision (the RDP) by the neo-liberal (GEAR) has fundamentally 
changed the relationship between the state and citizenry/communities. Under the RDP, the state played 
a principal and enabling role in development in partnership with the private sector and active 
involvement of all sectors of civil society (the concept of the developmental state). However, with 
GEAR, the state is called upon to play only a facilitative role. Development is perceived as less a 
matter of state involvement and organisation; and stress is rather placed on the role of policy and in 
particular the capacity of the state to develop policy frameworks to hold all stakeholders to these 
principles and targets (Khan 2004: 17).  
 
Khan (2004: 17) also argues that, “[t]he shift from the RDP to GEAR with respect to the relationship 
between state and citizenry/communities is characterised as movement from an empowerment model to 
a bureaucratic model of ‘limited’ public participation”. In addition, GEAR promotes decentralisation 
and partnership between the state and private organisations – not disassociated from the withdrawal of 
the state from direct service provision (Simon 2003: 7). According to Khan (2004: 17), the RDP policy 
was inclusive in the sense that it encouraged the participation of communities in development and 
decision-making. Moreover, it ensured partnerships and co-operation between the state and the 
communities in development.  
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However, the GEAR policy seems to discourage public participation in development planning and 
decision-making. It also limits the state intervention to development and promotes the interests of the 
private sector. “In terms of land reform and redistribution, for instance, the government has been 
insistent on a market-driven process – almost by definition – severely limiting the rate and scope of 
sales and is giving rise to growing frustration” (Simon 2003: 8). The shift from the RDP to the GEAR 
policy seemed to have influenced the Minister of Land Affairs, Thoko Didiza in 2001 to alter the pro-
poor SLAG redistribution programme to the LRAD policy, which promotes a commercial way of 
farming.  
 
Seeking & Nattras (as cited in Cousins 2005: 3) challenges, “this neo-liberal view and recommend a 
‘social democratic policy agenda’, aimed at sustained job creation (including low-wage, labour-
intensive employment), improvements in education, ‘democracy deepening asset redistribution’ 
(worker ownership of firms plus land reform), and welfare reform, in order to reduce inequality while 
ensuring growth in income”. Others such as Khan (2004: 19) suggest that policies that diminish 
inequality and poverty through increasing the income of the poor – investments in education, health, 
infrastructure and nutrition – are also policies that improve the productive capacity of the economy in 
the aggregate. Still others argue for a large-scale redistribution of productive development (De Swardt, 
2003: 18; Terreblanche, 2002: 466; Makgetla & van Meelis, 2003: 103, all cited in Cousins 2005: 3). In 
addition, for May et al (2004: 20 as cited in Cousins 2005), a fundamental rethinking of economic 
strategy may be required, involving stronger linkages between macroeconomic and microeconomic 
reforms, the latter including channels that improve the access of the poor to productive assets such as 
land reform, infrastructure and financial services. Integration of macroeconomic and microeconomic 
policies will close the wide gap between those who belong to the first economy and those in the second 
economy.  
 
Simon (2003: 8) states that, “it is important to note that market-led economic policies anywhere 
generally reduce the scope for integrated development policy and planning that is sensitive to local 
specificities and appropriateness, in terms of environmental, socio-cultural, gender or other factors”. 
According to Simon (2003: 8), market-led economic policies limit the role of the state in development. 
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In addition, they disencourage the participation of marginalized groups such as the poor, women, 
unemployed, young people and people with HIV/AIDS in development. Economic-led policies such as 
GEAR in particular tend not to serve the needs and interests of the underclass citizens of South Africa.  
 
Hall (2004a: 221) says that in 1996, when the new macro-economic policy (GEAR) was unveiled in 
South Africa, it encouraged the ANC government to strengthen its interests in commercial agriculture 
and underrate the land uses of the poverty-stricken. According to the above statement, the move to 
GEAR has influenced the state to undermine small-scale subsistence farming and prioritise the 
commercial farming sector in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF LAND AND 
AGRICULTURAL ISSUES IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
2.1 Background  
The struggle for land in South Africa dates back to the era of colonization when indigenous people 
were marginalised and land was taken away from them. When the first colonies of settlers arrived in 
Africa, their systems of land ownership, based on individual ownership or ownership by the state, 
clashed with the indigenous systems of communal ownership by groups of people. In the beginning the 
Dutch and British systems saw the government (the crown) as owning all land, and only allowed long 
term renting (quitrent, etc), which eventually became full ownership, linked to a formal registration 
system (Pienaar 2005: 1). The individual ownership system, when applied to traditional areas, limited 
the power of the chiefs over land and strengthened the power of government over land. Under the 
traditional communal systems, the chief is the main decision-maker over the land. According to 
Cousins (2002b: 3), traditional communal systems are based on the principle that everyone within the 
community of origin has rights to land, but that individual rights are balanced against their obligations 
to the social groups. Rights are therefore, shared and relative.  
 
Traditional communal systems tend to be inclusive, not exclusive, and rights and obligations are held at 
a number of levels of social organisation, from the neighbourhood to the village to the larger 
community (Cousins 2002b: 3). The British and Dutch systems did not acknowledge the traditional 
system, except in so-called homelands (reserves). Sir George Grey, Governor of the Cape from 1845 to 
1861, favoured individual tenure over the traditional communal system. Grey recognised the political 
advantage inherent in the individual land ownership system:  it would limit the power of the chiefs and 
create a class of minority black landowners, which could be co-opted and controlled more easily 
(Pienaar 2005: 5).  
 
However, as a consequence of these clashes, the majority of black people remain landless. According 
to Sihlongonyane (2005; as cited in Moyo & Yeros 2005: 144), referring to the apartheid government:  
the “white supremacist government carried land alienation further, securing and safeguarding land for 
the white population”. This process saw huge tracks of land being transferred into state control and 
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white capital at subsidized rates, and was accompanied over time by more and more segregationist 
laws.  
 
According to Pienaar (2003: 2-3), the Communal Land Rights Bill (CLRB), which is now a law, was 
introduced in South Africa in order for the government to acknowledge the traditional system of those 
who live in the reserves and homelands. The Communal Land Rights Bill sought to demarcate land 
areas on which communities lived and it would cause such portions of land to be transferred in 
ownership to a community legal entity similar to a Communal Property Association (CPA).  
 
There were several laws that prevented black people from accessing or owning land in South Africa. 
“The Native Location Act of 1874 allowed blacks the right of occupation of land, although they could 
not own this land” (Fair Share 2002: 1). Several other laws systematically stole land from black people 
in South Africa. The 1913 Native Land Act decreed that blacks could not own land in urban areas 
(although millions lived there) and that they were to be “temporary sojourners” in the towns; allowed 
to reside there only while they “ministered to the needs of white” (Hendricks as cited in Coetzee et al 
2001: 290).  
 
According to the 1913 Native Land Act, blacks were originally only allowed to occupy 7% of the land 
in South Africa. Blacks were not allowed to buy land in urban areas. Bernstein, (1996: 5) claims that 
“legislation in 1936 (the Native Land and Trust Act) extended land ‘reserved’ for Africans from eight 
to 13 %, but this additional land had still not been fully allocated by the end of apartheid almost sixty 
years later”. In so-called “white areas”, only white people were given the right to own land while black 
people were only allowed to live on land because they were working for a white farmer.  
 
Because of these racial laws, resistance from rural people was often as simple as leaving the farm to go 
and work in the cities. The Group Areas Act of 1950 was introduced, which focused on urban 
separation of different race groups. “As a consequence of the Group Areas Act of 1950, more than 3.5 
million people were forcedly removed from their homes. At the time of the Group Areas Act, 80% of 
the land in South Africa was in the hands of the 20% white minority in South Africa” (Fair Share 2002: 
1). 
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The 1991 land reform programme was designed to remove or amend all the laws that prevented black 
people from accessing land in South Africa. The expected objective of the following 1991 land laws to 
transform the lives of blacks from misery to happiness in terms of accessing land was not achieved 
even today. In 1991 the National Party government issued a White Paper on Land Reform. It proposed 
the repeal of the 1913 and 1936 Land Acts, the Group Areas Act and other discriminatory land laws 
(Gordon & Phiroshaw 2000: 11). In 1991 the following laws were implemented in South Africa in 
order to get rid of the discriminatory laws that prevented blacks from owning land: The Abolition of 
Racially Based Land Measures Act, 1991 (Act 108 of 1991), The Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights 
Act, 1991, The Less Formal Townships Establishment Act, 1991 and The Physical Planning Act, 1991 
(Act 125 of 1991).  
 
Various Acts of 1993 such as the, “Regulation of Joint Executive Action Regarding Certain Land Act, 
1993 (Act 109 of 1993); the Distribution and Transfer of Certain State Land Act, 1993 (Act 119 of 
1993); The Land Titles Adjustment Act, 1993 (Act 111 of 1993); Provision of Certain Land for 
Settlement Act, 1993 (Act 126 of 1993) now entitled the Provision of Land and Assistance Act, which 
was enacted in the latter half of 1993”, were implemented in South Africa (Rutch & Jenkins 1999: 8-9). 
According to Rutch & Jenkins (1999: 8-9), the Provision of Land and Assistance Act of 1993 was a 
refreshing change in that, instead of tinkering with old apartheid legislation, it addressed the reality of 
landless, rural people and made provision for swift development and settlement of persons upon State-
owned land made available by the owner. 
 
In 1994 when the new Constitution and a government of national unity took over in South African, a 
new approach to land reform started (Rutch & Jenkins 1999: 9). The new land reform programme, 
which is consisting of:  land restitution, land redistribution and land tenure reform has been established 
in 1994. In order to redress the unequal patterns of land ownership, the Settlement/Land Acquisition 
Grant (SLAG) was established.  Due to several criticisms, the new Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development Programme (LRAD) launched in August 2001, is now the official redistribution 
programme of the department (DLA 2001a). Evaluation of these programmes will be discussed below.  
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2.2. Land Reform and South African History 
Due to many discriminatory laws and regulations that affected land ownership directly or indirectly, 
such as the Native Land Act of 1913 and 1936 and those mentioned above, it is generally believed that 
10% of the South African population presently own more than 80% of the 122 million hectares of land 
in use.  According to a 1990 estimation, of the 122 million hectare land available in South Africa, white 
farmers with their dependants used 77 million hectares, versus the 17 million hectares that were 
available in the ten homelands for blacks (see table 1 below) (Minnaar 1994: 30). This shows that the 
issue of land redistribution is very appropriate and it is necessary to find a solution.  
 
Table 1 Share of the 122 million hectare land in South Africa 
 
Place Hectares Share Population Hectare/person 
White Farmers 77 million 63(%) 1.5 million 51 
Black Homelands 17 million 14(%) 14 million 1.2 
Urban/Per-urban 28 million 23(%)   
Total 122 million 100%   
Source: Minnaar (1994: 30) 
 
2.3. Land Policy Before Apartheid (1652-1948) 
During the colonial era dating back to 1652, under the Dutch and British occupation of the Cape, white 
settlers and colonial authorities successfully forced blacks from their land. Gordon & Phiroshaw (2000: 
2) contend that the aim was mainly to obtain the best agricultural land for farming. Before apartheid the 
land programme consisted of successive land issues and reforms beginning from the first land 
settlement and occupation in South Africa by whites that developed and expanded their holdings using 
force, and slowly but systematically as well as through land use, as well as through the labour-tenant’s 
system of work (De Klerk 1991: 45-46).  
 
This reduced the availability of land for rural poor people and obliged them to become farm workers, 
either for cash plus payment in kind or to serve as tenants by residing on the farm while giving free 
service to the owner, which later developed into sharecropping relationships. However, the discovery 
of gold and diamond transformed the economy of the country into industrialisation, but the black 
people remained in a poverty trap as the government started to assist white farmers to introduce 
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mechanisation to boost production and reduce wage costs, while on the other hand there was a huge 
demand for a labour supply for the mining sector (ibid). The main method whereby a cheap migrant 
labour source was created in South Africa was to make sure that more black communities were 
deprived of their land, so that they can depend on whites for their livelihoods (Gordon & Phiroshaw 
2000: 2). 
 
According to De Klerk (1991: 46), in order to meet these double needs, the government passed laws 
that determined the number of farmers and squatters and for the rest of the black population reserve 
areas were set aside under the rational of protecting those dispossessed of their land. However, the 
other philosophy was to fulfil the needs of the white economy at home and in Europe in the form of 
food production while reducing competition by black production (De Klerk 1991: 46). The blacks were 
forced to enter the wage labour communities in the mining areas as the reserve areas were not sufficient 
to sustain them and consecutive laws, such as Native Land Act of 1913, forbade them to acquire more 
land. It was another ways of making sure that blacks did not own land but became cheap labour for the 
benefit of the white community in South Africa. The only concern of the white government was to 
boost South African economic growth to make it economically sustainable at the expense of poor black 
people (Gordon & Phiroshaw 2000: 2). 
 
Thus the land system through these manipulations and the Act of 1913 has served in providing a labour 
force to mining and industries (Letsoalo 1987: 35). The Native Land Act restricted or limited the rights 
to blacks to own land, and removed African cash tenants and sharecroppers from their land and 
consequently replaced sharecropping and rent-tenant contracts with labour tenancy (Thwala 2003: 2). 
In later years, in an attempt to reform the land system, having recognised the shortage of land in the 
reserves and the ethical feeling to redress the problem, a commission was set up and its 
recommendation was to release more land, but this backfired due to opposition from white farm owners 
that instead promoted the 1936 Act to reject the commission’s proposition. 
 
But the 1936 Act did allow some land transfer that increased the original size of the reserve from 7.5 to 
13 % (Letsolalo 1987: 39).  However, according to Letsoalo (1987: 40-41), this had been done through 
the money paid by blacks in the form of taxes and fines. Letsoalo (1987: 41) states that the process of 
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buying released lands from white owners was never completed. Trust farming/land was used by the 
government to create the homelands. In practical terms the black people owned less than 13 % of South 
Africa with no full control or ownership rights. They were also forbidden, by the 1936 Native Land 
Act, to have job contracts with owners, as there was a sanction on the white farmer regarding the 
number of labourers allowed and the payment of registration fees. Webb (2000: 160 as cited by 
Greenberg 2002: 2) declares that, “between 1910 and 1935 some 87 bills related to land reform and 
agricultural assistance to white farmers were enacted in the South African parliament”.  
 
Greenberg (2002: 2-3) illustrates the two major impacts caused by these laws on the structure of South 
African agriculture. “Firstly, this legal framework ensured that white farmers were able to gain control 
over the land, and consolidate this control over time without fear of competition from black farmers. 
Secondly, the laws consolidated the system of migrant labour, whereby the black rural population was 
forced to live within racially defined areas and migrate to white-owned farms, mines and industrial 
areas for employment”. He also argues that because of these laws “a dual agricultural structure was 
created, with a protected white commercial sector and a neglected black sub-subsistence sector”.   
 
2.4. Land Policy during the Apartheid Era (1948-1994) 
Later, a series of laws were passed to prevent blacks from living in towns and outside reserves. 
Following the National Party conquest in 1948, the apartheid system was legislatively formalised 
(Gordon & Phiroshaw 2000: 2).  
 
When the Nationalist Party government took over in 1948, the reserved lands were transformed into ten 
tribal homelands (SAERT 1991: 129). To strengthen its land reform policy-shift from an economic to a 
political focus regarding the issue of the black population, many laws concerning land settlement and 
labour were promulgated, such as the Group Areas Act, 1950, the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, 
1951, the Bantu Authorities Act, 1951 (as a result of which the tribal, regional and territorial authorities 
were established), the Pass Law, 1952, the Black Labour Regulation Act, 1964, the Bantu Homeland 
Citizenship Bill, 1969, the Homeland Constitution Act, 1971, the Proscription of Labour Tenancies 
Act, 1973 and many others.  
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The Group Areas Act, which affected all race groups, racially segregated areas with respect to 
residences and business and controlled interracial property actions (Moyo & Yeros 2005: 143). 
According to Festenstein (1987, as cited in Moyo and Yeros 2005: 144), “these groups were all forced 
to live in segregated areas, and they were not allowed to occupy land outside areas assigned to them”. 
In addition, the Group Areas Act can be seen as an attempt to ensure separation and “unequal” 
development. This was exacerbated by the promulgation of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act in 
1951 and the Reservation of Separated Amenities Act in 1953, which created the power to remove 
people and demolish their homes without notice and ensured the reservation of public amenities for the 
use of persons belonging to a particular race (Moyo & Yeros 2005: 144). Through the Prevention of 
Illegal Squatting Act, the government was given the power “to establish resettlement camps for surplus 
people evicted from white farms” (Thwala, 2003: 2).    
 
“The Blacks Resettlement Act was also passed in 1954. This Act gave the state the authority to remove 
Africans from any area in the magisterial district of Johannesburg and adjacent areas. The Promotion of 
the Bantu Self-Government Act was enacted in 1959 to build the so-called Bantustans and make the 
reserves the political homeland of black South Africans. Furthermore, the Black Laws Amendment Act 
was enacted in 1964. This Act alongside the Native Trust Act was used to fully abolish labour tenancy 
and squatting on farm” (ibid 2003: 3).  
 
All these legal and administrative controls forced blacks to sell their labour to white farmers and also 
forced them into industrial areas, leaving control of vast areas of their lands to foreign firms and white 
settlers (SAERT 1991: 127-128).  In addition, Letsoalo (1987: 34-44) mentions that forceful 
resettlement of millions of blacks, left more than half of the black population landless, making them 
further vulnerable to exploitation. Another measure was the Homeland Consolidation Programme 
(HCP), used in the 1970s for concentrating the dispersed reserves into specific areas and minimising 
the land occupation by blacks, while strengthening legal and administrative control mechanisms.  
 
Later, in order to improve the conditions in the homelands and make provision for people to be able to 
support themselves to a certain level, the government introduced a kind of land reform known as “the 
Betterment Plan”. In order for the Apartheid government to deal with the problems of force removals 
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of more people to live on small areas of land, betterment planning was introduced. The effect of 
betterment planning was cattle culling, fencing off of fields and grazing land from residential areas, and 
the moving of people into villages set away from farming areas (Thalwa, 2003: 2).  
 
In addition, “because of the 1936 Land Act, which established the legal basis for betterment planning, a 
top-down conservation approach was followed to divide the land into small parcels – the basis for the 
‘one man one lot’ system – in order to limit stock and to institute anti-erosion measures” (Yawitch, 
1982; 10 cited in Greenberg 2002: 3). But this type of reform or rural development plan (betterment 
plans) failed to improve the standard of living for the rural populace. Indeed, the observed growth in 
the landless population lead to reductions in the available areas for ploughing, and the forced 
settlement of large numbers of people and, most importantly, reductions in livestock numbers resulted 
in the impoverishment of many (Letsoalo 1987: 56). This kind of land reform denied black people the 
chance to make a living from agriculture, because the land that was available for each person was too 
small. 
 
Schirmer (2000: 143) states that under the apartheid government, large white farmers became 
successful only because they enjoyed state support.  In addition, Greenberg (2003: 99) confirms that 
the white government played a critical role in terms of providing significant assistant to white farmers 
as its key constituencies, with major effects on the rural economy. The NP after 1948 enacted a number 
of laws which were designed to reassert control over rural labour and to shore up the agricultural 
sector, in particular by subsidising and otherwise encouraging mechanisation and the escalation of 
production  (Greenberg 2003: 98-99).  
 
The Marketing Act was enacted and contributed directly to stimulate mechanisation, the emergence of 
large farming units, and capital-intensive agriculture (Jeeves and Crush, 1997; as cited in Greenberg 
2003: 99). There is a consensus that “black farmers had done well until the state denied them land, 
access to resources and prevented them from competing with favoured white farmers” (Schirmer 2000: 
143). “Black farmers were also denied access to marketing and other credit facilities” argues Lipton 
(1993: 359; as cited in Kariuki, 2004: 28). Agricultural development in the former homelands was not 
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on the agenda of the apartheid government as stated by Greenberg (2002: 3), the “agricultural sector in 
the Bantustans was not part of the broader apartheid picture”.  
 
As a result, black people in the reserves were forced to leave agriculture as their livelihood and become 
labours. The economic development of the homelands was stifled and a labour market was created so 
that labour remained as cheap as possible (Gordon & Phiroshaw 2000: 2). Kariuki (2004: 29) sees it as 
“a political instrument by the white government to separate and exclude the majority of black people 
from participating in the agricultural business in South Africa”. White farmers were seen as an 
important political component of the apartheid government in South Africa (ibid).   
 
Because of the favouritism in terms of providing assistance to white commercial farmers by the 
government of the day, the government did not even look at how they used the soil (Schirmer 2000: 
144; Greenberg 2003: 102). The apartheid government had a political ambition and tried through all 
means to retain white farmers on the land. According to Greenberg (2003: 102) in the reserves areas, 
the government policy from the 1930s onwards encouraged and favoured a small minority of richer 
producers, which led to class differentiation among the black population. Under apartheid this kind of 
“progressive farmer” approach was repeated in the findings of the Tomlinson Commission in 1955, 
which created a division among rural people in Bantustans into a landless population and a 
“progressive” farming sector.  
 
According to Letsoalo (1987 as cited in Greenberg 2003: 102), “[t]he NP government discarded the 
Tomlinson Commission recommendations and implemented a ‘quasi-type of ‘betterment scheme’ in 
which land was divided into units that were allocated by officials and not economically viable”. As a 
result, people in Bantustans could no longer engage in agriculture as their main source of living. 
Although, the research by Hendricks (1993 as cited in Greenberg 2003: 102) shows that, “more than 
1.3 million households in the Bantustans engaged in some sort of agricultural production, the vast 
majority of African rural households relied directly on wage remittances or social grants for living”. 
Greenberg (2003: 104) argues that, “inefficient, labour-intensive and individual undertakings declined 
in the agricultural industry”.  
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The government subsidies to white farmers led to overcapitalisation, the rising of the debt burdens of 
farmers and trade reduction that increase the cost of inputs and left many producers facing serious 
financial pressure in the 1980s (De Klerk, 1991 as cited in Greenberg, 2003: 104). There was pressure 
on government for agricultural reform. These problems contributed in hindering the agricultural 
development in South Africa even today. 
 
According to Schirmer (2000: 146), the government responded to these problems by stopping its 
support to white farmers. The support, which was increasingly provided by the state to white 
commercial farmers, was henceforth designed to improve efficiency and viability of agriculture. The 
government was concerned about financial sustainability in the sense that the government reduced the 
levels of subsidy and support given to white farmers (Schirmer 2000: 146).  
 
2.5. Land Reform during late Apartheid (1991-1994) 
During 1991, the NP government enacted various so-called “reform” laws. The stated objective of 
these 1991 “reform” laws, to quote from the White Paper of March 1991, was “to offer equal 
opportunities for the acquisition, use and enjoyment of all the people within the social and economic 
realities of the country”, together with a policy designed to make, “the market mechanism the primary 
instrument for facilitating land reform” (Rutch & Jenkins 1999: 1). The main purpose of the following 
laws was to repeal all the apartheid laws discriminating against black people in South Africa.  
 
According to Rutch & Jenkins (1999: 2), the Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act, 1991 
(Act 108 of 1991), which came into operation on the 30th June 1991, repealed a number of statutes, 
which formed the legal foundation for land segregation. This Act was designed to, “remove or amend 
those laws which restrict access to, or use of, land based on grounds of race; to phase out racially based 
institutions and systems; to regulate norms and standards in residential areas; and to set up the 
Advisory Committee on Non-Racial Area Measures and the Advisory Commission on Land 
Allocations” (ibid 1999: 2). Chapter 1 of this Act provided for the repeal of the Black Land Act 1913 
and the Development Trust and Land Act.  
 
Another of these “land reform” laws, the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, 1991 purported to 
provide for, “the upgrading and conversion into ownership of certain rights granted in respect of land; 
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for the transfer of tribal land in full ownership to tribes and matters connected therewith” (Rutch & 
Jenkins 1999: 4). The Act also ensures that people in the former reserves have secured tenure rights in 
their land (ibid). However, problems became apparent in the structure of the Act. In rural areas, the 
spectre of past administrations arose to bedevil its implementation. Several problems that were caused 
by the apartheid system made the provincial administrator’s task almost impossible (ibid).  
 
The Less Formal Townships Establishment Act, 1991 was brought into operation on 1 September 
1991. The purpose of the Act was to provide an interim measure whereby, on an immediate basis, 
opportunities can be created for the establishment of less formal settlements in areas where an urgent 
need existed  (ibid: 7). The implementation of the Act was placed squarely on the shoulders of the 
Provincial Administrators (ibid). This Act did not provide a comfortable life for the Provincial 
authorities. Lack of funding hampered progress (ibid). Of all the 1991 “reform” laws it did attempt to 
face reality in the shape of the millions of persons housed in the informal and shack settlements 
surrounding the urban areas of the country (ibid).  
 
“The Physical Planning Act, 1991 (Act 125 of 1991) came into operation on 30 September 1991. This 
Act was seen as the vehicle for co-ordination of proper development in both urban and rural areas” 
(ibid 1999: 7).  The objective of the Act appeared to be twofold – to provide a framework whereby 
effect could be given to the policy and strategy for rural areas and to promote the orderly physical 
development of the country in the national, regional and urban context and reverse the effect of the 
distortions brought about by the unnatural needs and results of apartheid that made productive 
utilisation of land and other resources impossible. The Act was bedevilled by an apartheid legacy 
(ibid). 
 
In the latter half of 1993, acts such as the Regulation of Joint Executive Action Regarding Certain Land 
Act, 1993 (Act 109 of 1993); the Distribution and Transfer of Certain State Land Act, 1993 (Act 119 of 
1993); The Land Titles Adjustment Act, 1993 (Act 111 of 1993); Provision of Certain Land for 
Settlement Act, 1993 (Act 126 of 1993) (now entitled: Provision of Land and Assistance Act) were 
implemented in South Africa  (Rutch & Jenkins 1999: 8-9). The Provision of Land and Assistance Act 
of 1993 was a refreshing change in that, instead of tinkering with old apartheid legislation, it addressed 
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the reality of landless, rural people and made provision for swift development and settlement of 
persons upon State-owned land made available by the owner (ibid).  
 
2.6. The Land Reform Programme in The New Democratic South 
Africa 
Prior to 1994, land was used as an instrument to suppress and divide people along racial line in South 
Africa. Racial land laws such as the Native Land Act of 1913, the Group Areas Act of 1950 and others 
were implemented to discriminate and prevent black people from owning land. As a result, the majority 
of black South African people in both the rural and urban areas are homeless and landless. According 
to the National Land Committee (NLC 2001/2 cited in Moyo & Yeros (2005: 150), “…more than half 
of South Africans are landless and need land”. Furthermore, insecurity of tenure, land shortage, 
unemployment and poverty in the South African former homelands has been acknowledged.  
 
With the arrival of the new political dispensation in April 1994, the commencement of the new 
Constitution and a government of national unity, the whole approach to “land reform” transformed 
(Rutch & Jenkins 1999: 9). In 1994, the ANC-led government introduced the land reform programme, 
which consisted of three elements: land restitution, land redistribution and land tenure reform. The 
aims and objectives of the land reform programme was to redress the racial imbalances in landholding, 
developing the agricultural sector and improving the livelihood of the poor as set out in the 
Constitution. Land restitution involves returning land or compensating victims for land rights, lost 
because of racially discriminatory laws, passed since 19 June 1913. Land tenure reform is the most 
complex form of land reform (DLA 1997: 32). Land redistribution made it possible for the poor and 
disadvantaged people to buy land with the help of a Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG). Ferrer 
& Semalulu (2004: 1) state that through the transition to democracy in 1994, an African National 
Congress (ANC)-led government initiated a land redistribution programme by offering 
Settlement/Land Acquisition Grants (SLAG) to poor black South Africans to purchase formerly white-
owned farmers on a willing buyer-willing seller basis. 
 
The objective of the grant programme was to redistribute 30 % of the country’s commercial farmland 
(about 25 million hectares) to black people within five years (ANC, 1994 as cited in Farrer & Semalulu 
2004: 1). The programme was criticised for its slow pace of redistributing commercial farmlands to 
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black people. For example, “by the end of 2000, the SLAG programme transferred about 780,407 
hectares to previously disadvantaged households, which represented only three per cent of the 25 
million hectares that the government had initially hoped to redistribute during this period” (Ferrer & 
Semalulu 2004: 1). Due to several problems that faced the SLAG redistribution programme, the new 
Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development Programme (LRAD) launched in August 2001, is 
now the official redistribution programme of the department (DLA 2001a).  
 
The new policy was seen as a plan to create long-term sustainability where people would be able to use 
the land productively. According to Fair Share (2002: 2), the Minister stated, “the grant will be 
structured in such a way that they are able to support rural livelihoods, small farmer development, local 
authority efforts, commonage acquisition, share equity schemes and the setting up of black commercial 
farmers”. Yet, today, poor people in both rural and urban areas continue to struggle for land and 
security of tenure for different purposes.  
 
The land reform programme was also aimed to equalize the racial imbalance in land holding and to 
secure the land rights of historically disadvantaged people. The land reform programme sought to 
redistribute 30 % of agricultural land between 1994 and 1999 through land restitution, land tenure 
reform and land redistribution programmes (Moyo & Yeros 2005: 150). “The aims and objectives, as 
set out in the Constitution of South Africa, the 1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy and a 
succession of legislation, are ambitious and potentially far-reaching, including redressing the racial 
imbalance in landholding, developing the agricultural sector and improving the livelihoods of the poor” 
(Lahiff 2001: 1). Furthermore, the land and agrarian reform system was also aimed to empower the 
previously disadvantaged groups such as blacks, Indians and coloureds to become sustainable 
commercial farmers.  
 
The land reform programme was build around the World Bank’s 1993 prescriptions of a market-driven 
willing-buyer-willing approach coupled with a limited state grant, the protection of private property, 
and compensation based on market value for any appropriated land (Hall 2004b: 4-5; Kariuki 2004: 9). 
The World Bank’s proposal for rural restructuring was, “to transfer 30% of agricultural land to 600 000 
black smallholders within first five years, at a cost of R71 billion” (Hall 2004b: 5). 
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 Kariuki (2004: 6) declare that although South African people got their political freedom, 
approximately half of South Africa’s 43 million people and two-thirds of its African population still 
live in deep poverty. In addition, “in line with its neo-liberal macroeconomic policy, the approach of 
the ANC-led government to land reform has been based on the use of free market mechanisms, tightly 
controlled public spending and minimal intervention in the economy- the so-called market-based, 
demand-led approach” (Reed & de Wit 2003: 85). Because of this approach, the land reform 
programme is still struggling to equalise the racial imbalances in land ownership. 
 
The market approach to land reform has proved to delay the process of delivering more land to 
beneficiaries. Bush (2002: 26) have claimed that, “we have seen in the earlier review of the experiences 
in Latin America and elsewhere in Africa that policy shifts away from State planning and towards the 
dominance of the market have been influenced by US foreign policy regional security concerns”. State 
intervention in land reform is essential to pick up the pace of the programme and facilitate the 
programme itself. The policy shift away from State planning and towards the market system increase 
inequality in terms of land distribution and the marginalized will continue to be excluded.  
 
South African agriculture is characterised as a duality (Ainslie et al 2003: 1). “One sector has large 
farms, freehold tenure, capital-intensive farming systems and a well-developed input, processing and 
wholesale sector. On the other hand, the small farm sector is characterized with a traditional tenure 
system, labour-intensive farming systems, and a poorly developed output, processing and wholesale 
sector. It produces products for family subsistence or for poor consumers” (Murray-Prior & Ngcukana 
2000: 3; cited in Kariuki 2004: 28). 
 
These dualistic agricultural sectors in South Africa create inequality among these kinds of farmers in 
the sense that rich farmers are favoured and poor farmers are not part of the programme. The land 
reform programme occurred with the aim of changing the structural inequity that existed with respect 
to agricultural land ownership and to generate a viable agrarian transformation in rural South Africa 
(Kariuki 2004: 29). The ANC government must close this gap between the black and white farmers 
without disturbing commercial agriculture. According to Greenberg (2003: 106), agricultural policy in 
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South Africa during the new democratic government did not represent a fundamental break from what 
took place prior to 1994 when the ANC came to power. The policies of the World Bank and its local 
surrogates were adopted, for example, by the Land and Agricultural Policy Centre (LAPC).  
 
Schirmer (2000: 162) points out that, “since the democratic government under ANC party took power 
in 1994, the kind of agricultural development that could have had an impact on South Africa’s massive 
rural poverty and unemployment has failed to materialise”. According to him the redistribution 
programme since 1994, delivered little agricultural land and failed to facilitate the creation of new 
black commercial farmers. Schirmer (2000:162) insists that some new agricultural farming mostly 
consist of share-schemes taken up by ex-farm workers.  
 
The reason behind the lack of new black commercial farmers is that there is no state support for such 
activities, and land reform beneficiaries receive only R15000 each, which was swallowed up by the 
cost of the land purchase. The land that the beneficiaries received often was not in a good condition for 
agricultural purposes. The small amount of money from the government was not enough for them to 
buy farming equipments. Even if they received land, the beneficiaries received no proper assistance to 
support them with farming. Greenberg (2003: 110) challenges that, “large-scale land redistribution has 
not happened”. In 2000, a policy shift resulted in a closer link between the land redistribution 
programme and the creation of a commercial black farming class (ibid, 2003: 110). To some extent, 
since 1994, the land reform programme was hampered by the shortage of budget allocation, which 
delays the delivery of land to the hands of the poor.  
 
Greenberg (2003: 111) explains that, “restructuring and deregulation of the agricultural sector in South 
Africa to date suggests that the opportunities to be successful will be severally constrained for new 
entrants, small farmers, and farmers in the former Bantustans”. He also makes a case that a decline in 
government support to all farmers has meant that successful farmers will tend to be those who have a 
resource base from which to grow. In other words, it seems as if the rich or the haves is benefiting 
significantly from the LRAD programme while the needy or the have-nots seem to be neglected. In 
2001, the new land redistribution programme was adopted. The Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD) was designed to create a group of black commercial farmers. The programme 
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has an element of support to subsistence farmers and non-market farmers, but the bulk of the resources 
are likely to flow to “emerging” farmers who have some resources to match government funds to enter 
into high-level commercial agriculture (Greenberg 2002: 16; Kariuki 2004: 29).  
 
The Apartheid government created two agricultures, commercial agriculture on white-owned farms and 
subsistence agricultural production in the reserves. Kariuki (2004: 31) asserts that any policy has to 
take these differences into account. If the agricultural and land policies enhance differences among 
people, then the same old Apartheid divides in land will be perpetuated. “The Department of 
Agriculture echoes a similar dichotomization (division of agriculture/farmers) when it states that its 
main task is to establish an environment where opportunities for higher incomes and employment are 
created for resource-poor farmers alongside a thriving commercial farming sector” (ibid). To do this, 
“the policy aims to achieve the following goals for policy reform: 
• To build an efficient and internationally competitive agricultural sector; and  
• To support the emergence of a more diverse structure of production with a large increase in 
the numbers of successful smallholder farming enterprises” (MALA 1998 cited by Kariuki 
2004: 31).  
 
The above categorizations are not beneficial if farmers are to be differentiated in a meaningful way. 
Instead one needs a more nuanced understanding of what farmers do, since agricultural output is 
determined not by a category but also by the opportunities available along a spatial-temporal set of 
axes subject to factors ranging from rainfall to cash position (Kariuki 2004:31).   
 
The new LRAD programme envisaged a hierarchy of black farmers who are characterised as 
“subsistence”, “semi-commercial”, “pre-commercial” and “commercial” (Kariuki 2004:31). Hall & 
Williams (2000: 12) state that it is hoped that state interventions will assist large numbers of people at 
subsistence level. Agriculture in the new democratic era is still controlled by white farmers as well as 
black elites who have enough resources to influence government. The poor are not really on the agenda 
although they are mentioned in the LRAD policy.   
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Transferring 30% of agricultural land from white farmers to black people by 2015 (Hall 2004a: 219) is 
impossible under the current market-system. Sustainable development will not easily be achieved under 
the market-driven approach nor will it be possible to redistribute agricultural land to black people by 
2015, unless a new approach can be taken fast, for example by expropriation of farmland. Ravuku of 
the Land Access Movement of South Africa (Lamosa) insists that drastic and widespread expropriation 
of land is essential, if the skewed distribution of land ownership, caused by decades of apartheid is to 
be resolved (Cape Argus 2005: 12). 
 
To date, land reform has little impact on the racially skewed distribution of land in South Africa.  
Lahiff (2001 as cited in Reed & de Wit 2003: 85) say, “agricultural land outside the former homelands-
estimated at 82 million hectares in 2000, and divided into approximately 60, 000 farm units-remains 
overwhelmingly under white ownership. Over 13 million people, the majority of them poverty-stricken, 
remain crowed into the homelands, where rights to land are often unclear or contested and the system 
of land administration is in disarray”.  These statistics state that during the first five phase of land 
redistribution, land transfer to blacks was not efficient or effective.    
 
According to Lahiff (2001: 1), “on private farms, millions of workers, former workers and their 
families face continued tenure insecurity and lack of basic facilities, despite the passing of new laws 
designed to protect them”. There is an increasing consensus that the South Africa’s land reform 
programme is failing to meet its objectives during the first phase of redistribution.    
 
The history that is mentioned above illustrate that dispossession and forced removal of black people 
under colonialism and apartheid periods resulted in landlessness, homelessness, unsustainable use of 
natural resources particularly in the former homeland areas, poverty, unemployment, physical 
separation of people along racial lines and most crucially an tremendous land shortage and insecurity of 
tenure for many of the black people in South Africa. According to the DLA’s Strategic Plan 2005 – 
2010 (2005a: 20), “the total size of land delivered from 1994 to 31 December 2004 is about 3, 5 million 
hectares. This includes land delivered through the restitution, redistribution and state land”. This 
amount is about to 4.3 % of commercial agricultural land (CDE 2005: 13). The CDE report shows that, 
“according to the DLA, the government would need to redistribute an additional 20, 6 million hectares 
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of commercial agricultural land to reach the 30 % target – an average of 1, 87 million hectares a year”. 
Thus far delivery has averaged 0, 38 million hectares a year (CDE 2005: 13). 
 
According to the CDE (2005: 13), the delivery of land will have to be increased fivefold to meet the 
2015 target. The CDE also warns, “… if the current pace is maintained, the 30 % target will be reached 
in 54 year’s time”. These figures signify that our Land Reform Programme is still struggling to redress 
imbalances in land ownership. According to the Land Affairs Minister Thoko Didiza, in order “to 
speed up the pace of land reform she plans,  
• To review the country’s 30-year-old expropriation law to make it easier to use land reform 
when the willing-buyer, willing-seller system fails; and 
• A new look at valuation mechanisms to ensure that land reform does not drive prices to 
unrealistically high levels” (Boyle 2005: 6).  
Minister Didiza told the Sunday Times (Boyle 2005) that the government has managed in 11years to 
transfer just over 3 % of agricultural land, previously reserved for whites, to black owners. Minister 
Didiza argues that another 27 % has to be shifted to achieve the official target of 30% black ownership 
by 2015. She also insists that in order to achieve this commitment by 2015, proactive intervention by 
the State is needed. Matlala of the National African Farmer’s Union (Nafu) says in the Enterprise 
Magazine (Ndebele 2005: 20) that, “black people own 3, 3% of land in South Africa. He warns that this 
will result in a revolution if government and the different stakeholders do not resolve the land question 
within a reasonable time”.  
 
According to the CDE (2005: 10-11), farming nowadays is very knowledge and skills intensive and 
more and more farmers are moving out of business. There are currently 45 000 commercial farmers 
versus 78 000 farmers 15 years ago. In addition, farm prices declined by 15% in real terms. The CDE 
(ibid) also found that commercial farming thus does not have the capacity to be “transformed into a 
large-scale anti-poverty or unemployment relief mechanism”. In the next section, an overview will be 
given of the land redistribution policies in South Africa.  
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CHAPTER 3: OVERVIEW OF LAND REDISTRIBUTION 
POLICIES FROM 1994-2005 
 
 
3.1. General Overview of Land Reform (SLAG and LRAD) 
The specific original objectives and approach of the redistribution policy was set out in the White 
Paper on South African Land Policy (DLA 1997: 36):  
“The purpose of the land redistribution programme is to provide the poor with access to land for 
residential and productive users, in order to improve their income and quality of life. The programme 
aims to assist the poor, labour tenants, farm workers, women, as well as emergent farmers. 
Redistributive land reform will be largely based on willing-buyer willing-seller arrangements. 
Government will assist in the purchase of land, but will in general not be the buyer or owner. Rather, it 
will make land acquisition grants available and will support and finance the required planning 
process. In many cases, communities are expected to pool their resources to negotiate, buy and jointly 
hold land under a formal title deed. Opportunities are also offered for individuals to access the grant 
for land acquisition” (DLA 1997: 36). The South African land reform policy is derived from the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
• Section 25 (5) of the Constitution states: “The state must take reasonable legislative and other 
measure, within its available resources, to foster conditions, which enable citizens to gain 
access to land on an equitable basis”  
• Section 25 (6) states: “A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an 
Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress”; and 
• Section 25 (7) states: “A person or community disposed of property after 19 June 1913 as 
result of past racial discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an 
Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress”(Republic of 
South Africa 1996: 12).  
 
The programme for redistribution obtains its mandate from section 25(5) of the Constitution. 
According to Lahiff & Rugege (2002a: 1), “Section 25 of the 1996 Constitution can therefore be seen 
as an improvement on section 28 of the interim Constitution in that it introduced specific powers and 
duties on the state to implement land reform. Section 25 strikes a balance between the interests of 
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property holders and the general public interest, empowering the state to redress the injustices of the 
past through redistribution of land and other natural resources to the advantage of the previously 
deprived”. This section gives the state an obligation to look after its citizens through providing access 
to basic resources or socio-economic rights such as housing, health care, water, sanitation and land.  
 
Access to land is recognised as one of a “cluster of socio-economic rights enshrined in the 
Constitution” (Lahiff & Rugege 2002a: 2).  As stated by the Constitutional Court in the Grootboom 
case, these socio-economic provisions, “entrenched the right to land, to adequate housing and health 
care, food, water and social security. They protect the rights of the child and the right to education” 
(Lahiff & Rugege 2002a: 2). The State is obliged to take reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of the socio-economic rights 
entrenched in the Constitution (ibid). Lahiff & Rugege (2002a) claims that, “land is thus treated as a 
socio-economic right, despite the fact that the relevant provision (section 25(5) does not use the explicit 
language of a right as used in relation to housing, health and other rights in sections 26, 27, and 28. 
Nowhere in the property clause is it stated that everyone has the right to land, or the right to have 
access to land. Section 25 (5) merely puts an commitment on the state to take reasonable legislative and 
other measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access 
to land on an equitable basis”.  Thus it would appear that no individual person may demand access to 
land. This is not different to the situation with regard to the right to housing. The responsibility of the 
State in both cases is to pass legislation and design and implement a programme that is reasonable 
within its available resources (Lahiff & Rugege 2002a: 2).  In summary, section 25 of the Constitution 
therefore does not include a right of everyone to access to land although it imposes an obligation on the 
State to take reasonable measures to foster access to land.  
 
The land redistribution programme was implemented in order to meet the obligation imposed by 
section 25 (5) of the Constitution, “to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on 
an equitable basis”. The Provision of Certain Land for Settlement Act 126 of 1993 as amended (and 
now called The Provision of Land and Assistance Act) forms the legal basis for the land redistribution 
programme (Cousins 2000: 144).   
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The land redistribution programme has undergone a number of shifts since 1994. “The redistribution 
programme commenced in 1995, was based on a flat grant of R16 000 per household for the 
acquisition of land and start-up capital” (Aliber 2003: 1-2). This grant was known as the 
Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG). Due to unsatisfactory results, during 1999 the Department 
of Land Affairs (DLA) recognised that the programme was overwhelmed with serious problems. “In 
August 2001, the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) launched a revised programme, the Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD). LRAD has since been promoted by the DLA as 
the flagship programme through which it will follow the objectives of land redistribution” (Kariuki 
2004: 17).  
 
The following sections will deal with an evaluation of the progress that was made during the first 
(SLAG) and the second (LRAD) periods of democracy in South Africa. Key problems and constraints 
to delivery of land under the SLAG and LRAD processes was evaluated.  
 
3.2. Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG)  
Land redistribution was designed to deal with the past injustices of land dispossession and forced 
removals to ensure equitable distribution of land ownership and to reduce poverty and contribute to 
economic growth. In addition, it was made possible for the poor and the disadvantaged to purchase 
land with the help of a Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) of R16 000, equal to the basic 
housing grant at that stage, provided to qualifying households (Thwala 2003: 12). Land redistribution is 
specifically designed as a source of reconciliation between those who were previously oppressed, 
disallowed to own land with the oppressors in order to build a united and sustainable South Africa. The 
SLAG programme allowed poor households to purchase land. Within the redistribution programme, 
most projects have involved groups of applicants pooling grants to buy formerly white-owned farms 
for commercial agricultural purposes. The reason was that the grants, at R16, 000 per household, were 
not enough compared to the price of land (Hall 2004: 215). Groups of farm workers have also used the 
grant to purchase equity shares in existing farming enterprises. A separate grant, the Grant for the 
Acquisition of Municipal Commonage, has also been made available to municipalities wishing to 
provide communal land for use (typically grazing) by the urban or rural poor (Lahiff 2001: 4). 
 
   - 42 -
According to Lahiff (2001: 4), “by the end of 1999, a total of 77 municipal commonage projects had 
been implemented and 75 more were in the pipeline”. The amount of land approved for transfer in the 
first five years of the redistribution programme is as follows: 
 
Table 2 Land Approved For Redistribution (1995-1999) 
YEAR OF APPROVAL HECTARES 
1995 11 171 
1996 67 887 
1997 140 527 
1998 273 416 
1999 174 286 
TOTAL 667 287 
Source: National Land Committee (2000-2001) 
 
According to an interview with the Director-General of the Department of Land Affairs by the Personal 
Finance Magazine during 2002 (Mudzwiti; September 14, 2002), the Director-General conceded that 
there is still 80 million hectares, 85% of the agricultural land, in the hands of white owners that could 
be utilised for the land reform programme. He also mentioned that by 2002 the State had delivered 32 
0477 hectares from the available government figures of 1.2 million hectare, less than 25% of the 
available agricultural land.  
 
There are those who argue that even though the SLAG redistribution was inadequate, the pace of 
delivery of land accelerated rapidly between 1995 and March 1999 (Aliber 2003: 2; Lahiff 2001: 4). 
According to them, over this time, roughly 60 000 households were allocated grants for land 
acquisition, of which 20 000 benefited in the 1998/1999 financial year alone. They also agree that, 
“around 650 000 ha were approved for redistribution by March 1999, representing less than one per 
cent of the country’s commercial farmland”. Yet, the process of land redistribution has been slow.  
David (2005: 22) shows that, “from 1994 to end of 2000, only 68 494 hectares of land were transferred 
in only 2729 projects. In 1998 and 1999 the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) transferred land in just 
over 1000 projects for each year”.  
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Aliber (2003: 2) maintains that due to poor delivery of agricultural land, as the new ministry of the 
Department of Land Affairs in 1999, Thoko Didiza was just beginning to reach a critical level of 
awareness that its redistribution projects were overwhelmed with serious problems. Deininger et al 
(1999: 13) contend that, “while the decision in favour of a demand-driven approach has been upheld, 
difficulties in implementing the approach have indicated that land markets will not automatically work 
effectively for the poor and that both the private sector and (local) governments can help create greater 
transparency in these markets”. They also identify some of the problems that negatively affected the 
progress of the SLAG-redistribution programme.  
 
For example, the neglect of provincial and local government structures has made it much more difficult 
for DLA staff to provide land reform beneficiaries with technical assistance and to ensure 
implementation of land reform projects as an integral whole (i.e. including complementary 
infrastructure such as housing, material for minor improvements in infrastructure, etc.).  In addition, the 
business planning process itself proved to have limited capacity as an instrument to improve 
beneficiary capacity. Evidence illustrates that the process was perceived to be supply-driven and tended 
to disempower beneficiaries rather than giving them the tools they need to manage projects on their 
own (Deininger et al 1999: 17).  
 
SLAG policy was seen as a process that deprived people from taking part in planning or implementing 
and managing their projects in an extensive manner. Beneficiaries lack knowledge about the policies 
under which they had received support and their use of the planning grant and their involvement in the 
selection of consultants appear to have been limited. Hall (2004: 215) points out that the programme 
was criticised for the complex group dynamics that resulted, because it reproduced overcrowding, and 
because it did not link the acquisition of land to support and resources to enable beneficiaries to 
generate a livelihood off it.  
 
According to Turner & Ibsen (2000: 12, as cited in Darroch & Lyne 2003: 4), “by the end of 2000, the 
Ministry of Agricultural Land Affairs had approved 484 projects under the SLAG programme, 
transferring a total of 780, 407 hectares to 55,383 households of which some 14 % were headed by 
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women”. Land that was transferred to disadvantaged South Africans over a period of six years by both 
land restitution and land redistribution roughly totals one million hectares or less than 1.2 % of the 84 
million hectares of white-owned farmland (Darroch & Lyne 2003:4). As a matter of concern, “too 
many redistribution projects were not economically viable, and linked to this, redistribution did not 
appear to provide a stepping-stone into medium or large-scale commercial farming” (HSRC 2003: 5). 
Hall (2004b: 5) claim that, “in practice land reform in the first five years of democracy was a relatively 
small and isolated intervention into the livelihoods of the rural poor”. The first five years of democracy 
failed to enhance the livelihoods of the marginalized groups both in rural and urban areas. As stated 
above, since 1994, during the first period, the redistribution programme has not done well in terms of 
meeting its targets (Lahiff & Rugege 2002b: 10).  
 
3.3 Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
When Thoko Didiza was appointed as the new Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs shortly after 
the national elections in 1999, she called for a sweeping review of the redistribution programme. 
According to her, “the programme should be broadened to cater for those aspiring to become full-time, 
medium-scale commercial farmers, and should build more on synergies between Land Affairs and 
Agriculture” (Aliber 2003: 2).   
 
The LRAD programme is a new sub-programme of the Department of Land Affairs since 1999. LRAD 
is specifically aimed at giving black farmers access to land for subsistence or productive purposes and 
is jointly run by the Department of Land Affairs and the Department of Agriculture (DoA 2004: 6). 
The LRAD programme was established just after the Ministerial Statement of February 2000, which 
was followed by a lengthy period of policy review and debate (Cousins 2002a: 8).  According to Lahiff 
(2001: 4), “the new redistribution programme, entitled Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development: A Sub-Programme of the Land Redistribution Programme (LRAD), was designed in 
close co-operation with the World Bank, drawing on its recent experiences in Brazil, Columbia and the 
Philippines, with minimal input from staff at DLA or civil society”. 
 
The Department of Land Affairs (2001a: 5) shows that the redistribution programme has three 
components or ‘sub-programmes’: 
 “Agricultural development – to make land available to people for agricultural purposes; 
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 Settlement – to provide people with land for settlement purposes; and  
 Non-agricultural enterprises – to provide people with land for non-agricultural enterprises, for 
example, eco-tourism projects”. 
 
As stated, the collective aim of land reform is to ensure the transfer of 30 % of all agricultural land over 
a period of 15 years (DLA 2001a: 6). In addition, “the programme aims to transfer agricultural land to 
previously individuals or groups, and provide land for commonage projects in both municipal and tribal 
areas” (Cousins 2002a: 8). In order to achieve this target in such a time span would require an average 
annual transfer of 1.64 million hectares. The total cost of the programme is estimated at R 16 to 22 
billion (Kariuki 2004: 17).  
 
These two parts (Agricultural land and Commonage projects) of the sub-programme have in common 
that they deal with agricultural land redistribution (DLA, 2001a: 5). The LRAD programme aims to be 
a single, integrated facility for redistribution and is designed to provide grants to black South African 
citizens to access land specifically for agricultural purposes. The programme has the following 
strategic objectives: “not only contributing 30% of the country’s agricultural land over 15 years but; 
improving nutrition and incomes of the rural poor who want to farm on any scale; decongesting over-
crowed former homeland areas; and expanding opportunities for women and young people who stay in 
rural areas” (DLA 2001a: 5).  
 
The LRAD policy document also reveal the importance of sustainability in its projects by stating that it 
should be the policy, which  “promote environmental sustainability of land and other natural resources” 
(DLA 2001a: 6). Although, it aims towards sustainability, many projects failed due to lack of 
environmental sustainability. Turner (2001: 4) declares that, “the challenge is to bring environmental 
considerations to the attention of land reform beneficiaries and to work with them to develop 
sustainable production with conservation systems”.  
 
The DLA (2001a: 6) identifies the basic underlying principles of the programme: 
• “It is unified, basic and beneficiaries can use it in flexible ways according to their objectives 
and resources; 
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• All beneficiaries make a contribution in kind or cash, but in varying amount; 
• It is demand directed - beneficiaries define the project type and extent; 
• Implementation is decentralised: local level officials provide opinions and assistance in 
preparation of project proposals; 
• Inter-departmental collaboration will take place at all spheres of government, with district 
government assuming a key role; 
• Projects will be undertaken in a manner consistent with district and provincial spatial 
development plans; 
• Projects are reviewed and approved at provincial level; 
• Local level staff assist applications, but do not approve the application; 
• Ex post audits and monitoring will substitute a lengthy ex ante approval process; and 
• The mode of implementation is adopted in the interest of maximum participation and 
empowerment of beneficiaries, speed of approval and quality of outcomes”.  
 
The LRAD grant is a grant provided by the government to for the purchase of farmland. The grant 
serves as an additional mechanism to an own contribution that the beneficiary has made in order to 
access farmland. The key mechanism offered by LRAD is a grant system that beneficiaries can access 
along a sliding scale from R20 000 to R100 000. All beneficiaries are required to make a contribution, 
in cash or in kind, the size of which will determine the value of the grant for which they qualify. The 
minimum “own contribution” is R5 000, with which an applicant can obtain a grant of R20 000, while 
a maximum grant of R100 000 is available to those who are able to contribute private finance totalling 
R400 000 or more. Those who make a higher contribution of own assets, cash and/ or labour receive a 
higher grant, determined as a basic proportion of their own contribution At the bottom end of the scale, 
the R5 000 minimum contribution can be made in the form of “sweat equity” (labour), ostensibly to 
ensure that poor people can participate in the programme (DLA 2001a).  
 
The grant and own contribution is calculated on a per individual adult basis (18 years and older) (DLA 
2001). Darroch & Lyne (2003: 4) assert that, “LRAD differs from SLAG in one major respect: 
Beneficiaries do not have to be poor to qualify for a minimum grant of R20, 000 – and those who have 
more savings and who can raise bigger loans to finance their farms qualify for successively larger 
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grants”.  If people choose to apply as a group, the required own contribution and the total grant are both 
scaled up by the number of individuals represented in the group. The approval of grants is based on the 
viability of the proposed project, which taken into account total project costs and projected profitability 
(DLA, 2001a: 7).   
 
“Own contribution by beneficiaries in labour can be for up to R5 000 per individual applicant. In order 
for the applicant to claim the full R5 000 in own labour towards the own contribution requirement, the 
business plan must show evidence that the applicant intends to devote a significant amount of own 
labour to the establishment and operation of the project. The policy document continues that the 
contribution in kind could be calculated by costing assets such as machinery, equipment, livestock and 
other assets that a beneficiary may possess” (DLA 2001a: 7).  
 
The policy document (DLA, 2001a: 7) insists that, “the cash contribution can be in the form of one’s 
own cash contribution to the project, or borrowed capital, or a combination of the two. These three 
forms of own contribution can be added in any contribution to make up the required own contribution 
from the beneficiary”. The grant given to the LRAD applicants would cover expenses such as 
acquisition of land, land improvements, infrastructure investments, capital assets and short-term 
agricultural inputs (ibid).  
 
According to the DLA’s policy (DLA 2001a: 7), “for some beneficiaries who have skills and resources 
to manage larger farms, the total project costs can range up to R500 000 or higher, of which the grant 
can cover up to R100 000. The remainder (about R400 000) would be financed through a combination 
of normal bank loans approved under standard banking procedures, and own assets and cash. Farmers 
choosing this option would have to possess managerial skills adequate to handle the debt, as well as 
prior experience in agriculture. Land would be either owned or leased on an individual or household 
basis”.  The Policy also allows beneficiaries to “trade up”, or graduate, from one grant level to another 
(Jacobs, Lahiff & Hall 2003a: 4).  
 
In addition, grants may be accumulated until the ceiling of R100 000 (the maximum level of the grant) 
has been reached. LRAD has largely, but not entirely, replaced SLAG, which continues to be used for 
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certain, limited purposes (Jacobs et al 2003a: 4). According to Kariuki (2004: 21), “The LRAD sub-
programme is flexible enough to accommodate a number of types of projects. Moreover, residential 
projects would not be supported under LRAD unless beneficiaries sough to begin household gardens at 
their new residences and unless funds for top-structures were sourced from elsewhere, e.g. Department 
of Housing”.  
 
According DLA (2001a), the LRAD programme has four types of projects that can be supported under 
LRAD: 
• “Food-safety-net project: This type is for people to acquire land for food crop and/or 
livestock production to improve household food security; 
• Equity Scheme Projects: This type of project allows for the participant to make the 
requisite matching own contribution and receive equity in an agricultural enterprise.  
However, the equity share must be equal to the value of the grant plus you own 
contribution. 
• Production for market: This is for people who want to engage in commercial agricultural 
activities. 
• Agricultural in communal areas: If you are living in a communal area and already have 
secure access to agricultural land but do not have the means to use the land productively, 
you may apply for the grant in this type of project”.  
 
Cousins (2002a:8) argues that, “the LRAD programme continues to be described as “demand directed”, 
meaning that beneficiaries themselves must define the type of project in which they wish to engage 
and, with appropriate assistance, identify available land. Acquisition of land, from either private or 
public sources, continues to be on the basis of willing-seller, willing-buyer. Therefore, under the 
demand-directed approach, the poor will be unable to meet participation requirements in order to 
acquire land and they will be excluded from the programme. It seems as if the policy only care about 
those who have enough resources (Lahiff 2001: 5; Hall & Williams 2000: 9). At the same time as the 
process is still ‘demand-led’ as in SLAG, it did not involve the prior acquisition of land by the State for 
subsequent resettlement (Adams & Howell 2001: 4).  
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Politicians, who hold public office, and civil servants do not qualify and will not be eligible for the 
grant (DLA, 2001a: 10). The document makes it clear that LRAD is specifically for “South African 
citizens who are members of previously disadvantaged groups including Africans, Coloureds, and 
Indians; who are willing to live on or near the land and operate or work on it; and are committed to use 
the grant to purchase or lease land for agricultural activities”. The DLA (2001a: 10) makes it clear that, 
“men and women will have equal access to all benefits under LRAD, and women will be actively 
encouraged to apply” (DLA 2001a: 10). The policy document has a section on “Gender and LRAD”, 
which it states that LRAD, “provides an excellent vehicle for redressing gender imbalances in land 
access and land ownership, and thus in improving the lot of rural women and the households they may 
support” (DLA 2001a). The LRAD sub-programme is also portrayed as the one that will, “serve as a 
means of creating opportunities to enable women to develop in numerous spheres of life, thus given 
them security against poverty and providing them independent economic status” (DLA, 2001a: 6). 
Women-only projects are to be allowed and encouraged and in terms of targets, and altogether not less 
than one third of the transferred land resources must accrue to women (DLA, 2001a: 7). 
According to the LRAD policy document (DLA, 2001a: 10), successful applicants will be required to 
participate in training courses and activities designed to assist them in successful operation of their 
farms and gardens. LRAD is an integrated programme, which through its initiatives set up chances for 
beneficiaries to increase their level of participation within the programme. Those who have previously 
accessed the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) are eligible to apply, though priority will be 
given to first-time applicants (DLA 2001a: 11). Beneficiaries will be allowed to graduate from smaller 
to larger farms. 
 
3.4 Project Design and Approval (LRAD) 
LRAD projects experience a complex project planning cycle before they are implemented. According 
to the Department of Agriculture in the Western Cape (2004: 4) a completed application form must be 
completely filled in and submitted at the nearest office of the Department of Agriculture or Land 
Affairs. After officials from Agriculture have examined the application form, it will be sent to the 
district office of the Department of Land Affairs, where a planner will deal with the project.  
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In order to access LRAD grants, the applicants must identify a property they would like to purchase 
and negotiate a provisional sales agreement with the owner, the applicants then fill out application 
forms furnished by the PLRO or PDA; the property is assessed for its suitability; a business plan is 
drawn up explaining what the applicants propose to do with the property and the project money; the 
various application materials are submitted to the District Assessment Committee; after whatever 
reworking is required, the application is submitted to the Provincial Grant Committee; if approved, the 
project proceeds to the Provincial Director of the DLA (HSRC 2003: 6). Planners are appointed to 
work together with applicants to develop the application into a sustainable project proposal. 
 
Land Affairs and Agriculture officers will arrange information sessions with all role-players and where 
necessary, appoint a design agent to assist with project planning. During the project identification 
stage, the intended beneficiaries are informed about the programme options available. They then 
decided on the desired amount of the grant according to their preferred own contribution. They also 
decide whether to apply individually or as members of a self-selected group (Kariuki 2004: 24). 
According to the DLA (2001a: 10) once a suitable area of land has been located, the participant (s) 
enter into a contingent contract with the seller.  
 
In the project design/planning phase, the business plan is formulated consisting of the following details 
(DoA 2004: 11): 
• Loan or financing arrangements 
• Legal entity or institutional arrangement 
• Subdivision sketches 
• Environmental impact assessments 
• Sale agreements 
• Land rights investigations 
• Title deeds 
• Valuation 
• Farming plan 
• Training 
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The completed business plan is then forwarded to the Department of Land Affairs for comment, who 
presents it to the District Assessment Committee (DAC) for evaluation. During the assessment stage 
the business plan is evaluated by the District Assessment Committee for viability and sustainability. If 
it meets all requirements the Land Affairs Official sends a memorandum to the Provincial Director: 
Department of Land Affairs for the release of the grant (DoA 2004: 11).  
 
The participant obtains evidence of additional financial resources (loan, own resources, or both). In 
terms of contributions in own labour, an individual applicant can claim up to R5 000 (Kariuki 2004: 
24). The abovementioned memorandum with recommendations is presented to the Provincial Grant 
Committee (PGC). In the project approval stage, the applicant must submit all relevant documentation 
to the local extension officer to receive his/her opinion regarding the feasibility of the farm plan, 
including the agricultural potential, value of the land relative to market prices for land of comparable 
quality and access to water, cash flow projections, and environmental assessment. 
 
Once the local extension officer has provided an opinion, the participant submits the proposal package 
to the provincial grant committee. This committee comprises officials from both the Department of 
Land Affairs and the Department of Agriculture. The complete package ready for submission would 
include the following: 
• The project plan  
• A draft purchase or rental contract 
• A list of all the beneficiaries and their contribution, if the proposal is not individual 
• Evidence of own contribution and any necessary financing in addition to the grant 
• Confirmation from the local extension officer that the seller is in legal possession of the title 
• Confirmation from a professional evaluator that the price of the land is reasonable in 
comparison with recent land transactions in the area 
• Opinion of the local extension officer on the feasibility (agricultural and environmental issues) 
(SENWES 2005b: 2). 
 
LRAD projects are initiated, designed and implemented by different institutions or agencies. According 
to Jacobs et al (2003a: 17) all applications must eventually come before the PGAC. According to the 
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DLA (2001a: 12), “the Provincial Grant Committee under the appropriate MEC should consists of 
provincial officers of Land Affairs including the provincial accounting officer, directors from Land 
Affairs and officials from the Provincial Department of Agriculture together with other necessary 
Departments and stakeholders”. 
 
The committee should check that the proposal package is complete and coherent, and whether, based 
on the information provided in the proposal, the project is eligible for approval under LRAD (DLA 
2000: 12).  The provincial grant committee will review the package and evaluate the application and 
make one of three recommendations: 
• Complete and in conformity with the requirements of LRAD approval; 
• Complete but not in conformity with requirements of LRAD: do not approve and state 
reasons; or  
• Incomplete: return to applicant and state reasons (Kariuki 2004: 25).  
 
When the Provincial Grant Committee supports the release of the grant to the Provincial Director, the 
Department of Land Affairs will authorise payment thereof (DoA 2004: 12). According to the 
Department of Agriculture in the Western Cape (2004: 12), in the transfer stage, the Provincial Land 
Reform Officer: Department of Land Affairs, issues instructions to the conveyancer to effect transfer. 
The grant is paid to the conveyancer upon registration of transfer. The balance of the grant is then 
available as stipulated in the business plan.   
 
Jacobs et al (2003a: 17) agree that post-transfer activities are now being incorporated into the project 
cycle. The project planning cycle takes between three and eighteen months before the land title is 
transferred. Minister Thoko Didiza, as cited in the LANDNews, states that the reduction of the project 
cycle has been with DLA for some times and the department have now reduced it to between four and 
six months (DLA 2004e: 4). Didiza stated that the number of beneficiaries who get supported as a 
group to a manageable number per project was reduced. However, the purpose behind this according to 
Minister Didiza (ibid) was to “increase prospects for the sustainability of LRAD‘s projects as 
production units”.  
 
   - 53 -
Designation and implementation of LRAD is divided into two sections, namely the transfer of land 
titles, which is the responsibility of the Department of Land Affairs, and post-transfer support, which is 
the responsibility of Provincial Departments of Agriculture. In the post-transfer stage, the Provincial 
Department of Agriculture is responsible to move in and help the beneficiaries in implementing the 
goals of the business plan, such as starting farming enterprises, etc.  
 
The Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs and the Land Bank are instrumental in helping to 
implement the business plan. LRAD beneficiaries now also receive the training that was identified in 
the business plan. The Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs undertake joint monitoring of the 
project. During this phase the Department of Agriculture and Land Affairs and Land Bank support 
beneficiaries by providing additional aid to ensure project sustainability. This phase thus concludes the 
project cycle (South African, Ministry of Land Agriculture 2000 as cited to Kariuki, 2004: 26).  
 
The DLA (2001a: 12) states that the Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs at national level will 
be responsible for the overall design of LRAD and monitoring of its impact. The Department of Land 
Affairs should budget for the grant components of LRAD, while the Department of Agriculture must 
budget to ensure that its provincial departments are financially prepared to meet their commitment to 
provide post-transfer agricultural support. Both the Department of Land Affairs and Agriculture should 
provide training for beneficiaries, design agents and local and agricultural officers. According to the 
Department of Agriculture in the Western Cape (2004: 12), during the last phase of the project cycle 
(i.e. sustainability phase) the Departments of Agriculture and Land Affairs and the Land Bank will 
support beneficiaries by providing additional aid on request in order to ensure project sustainability.  
 
Jacobs et al (2003a: 17-18) contend that, “these two phases haven’t been perceived by many 
government department officials as quite distinct, resulting in poor integration of the efforts of the two 
departments. Efforts to integrate the two phases have progressed more in some provinces than in 
others, particularly where the PDoA has also become involved in the processing of LRAD 
applications”.  In addition, in some places, Provincial Departments of Agriculture (PDoA) are limited 
to verifying business plans and valuations submitted to them by the DLA  (ibid 2003a: 18).  
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Project planners are meant to work with land redistribution beneficiaries until the land title has 
completely been transferred (Jacobs et al, 2003a: 18). The partnership and collaboration between the 
Provincial Land Reform Office (PLRO) and Provincial Department of Agriculture is essential in terms 
of strengthening sustainability in land reform projects and making sure that post-transfer support is 
deliberately incorporated during the project design period. In some provinces this collaboration 
between the PLRO and PDoA has successfully happened during the project design and approval phase 
(e.g. in the Western Cape) (Jacobs et al 2003a: 18).  
 
Although LRAD repeats some of the SLAG based redistribution incidents, the Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme is different from the previous Settlement/Acquisition 
Grant (SLAG) redistribution programme in a number of ways. LRAD programme makes grants 
available to individuals rather than to households, and it substantially increases the level of grant 
funding obtainable, since each adult in a household can apply.  
 
Under LRAD, a typical poor black household with three adults would, in theory, be able to obtain three 
grants of R20 000 each (a total of R60 000) rather than one grant of R16 000 under SLAG.  In addition 
to these differences, the approval and implementation of projects have been decentralised to provincial 
and district municipality level, and closer cooperation is expected between various government 
departments and spheres of government, with an enhanced role for district municipalities and 
provincial departments of agriculture (Jacobs, Lahiff & Hall 2003a: 5; Hall 2004b: 8; Kariuki, 2004: 
27). Closer cooperation is expected between various government departments and spheres of 
government, with an enhance role for district municipalities and provincial departments of agriculture 
(Kariuki 2004: 27).   
 
The DLA (2001a: 6) regards this move (of decentralisation of powers from central to provincial and 
district municipality levels) as, “the substitution of ex post audits and monitoring for a lengthy ex ante 
approval process”. All the projects approved under LRAD must meet certain eligibility criteria. The 
approval of the grants is based on the “viability of the proposed project, which takes into account total 
project costs and project profitability” (Jacobs, Lahiff & Hall 2003a: 5). Every project application must 
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be accompanied by a business plan and strict commercial criteria are employed to assess the viability 
of these projects. 
 
LRAD is open to individuals or groups, although large groups are discouraged from applying (which 
differs from SLAG, where the creation of large groups was often the only way in which certain land 
could be bought). Group projects require the setting up of an appropriate legal entity, such as a 
communal property association (CPA), a trust or a close corporation (Jacobs, Lahiff & Hall 2003a: 5). 
Despite these changes in LRAD, considerable continuities with past policies are also evident.  Hall 
(2004b: 31) states that LRAD has been successful in increasing the pace of delivery, spending the 
available budget, and private finance has been leveraged. Critically, the purpose of reducing the 
number of people from larger groups to smaller groups under LRAD was to generate and promote 
sustainability in its projects, but although LRAD is aimed at helping the poor, it excludes the poorest of 
the poor from acquiring land on an extensive scale. Darroch & Lyne (2003: 4) claim that the new South 
African land redistribution policy has shifted away from poverty alleviation and group settlement, in 
favour of settling prospective farmers on their own farms. Lack of after care support is still one of the 
main challenges facing LRAD, although it is envisaged within the policy itself (Kariuki 2004: 30).  
 
Lack of sufficient funding for the DLA and DoA’s programmes (the Comprehensive Agricultural 
Support Programme, Land Care Programme and Agricultural Mentorship Programme) lead to the 
unsustainability of LRAD’s projects. Lack of coordination; lack of cooperation and lack of 
commitment between spheres of government and departments contribute to the lack of improvement in 
food security and livelihoods of the beneficiaries. Lack of integrated training to new black farmers is 
another problem that contributed to the lack of successful in LRAD’ projects. The budget allocated to 
LRAD is very small in itself and yet the money applicants qualify for is far more significantly than the 
previous SLAG grant (Kariuki 2004: 50). Although LRAD cater for both poor and rich people, in 
reality it is used by the more empowered emerging groups of farmers, and according to Kariuki (2004: 
50), it is not promoting the marginalized people. According to some (Wegerif 2004: 44), LRAD has 
failed to stimulate land markets, and has not encouraged any new investments. LRAD has not brought 
about any change in existing farming operations and has created no new jobs.  
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There are individuals such as Lahiff (2002: 16) who declares that in order for the redistribution 
programme to achieve its targets of transferring 30 % of agricultural farmland to blacks by 2015; much 
bolder steps will be required. Lahiff (2002: 16-17) also suggests that, “for a start, land adjacent to the 
former homelands and townships, and in areas of acute landlessness, needs to be targeted and acquired 
by government, through a mixture of aggressive interventions in the market and selective 
expropriation. The emerging consensus around the urgent need for land reform suggests that this may 
not meet with as much resistance as has been feared in the past”. According to the July National Land 
Summit, if South Africa is concerned about land delivery, LRAD needs to be reviewed (Hall 2005: 1).  
 
3.5 The key problems and constraints to delivery of land (SLAG and 
LRAD) 
Recently, July 2005, South Africa hosted a National Land Summit to address and overcome the 
problems and constraints that hampered and still hamper the delivery of land to previously 
disadvantaged citizens under the SLAG and presently LRAD programmes. Furthermore, the Summit 
addressed the slow pace of land delivery of agricultural land to blacks, mostly during the first period of 
democracy (SLAG).  
 
According to researchers such as Jacobs, Lahiff and Hall of PLAAS (2003b: 1) progress with land 
reform has been painfully slow and to date there has also been a lack of debate around land reform 
policy, especially over the key question of who will benefit. Many writers claim that the land 
redistribution programme is no longer about redressing the imbalances of the past but is strengthening 
those imbalances under the post-apartheid period. Those who were socially, economically, politically 
and environmentally marginalised during the apartheid period tend to be excluded again in the new 
democratic development programmes in South Africa.  
 
In support of this view, the CDE (2005: 27) makes a case that, “the fact is that 11 years into a 
democratic South Africa, the land reform programme is still struggling to meet its own targets”. 
Therefore, the market system approach to redistribute 30 % of agricultural land from white landowners 
to black people is one of the major problems that hamper South Africa’s land reform programme since 
1994. The market-driven approach presumes existing wealth as key entry requirements. This 
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hypothesis is fraught in the sense that millions of poor South Africans are likely to be excluded from 
the reform process while the wealthier sector will gain access (Kariuki 2004: 10).  
 
Various projects under SLAG based land redistribution were faced with several problems, which made 
SLAG struggle to meet its objectives of improving food security and enhancing the livelihoods of 
beneficiaries. McIntosh & Vaughan (2000: 227) challenge that, “the absence of a rational policy 
framework, and the fact that communities have been encouraged to meet the cost of the land through 
pooling their R16 000 grants, has resulted in the emergence of large, unviable and poorly-located 
settlements, or planning for such settlement”. The lack of “aftercare” to beneficiaries is one of the main 
obstacle to the success and sustainability of LRAD projects (Deininger et al 1999: 16).  
 
According to Lahiff (2001: 4) and others such as Hall (2004b: 6) and the HSRC, (2003: 5), some of the 
problems hampering the process of redistribution are the inexperience of officials in conducting land 
transactions, leading to lengthy delays and loss of interest from sellers; reliance on current land owners 
to determine when, where and at what price land is made available; insufficient co-ordination between 
the provincial Land Affairs branches (known as Provincial Land Reform Offices, or PLROs) and the 
provincial departments of agriculture (PDAs), leading to poorly designed projects and lack of post-
settlement support, unwieldy groups schemes, cumbersome approval mechanisms that require 
ministerial approval for every project; and the imposition of inappropriate business plans on poor 
communities. Sibanda (2001: 5) formulates the following key problems and constraints to delivery of 
land during the SLAG process:   
 “Scarcity of human resources at government level, 
 Lack of coordination and integration with other spheres of government and departments; 
 Lack of effective organisational, technical and managerial support to new farmers and land 
reform beneficiaries beyond the point of land acquisition and 
 The inadequate government capacity for land reform”.  
 
According to the researcher’s assessment, even though the SLAG programme focused on the poorest of 
the poor, it lacked to ensure that these people’s (the poor) lives and livelihoods are improved or 
enhanced. Under this programme (SLAG), beneficiaries were given land but not the necessary support 
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from the State to ensure sustainability in their daily lives.  As was said before, during the first decade of 
democracy, the DLA fell far short of the objectives it set itself (Kariuki 2004: 9). Lack of institutional 
and financial resources, which also hinder the LRAD programme, exacerbated the low rate of delivery 
of land to the marginalized groups (ibid). If perhaps, the sustainable development principles such as 
participation, consultation, coordination, integration, education, partnerships between different 
stakeholders, monitoring and evaluation and bottom-up approach to land reform, were taken seriously, 
it would meet its objectives.  In addition, Hall (2004a: 219-220) maintains that lack of accountability in 
terms of the operating budget and staffing are also constraints to land delivery. Hall insists that a 
greatly constrained and overburdened bureaucracy in the DLA is itself reliant for success on 
cooperation and contributions from other overburdened and cash strapped institutions, most notable 
local government (district and local municipalities) and the national and provincial departments of 
agriculture. The following paragraphs will focus on LRAD’s currently problems and constraints that 
hamper the programme. In order to ensure sustainability in agricultural development in South Africa, 
the DLA established a new sub-programme of land redistribution called “Land Redistribution for 
Agricultural Development (LRAD)” in 2001. In addition, the new programme was designed to address 
and correct the problems and constraints that hindered the previously SLAG redistribution programme.  
 
There is a fear that LRAD policy will repeat the mistakes of the SLAG policy, even though some of the 
problems were carefully reviewed by the DLA. According to Hall (2004b: 32), firstly, though LRAD 
has reproduced some of the previous problems, it has reduced but not stopped the tendency for groups 
to pool their grants in order to buy land. Secondly, the lack of sustainability in its projects (due to lack 
of accountability and responsibility of DLA and NDoA to ensure post-transfer support to beneficiaries) 
is unresolved within the LRAD programme. It seems as if, although, under LRAD, co-operation 
between spheres of governments, and departments and decentralisation of power from national to 
provincial and municipal district levels has been promoted since 2001, lack of commitments and 
mistrust between these levels is real. Kariuki (2004: 34) says that there is little evidence that the 
national or provincial Departments of Agriculture have experienced staff to take on the roles that 
LRAD is offering them.  
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Lack of resources such as money, agricultural inputs, infrastructure and so on seems to be the critical 
problems that still hinders the LRAD programme. Hall (2004a: 217) argues that despite the 
improvements of delivery of land to previously disadvantaged people, the marginalised and wealthy 
compete for limited resources. Kariuki (2004: 30) points out that the LRAD programme has failed to 
integrate its projects within a broader framework of agrarian change, which affects the delivery of land 
to blacks negatively. Furthermore, black farmers are not able to engage in viable agricultural ventures, 
which to date have remained a key domain of white farmers (ibid). One of the main problems 
connected with the new programme (LRAD) grant structure is its inflexible nature in dealing with the 
specificities of South Africa’s provinces with regard to the land market (Kariuki 2004: 54).  Even under 
LRAD, poor families or individuals are forced to group themselves to acquire land within the market. 
Post-transfer support to beneficiaries is one of the main challenges that faced SLAG policy and the new 
LRAD policy in South Africa. The lack of sufficient support to beneficiaries of land redistribution 
could ruin the country’s land reform programme. Various objectives of the land reform policies were 
not and are still not fulfilled.  
 
The pace of land reform has been very slow, although under the LRAD programme it improved. The 
former homeland areas, which constitute a third of the national population, over 18 million, are faced 
with severe problems of poverty and insecurity of land tenure, which is seen as the slowest part of the 
government’s land reform programme. For example, most of the inequities remain stubbornly in place. 
Many of the injustice still have to be addressed. The inefficiency and unfairness of land tenure and 
administration in the former homelands have yet to be tackled (Turner 2001: 1-2). Mngxitama (2000:2) 
of the National Land Committee have tried to show the similarity between the Zimbabwean land 
reform programme’s failures with South Africa’s failure to meet its promise of redistributing 30 % of 
agricultural land in the first five years of democracy. Land reform has managed to provide less than 2 
% of agricultural land. In addition, Jacobs (2002: 5) of the Surplus People Project (SPP) also shows 
that, “the land redistribution programme of government has not been successful in changing ownership 
patterns: the total amount of land redistributed between 1995 and 1999 constitutes less than 1% of the 
total farmland in the country”. The main reasons for this is the impracticability of the willing-buyer and 
willing-seller market principles where the landowners are assumed to place land on the market at fair 
and just prices; the restitution programme has been slow and costly with more emphasise on 
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compensating in cash than restoring in land terms; redistribution is involved in costly procedures and 
high market-value compensation paid to white farmers; and a lack of cooperation or willingness and 
commitment to reconciliation and change by land owners (Mngxitama 2000).   
 
Therefore, a radical land redistribution programme that focuses on the needs of those who have 
nothing, (the poor, landless and marginalised) is needed to overcome the above-mentioned problems 
and constraints. Radical land redistribution is a programme that accelerates the pace of land delivery of 
land to black people. It is a programme that promotes equity in ownership of land in South Africa. In 
2001, South African land reform was redesigned and LRAD was introduced, which still embraced a 
market-assisted approach. According to Obi of the University of the Free State (as cited in DLA 2004d: 
7), although under LRAD the pace has improved compared to SLAG, “the pace has remained 
extremely slow and growing discontent among the poor and landless raises concerns about the future of 
the programme and, indeed democracy”. The lack of funds to ensure the implementation of the land 
reform process constitutes a problem. Therefore, the government needs to mobilize financial resources 
from alternative sources e.g. private and international agencies (David 2005: 33). Partnerships between 
the State and the private sector are also important in order to mobilise financial resources. 
 
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter presented an overview of the land redistribution programme in South Africa during the 
period from 1994 to 1999 and the period from 1999 to 2005. The chapter revealed that during the 
period 1994-1999 the policy was characterised by slow delivery of land reform. Problems such as 
groups that were too large, poor post-transfer support; neglect of provincial and local government 
structures to ensure integration, and limited human resources within the DLA were documented. 
Following the slow pace of the SLAG redistribution, in 1999 the Land Redistribution for Agricultural 
Development (LRAD) programme was born as a new sub-programme of the DLA. Since the 
establishment of LRAD, delivery of land to beneficiaries improved enormously. Although, the delivery 
of land improved during the second five years of democracy, the policy was still faced with problems, 
some of them originally occurring in the SLAG programme. Therefore, some of the authors have 
suggested that in order for land redistribution to pick up its pace in future, radical steps must be taken. 
Some argue that more effort is needed if the State is to meet the obligations imposed by Section 25 (5) 
of the Constitution (1996).  A total of 1 347 943ha (43%) commercial agricultural land was transferred 
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through the redistribution programme. Regardless of significant achievements and a steep learning 
curve for implementers in the DLA and elsewhere, the early years of the programme were subject to 
criticism regarding the slow pace of delivery, the small size of grants relative to the cost of land, and 
the resultant tendency for large groups to pool their grants (People’s Budget Campaign 2005: 20).  
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CHAPTER 4: OVERVIEW OF POLICIES IN SUPPORT 
OF LAND REDISTRIBUTION 
 
4.1 Post-transfer Support   
The Department of Land Affair’s White Paper on South African Land Policy (DLA 1997b) 
distinguishes between equitable distribution of land and the provision of complementary development 
services. Support services, or complementary development support, as specified in the White Paper, 
include assistance with productive and sustainable land use, infrastructure support, farm credit, 
agricultural inputs, and access to markets for farm outputs (DLA 1997b: 16, as cited in Jacob et al, 
2003a: 3).  
 
Since 1994, the SLAG-redistribution programme was criticised for lacking in terms of providing 
sufficient post-transfer support to land reform beneficiaries. The main purpose of the LRAD 
programme was to create black commercial farmers and to provide additional post transfer support to 
them to ensure project sustainability. Jacobs et al (2003a: 19) and Kariuki (2004: 44) dispute that this is 
happening in practice or that holistic post-transfer support and advisory services are being provided, 
even though government institutions such as the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme 
(CASP) and the Micro Agricultural Finance Institutions of South Africa (MAFISA) are designed to 
assist black commercial farmers. The DLA promises in its Strategic Plan 2005 – 2010 (DLA 2005a: 
10) that, “the issue of institutional arrangement to support our beneficiaries once land has been 
transferred is also receiving attention”, but the DLA still needs to resolve problems that face land 
reform at the moment in order to meet its promises. More money needs to be allocated to land reform 
and to the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme to ensure that beneficiaries receive 
sufficient post-transfer support.  
 
The Department of Land Affairs will therefore be developing a comprehensive strategy on what type of 
institutions would be appropriate to provide continuous support, as well as what government 
intervention strategies would be appropriate if it becomes clear that some of the projects are heading 
for collapse. One of the proposals being considered is the Proactive Land Acquisition Strategy (PLAS). 
The Department of Agriculture, particularly its Provincial Department, has been given the mandate to 
provide post-transfers support services as is stated in the LRAD policy. Provincial Departments of 
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Agriculture have been restructured to incorporate Farmer Settlement Support (FSS) units, which are 
intended to coordinate post-transfer support and training. The Department of Agriculture presently 
lacks the resources and expertise required to execute this responsibility successfully. 
 
According to Hall (2004b: 58), it is not only the lack of financial resources that contribute to the delay 
of providing sufficient post-transfer support to beneficiaries, but Provincial Departments of Agriculture 
are also under-capacitated and short-staffed, given the role they are meant to play in supporting land 
reform. Hall (2004b: 58) identified some of the problems that some of PDoAs experienced, such as 
large numbers of unskilled staff, particularly those that inherited old Bantustan agricultural 
bureaucracies. She also states that there have been improvements, with new extension officers being 
hired and trained in some provinces. The Department of Land Affairs’ key mandate is to facilitate the 
transfer of land (Kariuki 2004: 44; Jacobs et al 2003a: 20).  
 
Gwanya, the Chief Land Commission made the following statement in “This Day”, in LANDnews: 
“We need a statutory body separate from land affairs that deals specifically with post-settlement 
support” (DLA 2004c: 6). The Chief Land Commissioner, in the researcher’s opinion realised that not 
providing sufficient post-transfer support to beneficiaries will spoil the land reform programme and 
delay the redistribution process as well. Furthermore, sustainable land reform will not be achieved 
without sufficient post-transfer support to the new black farmers.  
 
Although the redistribution programme (LRAD) between June 2003 and March 2004 settled 1 655 
black farmers and the accumulative figure of beneficiaries of LRAD since 2001 is 19 736, in her 
2004/2005 budget speech Didiza, the Ministry of Land Affairs and Agriculture noted that, “our 
experience of implementing the Land Reform for Agricultural Development (LRAD) and the 
Restitution Programme over the past ten years makes it clear that it is not sufficient to provide 
prospective farmers with access to land without also providing government support for production 
inputs and technical advisory services” (DLA 2004b: 4-5). The Department of Land Affairs has 
committed R210 million for 2004/05 for the initial roll out for the implementation of the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme.  
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Money will be made available to individuals or groups for purposes of erecting fences, dipping services 
infrastructure and infrastructure to support the handling and marketing of livestock. At the same time, 
through the linked programme for food production within the context of the Integrated Food and 
Nutrition Security Programme, DLA shall also work with the provinces and other national departments 
involved in the social cluster to ensure the availability of agricultural starter packs for poor people 
(DLA 2004b: 5). Research by Jacobs (2003a; as cited in Hall and Lahiff, 2004: 2) indicates that 
programmes of both national and provincial departments of agriculture are poorly aligned with DLA’s 
land reform programme, and that the resources allocated have been insufficient to provide even basic 
levels of support to the majority of land reform beneficiaries. Alignment between the Department of 
Land Affairs and National Department of Agriculture apparently improved during the implementation 
of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme in 2004.  
 
Post-transfer support needs more financial resources and attention in order to ensure that land reform is 
successful and sustainable. It is also important to train beneficiaries so that they can manage their 
projects successfully. Kariuki (2004: 70) asserts that, “post-transfer support is essentially about 
providing finance and the technical support needed for beneficiaries to implement the gaols of the 
business plan they have drawn up”. He also states that technical support without the necessary finances 
is inadequate since beneficiaries will not be in a position to purchase the vital farm inputs required for 
the project. Ainslie, Andrew & Shackleton (2003: 19, as cited in Kariuki 2004: 49) contend that 
support with agricultural production is mandated by the relevant provincial Department of Agriculture 
(PDoA), while the private sector or relevant NGOs also provide such assistance. They also state that 
unfortunately only a small section of communities are able to access assistance from these sources.  
According to them, lack of capacity in PDoA is the main constraint. 
 
According to the Department of Land Affairs in its Strategic Plan 2005-2010 (DLA 2005a: 10) one of 
the hard lessons they learned during the First Decade of Democracy is that without investment in skills 
development training, extension services and institutional support for land reform beneficiaries, 
projects that the DLA have implemented at much cost, both human and material, will fail. The DLA 
also argues that in order to ensure sustainability on its projects, the Department of Land Affairs and the 
National Department of Agriculture will jointly administer the Comprehensive Agricultural Support 
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Programme (CASP) to benefit those acquiring agricultural land through state assistance. The quality of 
land delivery is being impacted upon positively by the environmental planning guidelines now in place 
and mapping and integration of our projects into Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) (DLA 2005a). 
 
In addition, the Department of Land Affairs also stresses that they will jointly develop a framework for 
aligning CASP, LRAD and land and agrarian reform. The framework will indicate how CASP funding 
will be allocated and aligned to ensure the necessary support to LRAD projects and land reform 
projects. In addition, the framework will form the basis for an envisaged Memorandum of Agreement 
between the Department of Land Affairs and the National Department of Agriculture (DLA, 2005a: 
23). This is an interesting and promising strategic plan by DLA, which if implemented, will contribute 
to sustainability in land reform programmes Integration of land reform projects into municipal 
Integrated Development Planning (IDP) will help to promote the environmental management of the 
land reform policy. The Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism’s policy document (DEAT 
2002: 12) state that Integrated Development Planning seeks to support the appropriate integration of 
sectoral strategies, in order to achieve the optimal allocation of scarce resources between sectors and 
geographic areas and across the population in a manner that promotes sustainable growth, equity and 
the empowerment of the poor and marginalized.  
 
In her 2005 budget speech, Minister Didiza of the Department of Land Affairs stated that, “the 2005 
Budget sets out additional allocations of R200 million for 2005/06, R300 million for 2006/07 and R350 
million for 2007/08, for the implementation of the Agricultural Black Economic Empowerment 
programme and the agricultural credit scheme, Micro Agricultural Finance Institutions of South Africa 
[MAFISA]. R100 million in 2007/08 is added to the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme 
[CASP] conditional grant” (DLA 2005b: 8). Through CASP, beneficiaries can get government 
assistance in six priority areas, namely: information and knowledge management; advisory and 
regulatory services; training and capacity building; finance; on-farm and off-farm infrastructure and 
marketing.  
 
According to the Ministry of Land Affairs, the R1 billion which was allocated to CASP will enable 
those beneficiaries to experience the new possibilities for growth and economic development in their 
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lives and within their communities. Minister Didiza stated that during the 2005/2006 financial years, 
government will be spending a total of R250 million on CASP. She also contended that on entering its 
second year, CASP aims to continue to provide effective farmer support and streamline the provision 
of services to its beneficiaries.  
 
The Ministry promises that CASP support will reach at least 50 000 beneficiaries in the rural areas, 
particularly in the Rural Development Nodes serviced by the Department of Agriculture (DLA 2005b: 
9-10).  There is a consensus that there is already a gap between progress that the Department of Land 
Affairs has made with providing access to land for black people, and the provision of agricultural 
services to these beneficiaries. There are those who still argue that “…the recent announcement of a 
Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme is encouraging, but its budget allocation is still small 
(R200million in the first years) and the thrust and content of the programme is still unclear” (Cousins 
2005: 4).  
 
Bosman, Deputy-President of Agri-SA said at the conference held in Johannesburg during 2004, “if, 
however, the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) is effectively launched, with 
effective co-operation between all role players, it seem reasonable to expect that service delivery could 
catch up with the backlog to the extent that the government’s objective of providing effective 
agricultural services will materialise over the next ten years” (DLA 2004b: 12).  
 
In addition, in order to enhance post-transfer support through CASP, the co-operation between partners 
and alignment of strategies, clear definition of roles and responsibilities for partners and an approach of 
“management by project” is needed (DLA 2004e). Although there were changes in terms of increasing 
budget allocation and other promises, it is clear that National and Provincial Departments of Land 
Affairs and Agriculture still lack the capacity to provide adequate post-transfer support to land 
redistribution beneficiaries.   
 
According to the Human Sciences Research Council’s (2003: vi) final report, post-settlement support 
of new farmers is now recognised as of critical importance to sustainable development and support is 
being provided by a range of private providers and the Provincial Departments of Agriculture. The 
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report highlighted that, “though individual cases often have success with bringing in private support, 
results from the case studies suggest that in many cases there is still no institutionalised alternative to 
laying the whole burden of training, mentoring and general capacitation on the provincial agriculture 
departments”  (ibid). 
 
The CDE (2005: 13) and HSRC (2003: vi) agree that, “national and provincial departments lack the 
capacity to adequately support land reform beneficiaries”. Broader steps such as “a quite extraordinary 
increase in budget, official capacity, interdepartmental co-ordination, and political consensus will be 
required to achieve government targets” (CDE 2005: 13). Black farmers, however, need the same kind 
of support by the State, as white farmers received during the time of the apartheid government. 
Financial, technical and infrastructural support are the main mechanisms that are needed. Furthermore, 
the July National Land Summit’s delegates felt that more resources for land reform beneficiaries is 
needed in terms of training, implements, loans, mentoring, and also greater co-operation between the 
Department of Land Affairs, which implements land reform, and Provincial Departments of 
Agriculture, which are largely responsible for farmer support (Lahiff 2005b: 1).  
 
4.2. Agricultural Mentorship Programme  
The Government’s mentorship programmes in agriculture have a particular significance in realising the 
vision of various growth and development policies within agriculture (DLA 2005b: 11). Jacobs (2003a: 
12) states, “farmer training is critical for the viability and sustainability of agricultural projects”. The 
programme will assist in skills transfer within the industry, particularly with the assistance of organised 
agribusiness, commodity groups, donors and other bodies.  
 
Additional ways to enhance the technical and management skills of LRAD beneficiaries are through 
mentorship and management programmes. In her 2005 budget speech, Minister Didiza have said that, 
“government call upon those partners to actively engage in the mentorship programme and come up 
with specific frameworks on mentorship programmes within their sector as part of the AgriBEE 
consultation processes. Agricultural SETAs are responsible for the registration and accreditation of 
mentors. In addition, agriculture-aligned SETAs will be expected to submit reports on mentorships 
undertaken and results achieved to the department” (DLA 2005b: 12). The Land Bank also offers a 
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social discount product that encourages neighbouring farmers to mentor new farmers in exchange for 
rebate on interest payments (Jacobs et al 2003a: 20).   
 
The KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Department of Agriculture (PDoA) has developed a mentorship policy 
framework (Jacobs et al 2003a). Some of the agricultural colleges, such as Cedara in KwaZulu-Natal, 
operated by the PDoA, and Elsenburg in the Western Cape, which is operated by the Agricultural 
Research Council (ARC), provide training but these are oriented toward commercial farming and not in 
the language of beneficiaries (Jacobs 2003a: 13).  
 
Jacobs (2003a: 13; as cited in Kariuki 2004: 42) also claim that, “although training needs are identified 
and stipulated in business plans, actual training only starts after transfer, rather than at the time of 
preliminary project approval by the DACs”. For example, in the Western Cape, training was provided 
upfront, as a result it did not correspond with the post-transfer farming activity. The LRAD projects 
driven by the sugar industry in KwaZulu-Natal carry important lessons in this regard. Immediately after 
small-scale farmers have been selected for joint venture projects and about six months prior to transfer, 
the participants are put through an agricultural training programme. Beneficiaries are therefore well 
prepared for the first year, considered the most critical phase of any agricultural project (Jacobs 2003a: 
13). TRAC-Mpumalanga, a land rights NGO, has also developed a three-year mentorship pilot 
programme for redistribution projects in the province (Jacobs et al 2003a: 20 and Kariuki 2004: 56). 
Providing training to land reform beneficiaries before the transfer of land is sustainable in the sense 
that beneficiaries are capacitated and prepared to drive their projects successfully for themselves. 
Although several programmes have been initiated to provide training skills to emergent farmers, it 
seems that more new farmers still lack adequate farming skills (Kariuki 2004: 60).  
 
One of the key problems associated with the LRAD grant structure is its rigid and inflexible nature in 
dealing with the specificities of South Africa’s nine provinces with regard to the land market (Kariuki 
2004: 54). For instance, in provinces where land is expensive such as the Western Cape, Mpumalanga, 
Guateng and North West, people are forced to form large groups so that they can increase the grant 
funds they are eligible for and consequently decrease the loan component they can qualify for from the 
Land Bank (ibid 2004).  
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Leon, the leader of the DA, also calls for skills training for would-be-farmers (Mail & Guardian 
2005b). He says that would-be farmers should be provided with comprehensive courses in agricultural 
management before receiving state assistance (ibid). The researcher thinks this is a valid point in order 
to ensure sustainability in LRAD’s projects. The training courses for aspirant farmers will improve 
productivity and enhance their livelihoods. In addition, according to Leon, providing comprehensive 
courses in agricultural management for the would-be farmers will ensure that land provided to new 
farmers will be a long-term investment, not short-term loss.  
 
The following two tables illustrate the amount of land distributed to farmers as at March 2004. as well 
as the state of farmer training in terms of LRAD, as at April 2004. 
 
  
TABLE 3: LRAD: AMOUNT OF LAND REDISTRIBUTED TO FARMERS, AS AT MARCH 2004 
Province Farmers Area in 
hectares 
Provincial 
proportion of 
total land 
redistribution 
Redistribution 
ratio: hectares 
per farmer 
Eastern Cape 2 122 65 416 16.9% 31 
Free State 1 513 49 420  12.8%  33 
Gauteng  398 2 068  0.5% 5 
Kwazulu-Natal 1 691 37 647 9.7%  22 
Limpopo 368 26 671 6.9% 72 
Mpumalanga 6 479 72 782 18.8% 11 
North West 1 579 35 153 9.1% 22 
Northern Cape 467 53 878 13.9% 115 
Western Cape 5 145 44 450 11.5% 9 
South Africa 19 762 387 485 100. 0% 20 
Source: Department of Agriculture, as cited in SAIRR (2005: 1) 
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TABLE 4: LRAD: STATE OF FARMER SUPPORT AS AT APRIL 2004 
Province Farmers trained Farmers trained 
as a proportion of 
total beneficiaries 
Average cost of 
training per 
farmer 
Eastern Cape 250 11.8% 1 751 
Free State 723 37.8% 745 
Gauteng  115 28.9% 1 652 
KwaZulu-Natal 116 6.9% 3 448 
Limpopo 226 61.4% 3 646 
Mpumalanga 189 2.9% 1 321 
North West 230 14.6% 1 245 
Northern Cape 98 21.0% 1 755 
Western Cape 1 143  22.2% 336 
South Africa 3 090 15.6% 1 127 
 
Source: Department of Agriculture, as cited in SAIRR, (2005: 1-3) 
Note to understanding the above two tables: 
a. This land was redistributed to commercially viable farmers from previously disadvantaged 
communities under the Provision of Land and Assistance Act of 1993. The aim of the farmer 
settlement programme is to transfer 30% of all agricultural land to these farmers by 2014. 
b. Land redistribution only for agricultural use. 
c. Figures should add up vertically but do not, owing to rounding.  
 
Figure 1 below shows that trained farmers make up only 15.6% of all beneficiaries, while 84, 4% of 
new farmers are untrained. Government is still struggling to provide training for the new farmers to 
become sustainable. Minister Didiza acknowledges that State resources to help beneficiaries of land 
reform with capital and skills to work the land they have received have not been enough (SABCNews 
2005). Therefore, comprehensive courses for LRAD beneficiaries are necessary in order to enhance 
sustainability in its projects. Training is important to the success of the land redistribution process. 
According to Bernstein (2005, as cited in Wanneburg 2005: 1),  “to think you can move poor, unskilled 
people onto a farm and say ‘ farm’, it’s not going to happen”.  During the last 11 years many projects 
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have failed for this reason. The CDE report also warns that, “putting more agricultural land in black 
hands without proper training and support could have dire consequences for a region dependent on 
South Africa as a major food producer” (ibid). Training of new farmers, before and after land transfer, 
will promote the sustainability of land redistribution’s projects in South Africa. Proper training and 
support can ensure sustainable livelihoods and food security for the poor black farmers. Lack of 
training can also derail food production and security in South Africa.  
 
FIGURE 1: PROPORTION OF FARMERS TRAINED, MARCH 2004 
Untrained farmers: 84. 4% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Trained farmers: 15.6% 
Source: Department of Agriculture as cited in SAIRR (2005: 3).  
 
4.3. Land Care Programme  
In her budget speech, Minister Didiza states, “without effective resource management, all our well-
meaning policies on economic development cannot prosper if we continue to abuse our water and 
land”. She also states, “it is precisely for this reason why government has set aside approximately R 64 
million towards the Land Care Programme”. Some years back the Land Care Programme has been 
criticised for not promoting sustainable natural resource use in the communal areas. The budget 
allocation was the main problem in this regard (Jacobs et al 2003a: 21). Turner (2001: 4) criticises this 
programme for focusing too much on short-term poverty alleviation through labour-intensive public 
works.  
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The South African government promised that 6 000 ha will be cultivated over the next year and will 
benefit approximately 3 000 households. The Provincial Departments of Agriculture, district and local 
municipalities as well as the Department of Provincial and Local Government will jointly implement 
this project. It is hoped to create jobs opportunities within communities (DLA 2005b: 10). This joint 
project will be helpful in terms of creating employment opportunities, local economic development, 
empowerment of ordinary people and capacity building programmes.  
 
According to Hall (2004b: 59), regardless of these recent improvements, the challenge ahead is to 
stimulate the Provincial Departments of Agricultural, to enhance their skills base to upgrade extension 
services and to provide more capital funds, to enable land reform beneficiaries to invest in and use their 
land productively. Although our land reform programme is not presently doing well in terms of 
ensuring environmental sustainability in its projects, Dekker (2003: 15) insists that, “contemporary 
land reform is also closely linked to ecological and environmental issues”. Land Care Programmes 
need to create long-term employment opportunities for the poor.  
 
4.4 Agricultural Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (Agri – 
BEE) 
Similar to other initiatives to transform the economy and society, land reform is now considered as a 
means of achieving black economic empowerment (Hall 2004b: 59). The Agricultural Broad-Based 
Black Economic Empowerment (AgriBEE) Framework, unveiled by the Minister of Agriculture and 
Land Affairs in July 2004, seems largely consistent with this new direction, despite its use of the term 
“broad-based” (People’s Budget Campaign 2005: 19). The Charter reiterates the existing target of 
redistributing 30 % of agricultural land to black South Africans by 2014, but also set ambitious targets 
for the deracialisation of ownership, management and procurement in the agricultural sector, including 
35 % black ownership of existing and new enterprises by 2008 (NDA 2004b, as cited by Hall 2004b: 
59). Hall (2004b: 59) makes a case that, “the Charter is present largely an agribusiness charter. It is not 
clear what commitments are entailed for the majority of the landowners in the farming sector, nor how 
it will empower farm workers and smallholders who are marginalized within the agricultural sector”. 
Therefore, the current view seems to be that only a minority will benefit from the AgriBEE Charter and 
the poor, who tend to be uneducated, will not benefit on a large-scale.   
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As stated earlier, “economic policy analysts are beginning to suggest that land reform could form a 
central thrust of government’s anti-poverty strategy, and recent government rhetoric implies that it 
should be seen in this light” (Cousins 2005: 3). Cousins also state that policy statements now portray 
land and agrarian reform, as well as the Black Economic Empowerment Charter for the Agricultural 
Sector (Agri-BEE) as part of a strategy to integrate the second economy into the first. The CDE (2005: 
9) reports that these new initiatives raise expectations of much enhanced “delivery”. This move by the 
government is important because it promotes the spirit of sharing between the rich and the poor.  
 
According to CDE (2005: 9), “while the draft AgriBEE framework asks established farmers, co-
operatives, and agribusiness to help achieve the well-known national objective of transferring 30 % of 
agricultural land to blacks by 2014, it also wants them to lease an additional 20 % of ‘high-potential’ 
land to blacks by 2014; and make available another 10 % of farmland to farm workers for their own 
farming activities”. The CDE (2005: 9) declare the government’s targets for agricultural land 
restitution and AgriBEE to be overambitious and unrealistic, raising expectations which cannot be 
fulfilled, especially since the budget provision is too small for what has been promised. The CDE’s 
Report further states that, “development such as these will not be good for investor confidence in the 
South African agricultural sector”. The People’s Budget Campaign (2005: 20) make a case that, “the 
establishment of targets designed to make additional high-value agricultural land available for lease by 
black farmers is welcome, but is likely to have limited impact on economic transformation in the 
industry, especially with respect to poorer communities”. For the charter to be successful, it needs to 
prioritise the needs and interests of the poor and historically marginalised groups.  It must also ensure 
that these groups are socially, economically and environmentally improved or sustainable.  
 
Despite the criticisms above, the Charter (maybe with some amendments) is essential and is one of the 
government’s anti-poverty initiatives to close the wide gap of inequality between the rich and the poor 
in South Africa. Integration of the first economy and the second economy will strengthen sustainable 
development in the agricultural sector, which is presently dominated by white farmers. It will also 
improve economic growth in our country. In order for this AgriBEE to be successful, strong co-
operation and partnership between government departments, private sector, NGOs, civil society 
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organisations, the poor, landless, and farm workers must be promoted and be a reality. The Charter 
should empower black farmers who are still marginalized within the farming sector. These farmers 
should be empowered through training skills in order to achieve agricultural skills so that they can 
produce sustainable production from their own farms. This is another government initiative to ensure 
that there is equality in the agricultural sector, presently dominated by white farmers. 
 
4.5. CONCLUSION 
The researcher assessed the contribution which the government’s Land Redistribution Programme, 
specifically the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme is making to 
transform the unequal distribution of landownership in South Africa since its inception To speed up the 
redistribution process, however, various policies are needed to support it, such as the subdivision of 
agricultural land. The lack of sufficient post-transfer support for beneficiaries is broadly recognized. 
The Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) was initiated during 2004 to provide 
adequate post-transfer support to land redistribution beneficiaries in South Africa, showing that the 
South African government and particular the DLA and PDoA are concerned about the sustainability of 
its land reform projects. Mentorship and Land Care Programmes were also fully recognised by the 
government to empower new farmers through the transfer of skills. Sharing of skills from better to 
lower skilled farmers is essential to empower those who are engage in commercial farming. The 
AgriBEE programme was unveiled to balance skewed ownership in the agricultural sector.  Training 
and post-transfer support are the critical parts to the success of the LRAD programme in South Africa. 
However, the government is still struggling to ensure that new farmers get sufficient training in order to 
promote sustainable development in LRAD’s projects. The following chapter will provide an 
evaluation of LRAD. 
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CHAPTER 5: CRITICAL EVALUATION OF CERTAIN 
ELEMENTS OF LRAD 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This section will critically evaluate certain elements of LRAD, inter alia by looking at the different 
views held by various parties on land policy. In order to do this, similarities and differences put forth 
by different authors on the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme in 
South Africa will be examined. 
 
5.2. Achievements  
The main purpose and challenges facing land redistribution in South Africa is to achieving greater 
equality in land ownership and improve the livelihoods of rural people. During the first ten years of 
land reform, most land has been transferred through the redistribution programme (Hall 2004: 25). This 
section will discuss and assess the contribution that the government’s land redistribution programme, 
specifically LRAD, is making to transform skewed landownership and promote development in the 
rural economy.  
 
There are those who agree that the delivery of land under the LRAD programme has accelerated since 
2001 (Jacobs et al 2003a: 11, Hall 2004: 9). According to the DLA (2004e: 4), Minister Didiza states 
that, “between June 2003 and March 2004 we settled 16 55 black farmers through LRAD and the 
cumulative figure of beneficiaries of LRAD since we launched the programme in 2001 is 19 736”. 
During the National Land Summit in July 2005, the DLA came up with the new following statistics on 
land delivery:  
 
Table 5: The latest statistics on land reform delivery 
 
 Ministry (Oct 2004) Ministry (July 2005) Changed 
% 
Redistribution 1 732 111 1 347 943 -22.18 
Tenure 
reform 
145 258 100 175 -31.04 
State land 770 000 772 626 0.34 
Restitution 810 292 916 470 13.10 
TOTAL 3 457 661 ha 3 137 214 ha -9.27 
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs, October 2004; July 2005 cited in PLAAS (2005b: 
3).  
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The latest statistics on land reform delivery come from the publication issued by the Department of 
Land Affairs and Agriculture for the National Land Summit in July 2005. These figures shows that 
approximately 3.1 million hectares of land have been delivered under all aspects of the land reform 
programme (presumably up to June 2005), equivalent to 3% of the total of white-owned commercial 
farmland in 1994. 
 
These figures are, substantially lower than those presented by the Minister of Agriculture and Land 
Affairs before the public hearings on the pace of land reform convened by the Portfolio Committee on 
Agriculture and Land Affairs of the National Assembly on 18 October 2004. There, the Minister 
reported that approximately 3.5 million hectares had been transferred (as of 31 September 2004). This 
drop of over 9%, is largely accounted for by a decrease of 384 168 ha in the figure for redistribution. 
This figure for tenure reform has also declined, while the only significant increase is in the figure for 
restitution (PLAAS 2000b: 3).  According to PLAAS (2005b: 3), “[i]t would appear that the need for 
accurate and reliable data on the performance of the land reform programme is as pressing as ever”. It 
seems that there is a lack of correct and consistent statistics in terms of delivery of land to blacks.  The 
figures also symbolise that LRAD is not moving as fast as it was expected in 2001 when it was 
launched. 
 
The total land redistributed through redistribution and tenure reform, as of September 2004, was nearly 
1.9 million hectares (Hall 2004: 25). Organisations such as the South African Communist Party, Dora 
Tamana Co-operative Centre, SAAPAWU, FAWU and the Landless People’s Movement, criticize the 
implementation of land reform process in South Africa. They assert that the process of redistribution is 
going very slowly (David 2005: 17). Since 1994 to 2004, only 4.2% of the 80% of agricultural land in 
the hands of white farmers was redistributed (David 2005: 11). On the other hand, Minister Didiza says 
the country has made impressive progress on land reform during its first ten years of democracy 
(SABCNews 2005). The Minister, however, also acknowledged that there are still challenges ahead. 
For example, she says that to date government has settled about 62 000 land claims and transferred 
ownership of about 900 000 hectares of land to communities at a cost of R1.9 billion (SABCNews 
2005). By the end of 2002, a total of 1 480 835 hectares of land had been transferred through land 
redistribution to an estimated 130 000 households (Hall, Jacob and Lahiff, 2003, as cited in Kariuki 
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2004: 11). The one discernible trend in the redistribution programme has been an increase in the 
amount of land being transferred year on year, but a decline in the number of people benefiting. This is 
to be expected, with the change in the grant structure that allows households to obtain larger grants. In 
2004, when South Africa reached ten years of democratic government, the country has reached a 
critical moment in the development of its approach to land reform. So far, by December 2004, it had 
only transferred an area equal to 4, 3 % of commercial agricultural land to blacks. This figure includes 
the transfer of state land; and if this is excluded, the percentage drop to 3, 4 % (CDE 2005: 7). 
 
Table 6: Land redistribution, 1994 to 2004 
 
 
Year 
 
Total of hectares 
 
No of project 
Average project 
size (ha) 
1994 71 656 5 14 331 
1995 26 905 12 2 242 
1996 72 416 49 1 478 
1997 142 336 97 1 467 
1998 205 044 236 869 
1999 245 481 156 1 574 
2000 222 351 236 942 
2001 249 302 400 623 
2002 299 969 742 404 
2003 158 668 502 316 
2004(to Sept) 183 625 251 732 
Total 1 877 754 2 686 699 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Land Affairs (2004, as cited in People’s Budget Campaign 2005: 
21) 
 
The People’s Budget Campaign (2005: 20) illustrate that, “by 31 August 2004, a total of 187 7754 
hectares of land had been transferred under the land redistribution programme to 153 545 households 
plus 39 221 individuals” (see table 6). However, despite significant achievements and a steep learning 
curve for implementers in the DLA and elsewhere, the early years of the programme were subject to 
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much criticism regarding the slow pace of delivery, the small size of grants relative to the cost of land, 
and the resultant tendency for large groups to pool their grants (ibid). 
 
In its Strategic Plan 2005 – 2010 (DLA, 2005a: 15), the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) has 
promised to increase the pace of the redistribution programme and ensure that the land redistributed 
will improve the rural livelihoods of beneficiaries and have a positive impact on rural communities’ 
welfare. The Department also promised that to further contribute to rural development, the alignment 
of LRAD and CASP will contribute to increasing the agricultural performance of beneficiaries on 
transferred land. Since 2001 when the LRAD programme stated, a total of 19 736 new black farmers 
have reportedly been resettled (CDE 2005: 12). 
 
5.3. Market-Led Approach to Land Redistribution   
Eleven years after white rule ended, most of South Africa’s agricultural land remains in white hands 
and some of the representatives at the July 2005 Land Summit felt that the government’s target of 30% 
under black ownership by 2015, cannot be achieved under the current approach (Apps 2005: 2). It 
became clear that a majority of delegates felt strongly that the way the current market led approach in 
land delivery works, does not enable the State to deliver land faster. It was felt that where the market 
mechanism on its own does not work, the State must intervene (Apps 2005: 2). Representatives of the 
recent July Land Summit agreed that market-driven land reform was not working because land 
purchase grants were too small, landowners have been able to inflate prices and there is no compulsion 
on landowners to sell (PLAAS 2005b: 2). 
 
The South African government has adopted a market-driven approach to redistribute land. This 
approach utilizes the forces of the market to redistribute land and is largely based on the willing-buyer-
willing-seller principle. However, many academic writers, researchers, students, NGOs, landless 
people and many more argue that the commitment by the government to a neo-liberal macroeconomic 
programme and market-driven capitalist approach in land reform programme has helped to slow down 
land redistribution during the first, as well as the second phase of democracy (Moyo & Yeros 2005: 
150). A purely market approach to land redistribution may not lead to positive outcomes in South 
Africa; instead it may perhaps strengthen the skewed distribution of landownership between white and 
black people. In other words, the market approach will not on its own correct the inequality in land 
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ownership but should be aligned with other non-market-related programmes. There are some land 
reform experts such as Cousins (2002a: 9) who contend that market-driven land redistribution 
programme imposes extreme difficulties in terms of integrating projects with other rural development 
processes.  
 
According to the National Department of Agriculture (NDA)’s Strategic Plan (2001: 16; cited in 
Greenberg, 2002: 16), LRAD, “strengthen the philosophy of market-assisted land redistribution of 
earlier land reform”, which means that the LRAD programme will continue the struggle to overcome 
the legacy of unequal land distribution, poverty and environmental degradation in both rural and urban 
areas. The policy is also struggling to produce sufficient results in terms of improving the lives of the 
new entrants in commercial farming sector. Efficiency and equity will not easily happen under a 
market-led redistribution programme. A holistic approach and the integration of economic, social and 
environmental factors in the land reform policy is essential for promoting sustainable development.  
 
“The policy which initially guided the land redistribution programme was very general, and often 
contradictory in that the goals of providing land for the poorest of the poor, and promoting economic 
growth and environmental sustainability was not necessarily compatible” (McIntosh & Vaughan 2000: 
227). Kariuki (2004: 10) argues that the market-based approach is often seen as paternalistic, 
patronizing and ahistorical in that it does not recognise perceived injustices or non-monetized rights to 
land. Equally, it does not recognize the financial weaknesses of rural black people as a result of 
apartheid policy. It is also argued that the potential for land reform to succeed is compromised by 
current initiatives, which stress the market as a distributive mechanism (Kariuki 2004: 10). The 
problems that are outlined here had caused a negative impact on the rate of delivery the Department of 
Land Affairs could embark on, as noted earlier. 
 
The land redistribution programme cannot meet its original purpose of enhancing the livelihoods of the 
poor, unless the marginalized groups such as poor people, women, unemployed, disabled, young and 
HIV/AIDS people’s needs can be practically served, and environmentally sustainable projects can be 
promoted. Land redistribution can only achieve sustainable development when the integration of 
economic, social and environmental factors is seriously incorporated in our land policy in South Africa. 
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It is not only the amalgamation of these factors that can contribute to a sustainable redistribution 
programme in South Africa but the willingness of the State to practice its powers to expropriate land, 
increased budgets, more professionals in the land reform sector, proper support programmes to 
beneficiaries and the contributions of others as well.  
 
Haar & Zoomers (2000: 69) agree that, “little is known about the functioning of land markets as an 
instrument for achieving sustainable development”. According to them, the market-led approach to 
development is not designed to redistribute resources such as land to those who were previously 
disallowed to access land. Policy makers must try by all means to provide an alternative policy in order 
to speed up the land redistribution process in South Africa. Therefore, the government have no choice 
but to also use expropriation as an alternative to speed up the process. “The market-based approach to 
land redistribution has been rationalised on the basis of efficiency. This rationale is to ensure that 
efficiency in the agricultural sector is maintained, so as to be able to maintain or even improve the 
current production level of the country and ensure food self-sufficiency” (Thwala 2003: 14). Yet, the 
agricultural sector is still experiencing problems of inequality. Agricultural farming in South Africa is 
still divided. Small-scale farming or subsistence farming is still marginalised while commercial 
farming is regarded as the best industry in terms of boosting economic growth in this country. 
 
According to Greenberg (2003:1), a market-centred approach in land reform in South Africa, which 
was adopted in 1994, is biased towards those with resources. Hence, the poor and landless will be 
excluded from the same development that is designed to help them. Moreover, Greenberg (2003: 2) 
claims that, “markets allocate resources on the basis of ‘effective demand’; goods and services flow 
towards those who can pay the market rate for them”. He further states that as a result of this approach, 
the majority are marginalized from the same development process that is meant to benefit them. 
Because of the market system in land reform, the State plays a small role to assist the previous 
disadvantaged groups in acquiring agricultural land. Lahiff & Rugege (2002a: 8) contend that this 
dependence on the market, which continued after 1999 when the new Land Reform Ministry took over, 
has exposed itself to be slow and burdensome. According to them this approach cannot meet the needs 
of either sellers, buyers or the State, unless bolder steps can be taken. 
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There is growing recognition that the market system alone will not transfer land to poor farmers 
without adequate or concerted efforts by the State to eliminate or remove advantages favouring large-
scale producers (International Crisis Group 2004: 192). 
 
There are those who also agree that “redistribution of land through the market is problematic in two 
ways: it ignores the lack of purchasing power of blacks and more importantly, it is a blatant disregard 
for history because blacks are essentially asked to buy back what had been wrestled from them by 
force” (Irogbe 2003: 24). The land market approach overlooks an important tenet of “property rights” 
law in South Africa, namely that it has historically been applied with double standards (ibid 2003: 24). 
Another problem of the market approach to land is that it creates an opening for only a small minority 
of blacks, leaving the majority land hungry (ibid 2003: 24). Similarly, Greenberg (2003: 172) points 
out that, “market-driven neo-liberal policies based on land reform programmes ensure that land belongs 
to those who can pay for it”. South Africa’s market-led land reform is consistent with the government’s 
present macro-economic orientation and notions of the roles of the State and market.    
 
Kariuki (2004: 10) supports the above view by stating, “the potential for far-reaching land reform is 
restricted by current initiatives stressing market forces as the chief mechanism for land redistribution”. 
He also states that Markets are never truly free, they are bound by social and political power-relations, 
which determine their regulation. According to Thwala in the LANDNews document (DLA, 2003a: 
21), the South African government has failed to fulfil its obligations to the landless by choosing a 
market-driven approach to land reform. 
  
Where there is unequal distribution of resources (such as clean water, sanitation, electricity and land in 
particular) there will be no sustainable development. And where there is equality in distribution of 
resources among people, there is a much larger chance of sustainable development. The Land 
redistribution process under the market approach is struggling to redress the unequal distribution of 
land between white and black people in South Africa. To substantiate, Wegerif (2004: 41) agrees that, 
“Clearly the programme is falling dramatically short of its own targets and making a negligible impact 
on the unequal and highly concentrated patterns of land ownership”.  South Africa is faced with 
chronic problems and constraints in land issues, which have clear roots in the dispossession of Africans 
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under colonialism and apartheid, and the powerful legacy this has left both in terms of outright 
suffering and also in the historical memory.  
 
5.4. The “Willing – Buyer, Willing – Seller” (WBWS) Approach 
The slow progress, according to most civil society, trade union, NGOs, church organisations, 
academics and political party representatives who met at the recent National Land Summit in 
Johannesburg, was a effect of the willing-buyer, willing-seller policy  (Howell 2005: 3). The Summit 
was organised to address the complexities of land reform in South Africa. The WBWS policy was seen 
by the delegates as the key matter to the success of land redistribution in South Africa. However, the 
Summit concluded with the government pledging to consider scrapping the WBWS process but 
according to Apps (2005: 1) saying little on what would replace it. There was disagreement about the 
role of the market in delivering of land to blacks. Most delegates at the Summit share the same feeling 
that land reform should not be market-led, but others, such as AgriSA, disagree.  The Summit agreed 
that the WBWS principle is the same as the market-driven approach. The Land Summit delegates asked 
the government to use expropriation as it provided for in the Constitution (1996).  
 
This section will give an overview of the different views of people about the willing-buyer, willing-
seller (WBWS) principle in delivering agricultural land to blacks in South Africa. The African National 
Congress (ANC) has since 1994 adopted a market-driven land reform programme that embraces the 
WBWS principle. The WBWS provision occurs when private land has to be purchased and the owner 
is a willing seller. Hall (2004b: 56-57) states that the confidence in this principle resulted in ad hoc 
land transfers that are isolated from wider processes of development such as local economic 
development, and delivery of infrastructure and services. The government intended to use this principle 
to redistribute 30% of agricultural land from white farmers to black South Africans by 2015. However, 
no real progress has been made in redistribution of agricultural land to black owners. For example, over 
the past 10 years of freedom, the government has only redistributed about 1% of agricultural land, 
according to Leon of the Democratic Alliance (cited in Mail & Guardian 2005b). According to Jacobs 
(2003:1) the availability of land for redistribution continues to be limited by the unwillingness of 
landowners to sell.  
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According to the DLA (2003b: 33), “the willing-seller side of the equation is an obstacle to any form of 
systematic designation of land for redistribution”. The willing-seller wants to get rich overnight by 
asking high prices for land without any interest in the redistribution programme. The land redistribution 
programme relies heavily on the voluntary sale of land by current owners who, according to Cousins 
(2002a: 7), “cannot be assumed to be motivated by the spirit of transformation”.  
 
Cousins (2002a: 7) states that, “the implementation of the redistribution programme is heavily 
dependent on a private party – current landowners – who have a vested interest in the envisaged 
transactions and can be reasonably be assumed to wish to maximise their own interest”. As a result, the 
pace of the land redistribution programme has been slow. There are those that feel that some white 
farmers are not willing to embrace land redistribution, and have a tendency of asking high prices for 
their land. There are those who dispute that the market-based programme and racism among 
landowners who have allegedly refused to sell their land to black applicants is an issue (Hall 2004b: 
56). Furthermore, landowners in South Africa can easily refuse to sell their land to beneficiaries for 
land reform because it is their rights to do so (Mudzwiti, 2002). This attitude by some white farmers 
may lead to the failure of the redistribution programme. Although, the State and DLA have a right to 
expropriate land for land reform in terms of the Constitution of 1996, they were reluctant to use these 
powers. The National Land Summit has urged the State to use these powers to speed up the delivery of 
land to blacks by 2015.   
 
For instance, the unwillingness of white farmers to sell their land at fair prices is the reason why ‘in 
August 2003 a senior land official reportedly warned white farmers that if they did not co-operate, a 
situation similar to Zimbabwe was not far off. He attacked farmers who were asking too much for their 
land, accusing them of making land reform unworkable (CDE 2005: 8). In addition, Lahiff (2005a: 2) 
contends that a, “willing-buyer, willing-seller principle (WSWB) has granted enormous discretionary 
power to landowners to influence the pace and direction of land reform in South Africa, tantamount to 
a veto over the land reform process”. Therefore, more state involvement is needed in this situation. To 
substantiate, according to Nzimande of the SACP (SABCnews, 2004: 1) “white commercial farmers 
were stumbling blocks to land and agrarian reform because they resisted the transfer of productive land 
to the South African majority”.  
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Unequal distribution of agricultural land between white and black South Africans will prevail and will 
not be corrected if the government rely on the WBWS principle alone. Cousins told the Mail & 
Guardian (2005a: 2) that the willing-buyer, willing-seller system rests on landowner‘s willingness to 
sell at prices the State consider reasonable, and to make their land available for sale. He further states 
that despite a recent legal amendment allowing the Minister of Land Affairs to expropriate, the 
government has been hesitant to expropriate farms where negotiations have broken down. In other 
words, the government is not presently prepared to use expropriation to fast track the redistribution 
process. Only one farm in the North West has been expropriated for land reform purposes (Groenewald 
2005).   
 
Greenberg (2002: 16) makes a case that privatisation of State land is one of the fundamental features of 
the land reform programme and that State land should rather be transferred to land reform 
beneficiaries. He also states that privatisation not only opens up more opportunities for potential 
investment in the future, but also allows for the redistribution of some land without white landowners 
having to give up any of the land under their control unless they choose to do so.  
 
According to Dixon-Gough (1999: 7), “the process of land privatisation and re-privatisation has tended 
to create inefficient patterns of land use, with many farmers being in the position of owning several 
small land parcels”. The willing-buyer, willing-seller approach promotes the process of privatisation of 
land in South Africa, which led to the minimisation of access to land by the historically disadvantaged 
groups. The consequences of this principle in land reform spoil the redistribution process in South 
Africa. For example, Lahiff (2005a: 2) contends that, “…a co-ordinated effort by landowners to refuse 
to sell to any land reform beneficiary could bring the entire land redistribution programme to a halt”.  
 
Cousins & Kepe (2002: 3-4) call for radical reform and state that, “…a large-scale redistribution of 
land and resources, accompanying by the securing of tenure rights, in practice as well as in law, is 
required for long-term sustainability’. A state-driven approach and expropriation of land to blacks is 
required. Lahiff of the Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) at the University of the 
Western Cape argues that the willing-buyer, willing-seller policy ensures that land reform in South 
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Africa remains expensive and that the government should adopt the approach mandated by the 
Constitution of 1996, which allows expropriation (Insession 2004: 14). However, thus far the 
government has not been keen to expropriate land to speed up the redistribution process and to fulfil its 
constitutional commitment.  
 
Cousins (2002a: 12) contends that land redistribution (as manifested in both SLAG and LRAD) has 
combined market–based land acquisition and a highly bureaucratic project planning process. He argues 
that the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of this approach is clear, and flows from the fact that the least 
appropriate and useful aspects of both approaches have been combined.  
 
There are other people like Crosby (Democratic Union of Africa; 2001: 83) of Agri-South Africa who 
support a land reform programme that include an orderly, sustainable process underpinned by 
legislation and based on the WBWS market principles.  According to her, a WBWS policy is efficient 
and effective and it needs to be respected to achieve positive results in our land redistribution 
programme. Some authors relate the programme to the fact that agricultural production covers a 
significant portion of the existing GDP and also plays a role in attaining foreign markets. They point 
out that not only the issues of redistribution and poverty must be of concern but also the viability of the 
existing commercial agriculture sector (SAERT; 1991: 2). This is also an important aspect, because in 
Zimbabwe, parts of their economic problems are due to the collapse of their agricultural sector. In other 
words, any negative measures taken against the commercial agricultural sector would mean affecting 
the whole economy adversely, as food output would be disrupted and reduced, with detrimental 
consequences for domestic consumption, production and exports (De Klerk 1991: 37). 
 
Crosby, who is a Parliamentary Liaison and Land Policy Adviser for AgriSA says in the Cape Argus 
(2005: 12) that, “they are concerned that farmers whose land is to be expropriated might not be 
compensated at market-related prices that will allow them to continue farming elsewhere”. She states 
on behalf of AgriSA that they are not convinced that they have reached a point where government 
needs to start interfering in the market. Ramuka of the Land Access Movement of South Africa 
(Lamosa) rejects Crosby’s view that farmers whose land has been expropriated would lose out because 
they would have to sell at a below the market price and re-enter the market elsewhere at market-related 
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prices (Cape Argus 2005: 12). Ramuka stresses that the government’s intervention does not mean it 
will do so without taking cognisance of the market value of land. In other words, government will not 
eradicate the market system in land reform but should harmonize it with other policies.  
 
AgriSA states that the economic contribution of agriculture was already under threat and that the 
current land reform approach further jeopardised this sector. While it recognised that transformation 
was essential, land reform could not be achieved if stability and output were affected by unresolved 
land claims and inadequate technical support to new farmers. In addition, AgriSA president Bosman 
says the calls for the scrapping of the WBWS system were misinformed because even under the 
expropriation system, market value of the land had to be paid (Insession 2004: 15).  AgriSA also say 
that there is a lot of land available for redistribution other than land presently farmed commercially, but 
such redistribution does not take place due to the red tape created by government. AgriSA cited an 
example of a farmer who said he had been struggling for years to sell his land and the State had not 
responded to his letters.  
 
In relation to the free market system in dealing with this issue (willing-buyer, willing-seller) Payze (as 
cited in Minnaar 1994: 3) oppose this principle as an inadequate solution and gives two reasons for 
this: Firstly, whites, currently holding deeds, have not obtained these within the parameters of a proper 
free-market system while the original owners were forcefully removed, often without any 
compensation whatsoever. Secondly, very few blacks can presently afford to participate in a free 
market system. The poor black people will therefore remain excluded from market-assisted willing-
buyer, willing-seller based land reform. Additionally, those without title deeds will also be excluded 
from the free market process, although they might legitimately lay claim to certain pieces of land. Thus 
it seems that the free market system is not only inadequate, but will also keep most of the land under 
the control of the white minority (Minnaar 1994: 3).   
 
After arguing that repealing the instrumental acts of apartheid would not be enough without assessing 
their legacies, Minnaar (1994: 31) states that the free market in land reform would not significant uplift 
the rural or landless poor, which is the group that need the most assistance, as they have no money to 
buy land. According to him, it’s one thing to ensure the rights to buy the land but another to be given 
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the ability to buy land and use it productively. In order to deal with these two opposing views and 
override the complexity of equity and sustainability of production there are different propositions.  
 
The National Land Committee complains that the market-driven conditions coupled with policies to 
achieve 30 % black ownership of agricultural land by 2015 would entrench the middle class and benefit 
only a small black elite. On the other hand, the Landless People’s Movement complained that the 
Department of Agriculture’s LRAD programme did not recognise that landless people often need land 
for reasons other than agriculture. It calls for the market-based system to be scrapped and for restitution 
to be offered to people dispossessed when white people first arrived in South Africa in numbers in 
1652.  
 
Leon of the Democratic Alliance warns that rejection of this principle by many delegates at the Land 
Summit means land reform in South Africa, “has reached a potentially dangerous turning point” (M&G 
2005b). He said, the government’s plans to re-examine this principle threatens to, “reignite one of the 
most contentious issues in our society”. In addition, rejection of the willing-buyer, willing-seller 
principle could also frighten away foreign investors. Leon also comments that estimates of the number 
of black South Africans who want to become farmers may have been exaggerated. The CDE (2005: 14) 
states that there are fewer black South Africans that want to farm (only 9%), than is commonly 
supposed – most people according to this report, would rather have jobs and houses in urban areas or a 
place to stay in rural areas.  The scrapping of the WBWS principle as many commentators suggested in 
the Land Summit of July 2005, will destabilise our economic growth and reduce the interests of foreign 
investment. Land Affairs Minister Didiza view is that the willing-buyer, willing-seller principle should 
not go out of the window, to be replaced by expropriation (Boyle 2005: 6).  She believes there is a 
place for both methods. 
 
The recent Land Summit has rejected the WBWS principle as a basis for land reform in South Africa 
(Cape Argus 2005: 12). AgriSA, the only opposition to the Summit’s recommendation, warns that any 
departure from the principle would set a dangerous new model (Cape Argus 2005). On the first day of 
the Summit, Deputy President Mlambo-Ngcuka said that adherence to the WBWS principle was 
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slowing down land reform in South Africa. She declares that this principle must be reviewed 
(Groenewald 2005). Many stakeholders at the Summit welcomed this idea.  
 
Cousins (as cited in Groenewald 2005: 1) states that the Deputy President’s announcement at the 
National Land Summit was a shift in policy and a clear sign that the government realised South 
Africa’s land reform programme was not yielding the desired results. On the opposite side, Bosman of 
AgriSA disagrees with those who blame the WBWS principle for the slow pace of the redistribution 
process (Hall 2005: 7).  
 
Bosman stresses that it is not the WBWS principle that contributes to the slow pace of the 
redistribution process but the lack of enough money from the government’s side. In addition, AgriSA 
shows that in this year’s budget there was R2. 7 billion for restitution and only R770 million for land 
redistribution (Hall 2005: 7). They also came up with the following figures that, “in the legal 
framework of restitution, 812 million hectares were transferred, whereas 1.78 million hectares were 
transferred through redistribution”. Therefore, according to AgriSA, the problem is not with the 
willing-buyer, willing-seller principle. AgriSA states that the State will dictate the pace of reform, 
through allocation of budgets (Hall 2005:7).   
 
Matlala, the President of the National African Farmer’s Union (Nafu) disagrees with AgriSA’s views 
that a WBWS approach is the best way to manage land reform. He feels that the WBWS concept has 
seen prices of land escalating beyond the reach of black farmers (Ndebele 2005: 20-21). Matlala 
maintains that, “some farmers have used the willingness of foreign buyers to spend large sums of 
money on acquiring land, therefore overpricing their farms” (Groenewald 2004). He contends that this 
is making it difficult for blacks to access the land. In addition, in its submission to the portfolio 
committee on agriculture and land affairs, PLAAS blamed the market-based approach for the slow pace 
of land reform (Groenewald 2004: 5).  
 
The Landless People’s Movement (LPM) and the National Land Committee (NLC) declared that the 
WBWS model is “doomed to failure”. Pheko of the Pan African Congress (PAC) insists that the 
“willing-buyer, willing-seller principle will not solve the land question in South Africa” (SABCNews 
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2005). Pheko also warns, “The present land reform policy of this government can only perpetuate land 
dispossession and landlessness of African people”. According to him, the land reform programme 
repeats what the NP’s land reform programme did to African people. The new land reform does not 
change anything, instead it continues to oppress the poor and those who were previously marginalized 
under the apartheid government.  
 
In order to speed up the redistribution process, Matthew, spokesperson for the chief land commissioner 
says, “but we are encouraging land owners… to offer reasonable prices for their land” (Groenewald 
2004). A donor government’s official commented that the WBWS approach “should be the basis of 
land reform efforts, but don’t expect it alone to solve the problem” (International Crisis Group 2004: 
182). In addition, this principle can play a critical role in terms of redistributing land equally to 
previously disadvantaged people and to reduce poverty but it needs to be complemented by other 
policies to increase agricultural productivity and promote integrated rural development.  
 
Moyo of the African Institute for Agrarian Studies told the National Land Summit in Johannesburg that 
the WBWS concept is the “opposite of development” because farmers decide what land to sell, when to 
sell it and what it should cost (Musgrave 2005). Moyo states that, “if you want to develop people, it 
won’t happen under this principle” (Musgrave 2005). In the same trend, Tseehama, The Permanent 
Secretary for Land in Namibia told the Summit that the willing-buyer, willing-seller principle has also 
failed in his country. He told the delegates that his government has decided to expropriate more land 
and the land of foreign absentee landlords will be the first to be expropriated (ibid).  
 
In order for the land redistribution programme to speed up, the South African government needs to put 
pressure on white landowners to give up some of their land. According to the International Crisis 
Group (ICG) (2004), a, “land tax should be introduced to encourage larger owners to sell land and 
combined with subdivision, make available a large pool of commercial farmland and introduce 
incentives for smaller farmers”. However, land reform beneficiaries should be free from an obligation 
[to pay tax] for ten years (ibid). A land tax would not remove the landowner veto over sales, but it 
would be expected to increase pressure on landowners to release land onto the market, and could also 
serve to dampen land prices (Lahiff 2005a: 3). Bosman of AgriSA opposed the calling of a land tax in 
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the Summit as an alternative to large-scale land redistribution, as he feels that “the viability of a land 
tax is uncertain, since most commercial farmers are small businesses and are not very profitable” (Hall 
2005: 12). AgriSA is convinced that land reform is in everyone’s interest, so everyone will have to pay 
for it through a tax (Hall 2005).  
 
Many land stakeholders have also supported expropriation at non-market related prices, as it is already 
mentioned in the Constitution of 1996 as a cheap option than paying market-related prices for farms 
(Groenewald 2004: 5). Mngxitana, Programmer Director of the NLC’s land rights campaigns 
pronounces that, “the government can also pay a flat rate to farmers for their land”. Mngxitana states 
that this would be feasible because, “there is nothing in the Constitution that suggests that market 
compensation must be paid when land is redistributed for land reform” (Groenewald 2004). Hall agrees 
with those who called for expropriation and a non-market option price in the redistribution process to 
speed up the pace. She points out that the government may be able to bring down the cost of acquiring 
land for land reform purposes to some extent by expropriating land and paying “just and equitable” 
compensation, as stated by the Constitution (1996), rather than market prices (Groenewald 2004).  
 
“This potential savings to the fiscus need to be weighed against the potential backlash from farmers 
and investors” (Groenewald 2004). Lahiff (2005a: 3) points out that granting the State the right of first 
refusal to purchase land before it is offered for sale on the market is another option. Mnisi of LPM says 
that the government will have to move away from the “failed” market-led WBWS land reform 
programme, or any other policy that requires poor people to buy back stolen land (Groenewald 2004).  
Hall challenges that a state-driven process of land confiscation is not on the cards politically, though 
community occupations of unutilised land may become more common in the future.   
 
The Department of Land Affair (DLA) makes a case in it’s Strategic Plan 2005 – 2010 (2005a: 21-22). 
They state that they will accelerate the pace of delivery on land redistribution to ensure that they get 
closer to achieving the target by 2015. In order for the DLA to meet its objectives, problems such as 
small budgets for land reform, the lack of human resources and financial assistance for beneficiaries 
and others need to be challenged and improved.  
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There was disagreement on the issue of a fixed land size and also on the role of a land ceiling. There 
are those such as Siyabulela of NERPO, who insists that the ceiling and subdivision should depend on 
the type of land use. The Summit recommended that the WBWS system written into the Constitution 
(1996) should be abandoned in favour of aggressive expropriation (Boyle 2005: 6). In addition to this, 
Palmer as cited in the LANDNews document (DLA 2003c: 19), concluded that, “if the ‘willing-buyer, 
willing-seller’ has been a constraint in the past, and it is now judged to be irrelevant, it should be 
dropped from the agenda altogether”.  
 
This section identified that the willing-buyer, willing-seller principle in land reform is not working and 
need to be reviewed by government. State intervention is also needed in this case to facilitate the 
process.  
 
To conclude, Ntsebenza identifies three main obstacles to land redistribution: 
• The WBWS principle. There seems to be broad consensus that this principle is one of the key 
obstacles to land delivery. Not everyone agrees, however, but there is broad consensus. 
• The price of land is an obstacle. There is broad consensus that the price of land is too high 
and makes it difficult for the Department of Land Affairs to budget for an effective land 
delivery programme. 
• Foreign ownership of land not only makes it difficult to get land but also impacts on the price 
of the land. Because people come with foreign currency, they inflate prices for prime land in 
particular (Hall 2005: 1).  
 
Several consensuses have pointed out that the market led willing-buyer, willing-seller approach in land 
delivery is not working effectively. They stated that a market approach on its on does not work 
efficiently, it need to be assisted by the other alternative mechanisms. The National Land Summit’s 
delegates in Johannesburg have radically called for a State-driven approach, with expropriation of land. 
The current policy (WBWS) has failed during the first phase and second phase of democracy to ensure 
positive or sustainable results in our redistribution programme. The researcher believes that the deputy 
president Mlambo-Ngcuka was right when she says that it is time for South Africa to learn a lesson 
from Zimbabwe. The deputy president, according to the researcher’s view, does not mean that South 
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Africa should forcefully removed white farmers from their commercial farms, but she insists that the 
white farmers should be more co-operative in terms of releasing land for redistribution programme. 
Therefore, in order for South Africa to avoid what happened in Zimbabwe, strong collaboration and 
more commitment between the government and white farmers is necessary.  
 
5.5 Who are Beneficiaries?  
Following the National Land Summit’s resolutions, beneficiaries of land reform, particularly LRAD, 
should be the poor and the historically disadvantaged (Hall 2005: 9). Some representatives at the 
Summit point out that for sustainable to happen, the real criteria for projects must be supportive of the 
very poor, farm workers and other marginalised groups (ibid).  To ensure that this is happening, strong 
partnership and co-operation between the government, the Department of Agriculture and as well as 
commercial farmers are required. The poorest of the poor should be priority number one.  
 
The shift from the SLAG to LRAD policy in 2001 was seen as an abandonment of the marginalized 
groups. According to Hall (2004b: 28), “land NGOs responded to the policy shift with hostility, 
arguing that LRAD represented an abandonment of the poor”. She also argues that LRAD is designed 
to open the programme to people who already have substantial resources. LRAD introduced the 
principle of “the more you have, the more you can get” and emphasised the creation of a class of black 
commercial farmers, in place of the previous emphasis on redistributing land to the poor for 
subsistence purposes (Hall 2004b: 28).   
 
The LRAD programme encourages beneficiaries to access a range of grants along a sliding scale from 
R20 000 to R100 000. Jacobs et al (2003a: 11) illustrates that, “the limited evidence that is available 
suggests that grants are being made all along the scale, but mostly in the range of R20 000 to R40 000”. 
In addition, the “scale differs considerably between provinces and between projects processed through 
the DLA and those through the Land Bank” (Jacobs et al 2003a: 11).  
 
Jacobs at al, (2003a: 11) state that “according to the Department of Land Affairs (DLA)’s 
implementation directorate, poorer applicants are in the forefront under LRAD by means of the ratio 
5:3:2, whereby 50% of resources (land and capital budgets) go to the poor, 30% to a ‘middle category’ 
and 20% to individuals accessing the grant at the upper-end of the scale”. Jacobs et al (2003b: 1) shows 
   - 93 -
that, “the use of a ‘sliding scale’, that pegs state grants to the size of beneficiaries own contribution, 
means that, among those who do qualify for help, substantially more is given to those who already have 
assets”. For example, in the Eastern Cape and Western Cape, individuals and small groups with access 
to loans and other resources acquired 72,8 ha and 88 ha of land per person, respectively (Business Day 
2003: 1). However, poor people who formed larger groups only acquired 15,1 ha of land per person in 
the Eastern Cape and 3 ha per person for the Western Cape (Business Day 2003: 1). These differences 
between the figures of the Eastern Cape and Western Cape, are due to the fact that in the Eastern Cape, 
land is not as expensive and is less productive.    
 
The LRAD programmes need to strengthen the needs of the poor and put them at the forefront of its 
projects. Kariuki (2004: 33) makes a case that the creation of commercial black farmers as is stated 
within LRAD policy, “is an implicit class bias entrenched within the policy objectives”. As a result, the 
LRAD policy targets those who are well resources and skilled farmers (Kariuki 2004: 33).  
 
Access to land by smaller groups is actively encouraged by the DLA, NDA and Land Bank to ensure 
sustainability. Lahiff & Rugege (2002b: 10) agree that the R5 000 “own contribution” of beneficiaries 
offered by LRAD is not an insignificant amount. They also state that it is unreasonable to assume that 
the unemployed or the working poor, who typically engage in multiple time-consuming activities to 
meet their daily survival needs, have a year’s worth of available time to donate to a new activity. 
Secondly, it sends a strong message to would-be applicants and officials alike that the programme is 
not aimed at the very poorest, potentially discouraging many applicants and making it unlikely that 
applicants from the very poor will be prioritised. In addition, Greenberg (2002: 16) supports the above 
view by saying that the shift is a sign of a new focus by the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) on 
providing adequate support to well-resourced farmers with their own resources and the capacity to 
enter the market.  
 
According to DLA (2001a: 6-7), adult individuals under the LRAD programme are encouraged to 
apply for grants in their own right, rather than as members of households, so that women can apply for 
grants to acquire land individually. Although the programme included women in a marginalized group, 
according to Jacobs et al (2003a: 14), “as far as could be established, no specific measures are in place 
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to ensure that such groups participate and benefit from LRAD grants, and no specific budgets are 
reserved for this purpose”. LRAD is designed to benefit all kind of people whether you are poor or 
rich. However, although LRAD clearly caters more to well-off applicants than did the SLAG-based 
redistribution programme, LRAD is still widely accessed by poor households (HSRC, 2003: iv).  
 
The Human Science Research Council’s final report also states that it is unclear whether or not the 
“poorest of the poor” are accessing LRAD in significant numbers. Thwala  (2003: 17) makes a case 
that, “the current policy focus (LRAD) of redistribution limits development in several ways: it seeks to 
concentrate resources in the hands of a small number of black commercial producers who are unlikely 
to spend much of their disposable income in the rural economy, while confining the poor majority to 
ongoing dependency on rural farm wages and paternalistic social relations; it limits the socially 
transformative impact of land reform to a small number of relative elites; and it delays the potential 
impact of asset redistribution on the ability of the poor to take economic risks and diversify their 
livelihood sources”.  
 
Lahiff (2001: 5) states, “while LRAD may be able to meet the needs of a small minority of emergent 
black farmers, it is unlikely to come even close to meeting the needs of the mass of poor and landless 
households or transforming the racially-skewed pattern of land ownership”. During 2004, the Director-
General disagreed with those who argue that LRAD policy is only for rich people, and claimed that 
72% of land reform beneficiaries were poor, from which he conclude that ‘targeting of the most poor 
has taken place (Hall 2004b: 28).  
 
According to this status report by Hall (2004b: 28), “clearly, the poor are no longer exclusively 
targeted, but it is not apparent how benefits are now being distributed and whether or not the poor 
continue to be the primary target”. A debate on who is benefiting is delayed by a lack of consistent 
information in the public domain (Hall 2004b). To some extent, according to Wegerif (2004: 43), 
“experience in Limpopo has confirmed the concerns of critics that it is the richer and more powerful 
who will benefit the most from LRAD”. Wegerif (ibid) further states that, “this has not happened so 
much because of their wealth, but because of their access to information and political influence”. 
According to the Summit, the poor and the historically disadvantaged should be beneficiaries. In 
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addition, the delegates call for a preference for women, farm workers, the unemployed and youth. 
There are those who sense that the marginalised are not benefiting significantly through LRAD 
projects. The government officials disagree with those who state that LRAD is only for well-off but for 
the poor as well. But there was a consensus that the poor should benefit most from the LRAD 
programme.  
 
5.6 The Budget and Land Redistribution  
The primary thrust of land reform in South Africa to address the racially skewed pattern of landholding 
need to be the redistribution of agricultural land.  Transferring more commercial agricultural land from 
white owned farmers to black people has been and is still constrained by a lack of funds. “Slow 
progress in redistribution over the past nine years underscores the urgency of finding ways to expedite 
the process, including, but not only, through substantially increased budget allocations for land 
acquisition and related costs” (People’s Budget Campaign 2005: 23). 
 
“The total budget for the DLA has gradually increased since 1994, reaching R1.9 billion for the 2005/6 
financial period” (Jacobs, Lahiff & 2003a 8). Although the budget for the DLA has increased since 
1994, Hall (2004a: 219) states, “fiscal restraint is one reason why the redistribution of land has been so 
limited.” A total of only 2.9% of agricultural land was transferred in the first decade of democracy, and 
during this period, the budget for land reform has remained at or below 0.5% of the national budget 
(DLA, 2004; National Treasury, 2004; as cited in Hall, 2004: 219 & Cousins, 2005: 4).  
 
“The land restitution programme and the land reform programme (comprising redistribution and tenure 
reform) together consume over 70% of the DLA budget” (Jacobs et al, 2003a: 8). Surprisingly, since 
1994, when the land reform programme started in South Africa, lack of spending or underspending has 
been a prominent feature in the financial reports of the DLA (Jacobs, Hall & Lahiff 2003: 8). The gap 
between budget and expenditure has narrowed considerably in recent years. “In the 2001/02 financial 
year, underspending by the DLA appeared to be down to about 6% of the budget, or R63.8 million 
(DLA 2002@: 89 cited to Jacobs, Hall & Lahiff 2003a: 8).   
 
According to a press release by Jacobs (2003b: 5) on redistribution and the LRAD programme, more 
resources (budgets) are needed. In addition, the following four points were stated in the press: 
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• Although the land reform budget gradually increased since 1994 and capital budgets (from 
which LRAD grants are paid) rose to approximately 63% of the land reform budget, it is still 
inadequate to meet redistribution commitments. 
• DLA offices throughout the country are committing funds to redistribution that exceed their 
available budgets. 
• Over-commitment of funds in 2002 and 2003 forced the Western Cape Land Reform Office to 
cease processing new LRAD applicants. In the Western Cape, DLA had accumulated LRAD 
commitments worth R102 million, of which only R48 million was available from current 
budgets. 
• In the Eastern Cape, before the end of 2002 the provincial land reform office had already 
committed itself to expenditure of R45.7 million, against an available budget for the year of 
just R44 million.  
 
In a press release Hall (2003: 4-5) maintains, “some provinces of DLA exhausted their budgets within 
their first quarter of their financial year, have been approving projects for which funds are not 
available, and are now unable to proceed with new projects”. For example in both the Western Cape 
and Mpumalanga provincial offices of DLA have refused new grant applications because the backlog 
of existing commitments will consume all budgets for at least the next two year (ibid 2003: 4-5). 
Furthermore, a R50 million initial disbursement to the Land Bank is exhausted and, having approved 
grants for which it has no further funds, the agreement between the two institutions has not been 
renewed.  
 
It is not clear when, or how, these commitments can be honoured.  Hall (2003: 5) states that “the 
‘freeze’ on land redistribution means that, in some situations, landowners and land reform applicants 
are ready to implement projects but are unable to proceed due to lack of funds”. Therefore, there is 
evidence of opportunities of sales being missed where wiling sellers and willing buyers are unable to 
proceed because of institutional and budgetary backlogs (Jacobs et al. 2003a as cited in Hall and Lahiff 
2004: 2).  
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“The recurring inability of DLA to spend its allocation has been one reason for significant fluctuations 
in its budget. More recently, the achievement of the department in accelerating land transfers has 
resulted in some provinces exhausting their budget”(Hall & Lahiff 2004: 2). The 2004/05 allocation to 
Land Reform is R474 million, a below-inflation increase of 1.9% on the previous financial year, and it 
is entirely due to the growth of the current budget (Hall & Lahiff 2004). 
 
The land redistribution programme in South Africa cannot meet its main objectives of redressing the 
unequal distribution of landownership and enhance the livelihoods of the poor, unless an adequate 
budget can be allocated to the Land Reform Programme. Hall (2004b: 57) maintains that the budget for 
the Land Reform Programme needs to be increased if the pace of delivery of land, and the quality and 
sustainability of projects, is to improve.  
 
In addition, it is also important for the strategic planning processes to be fully integrated into the 
national budget, so that LRAD can meet its objectives by 2015. Integration of national budget can also 
lead to transparency and accountability. Improving sustainable development in the land redistribution 
process will strengthen partnerships and alignment between the spheres of government and 
departments.  
 
Effective participation by all stakeholders and partnership can ensure the effectiveness of the budgetary 
process in the LRAD programme. Capacity for building budgets, which is based on strategic priorities, 
should be strengthened in land reform policies to ensure sustainability in projects planning. Hall 
(2004b: 58) emphasises that “substantial funds are still needed, even if below-market prices are to be 
paid for land”. In some instances, she also argue that experience to date suggests that, if the current 
approach is pursued in order to scale up delivery towards the targets, R 2 billion will be needed each 
year for land redistribution’. 
 
Interestingly, the land reform budget for the 2005/2006 financial year was dramatically increased 
(PLAAS, 2005a: 2). The budget of the Department of Land Affairs rose by 91% on the previous year, 
with further above-inflation growth predicted for subsequent years. More money was also allocated for 
farmer support in the budget of the National Department of Agriculture (PLAAS 2005a:2). A sum of 
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R250 million was allocated by NDA for the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP), 
and most of this money will benefit land reform beneficiaries (PLAAS, 2005a :). In addition, the 
budget for land redistribution and tenure reform was substantially increased from R770 million in 
2004/05 to R1 016 million in 2005/06 (an increase of 55.56%) (ibid, 2005a:2). Didiza of Land Affairs 
told Sunday Times, “Treasury figures released this week showed that the budget for land reform would 
rise from R735 million in 2001/02 to R5.2 billion in 2007/08” (Boyle 2005: 6).  
 
The largest amount was allocated to land reform grants, which are expected to increase from R345 
million this year (2004/2005) to R564 million in 2005/06, R774 million in 2006/07, and R1.1 billion in 
2007/08, or a total of R2.4 billion over the next three years. According to ‘Umhlaba Wethu’ (PLAAS, 
2005a: 2), “at current prices, this is unlikely to be sufficient to enable government to achieve its target 
of redistributing 30% of agricultural land by 2015”.  
 
Hall & Lahiff (2004: 4) advise that for the redistribution programme to achieve its objective of 
transferring 30% of agricultural land to blacks, it requires either that the budget be scaled up 
substantially, or that non-market options for acquiring land be considered – or both. The People’s 
Budget Campaign (2005: 23), “assumes that the redistribution programme makes a significant 
contribution towards the 30% target (with the bulk of the remainder coming from restitution), it would 
be reasonable to expect the redistribution programme to transfer 20% of land from white to black 
ownership by 2015”.  
 
Sibanda (2002, cited in Surplus People Project, 2002: 14) writes that, “[t]he budget constraints is a 
critical variable for the success of the redistribution programme in South Africa”.  He further states that 
as long as the DLA operates on the basis of the current land redistribution budget, delivery on scale in 
order to reach the stated target will remain an illusive goal. In other words, the land reform budget must 
increase. The People’s Budget Campaign (2005) proposes, “in order to achieve this, the land reform 
programme would require a capital budget of at least R1 billion per year, more than double the current 
allocation”.  It is crucial for the DLA to increase its land reform budget to achieve its well-known 
target.   
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The resources that have been made available for the purposes of land reform can be seen from the size 
of the annual budget allocated to the Department of Land Affairs. This has fluctuated between 0.22% 
of the national budget in 1997/98 and 0.38% in 2001/02. Future expenditure is projected at between 
0.33% and 0.34% of the national budget (Cousins 2002a: 10). Cousins (2002a: 10) have challenged 
that “the Department of Land Affairs has failed to spend its budget due to the lack of human resources 
and lack of skills among departmental staff and high staff turnover”.  
 
Cousins (2002a: 10) attributes all of these points to a lack of coherence between the targets quoted by 
government, the resources available in terms of the land reform budget and the capacity of DLA to 
deliver on the required scale. According to Cousins (2002a: 11), lack of sufficient funds is not the only 
obstacle to successful implementation of land reform programmes. Low skills levels, poor 
management, poorly designed processes and unrealistic planning are problems as well. This has led to 
severe underperformance, which in turn imposes limits on the resources that can be demanded from 
treasury. Lack of resources in our Land Reform Programme since 1994, has contributed negatively to 
the performance of the process. The small budget allocation for our Land Reform Programme is also 
one of the key constraints to the success of transferring land to the hands of black people in South 
Africa. Even though, the budget allocation has been increased, it seems as if it is not enough to meet its 
objectives. 
 
5.7 The Land Acquisition Process   
The model of redistribution developed around the Settlement/Acquisition Grant (SLAG) programme, 
and largely carried over into the implementation of LRAD centres around individual projects (Cousins 
2002a: 9). The market-driven land redistribution process according to Lahiff & Rugege (2002a: 8) 
forces every group of people or individuals who wish to acquire land to identify land available for 
purchase and negotiate with the landowner. While this can be expected to be a lengthy and difficult 
process, it is complicated by the fact that buyers and sellers are negotiating in advance of funding being 
approved for the project. Once an agreement is reached between the buyer and the seller, the project 
planning procedures starts that involves feasibility studies and the preparation of business plans, 
verification of beneficiaries, valuation of the land (typically conducted more than once) and vetting by 
various government officials.  
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Lahiff & Rugege (2002a: 8) state that until recently, this process alone would typically take between 
one and two years, during which time buyers and sellers could not finalise the transfer of land. This has 
created uncertainly for property owners and, in cases where projects are not approved, can result in the 
transaction being abandoned, with no recourse for the disappointed seller. The long duration and 
uncertainty surrounding purchase of land has led to many property owners withdrawing from the 
process and deterred others from becoming involved.   
 
Grants for purchase for land are released only towards the end of the lengthy project planning cycle, 
which itself is tied to a specific property. As a result the buyers cannot, in practice, acquire land 
through auctions or opportunistic purchases as farms come on the market (Cousins 2002a: 9). It also 
means that planning is abandoned, should the price eventually offered by the DLA be rejected by the 
landowner, thus obliging the applicants (and the DLA) to abandon the project or to start the entire 
planning process over again for another property.  
 
The uncoordinated redistribution projects and unpredictable negotiations between willing-buyers and 
willing-sellers create a problem for municipalities and other government departments to plan 
effectively for the provision of services such as agricultural extension, water, school and clinics to 
resettled communities (Lahiff & Rugege 2002a: 8).  
 
According to Cousins (2002a: 8), the most notable exception to this pattern is the Land Reform and 
Settlement Plan currently being implemented jointly by Amatola District Municipality and the 
Department of Land Affairs in the Eastern Cape. The process of moving beneficiaries on newly 
acquired land is long and difficult, and beneficiaries continue to depend on the availability of housing, 
infrastructure and basic services in their existing residential areas (Ainslie, Andrew & Shackleton 
2003: 3). They also contend that the reason behind this is that most beneficiaries are poor and there is 
little infrastructure on the farms, and it will take them many years to gradually accumulate the 
resources to build houses and develop the other basic services to make it possible to move onto these 
farms  (ibid). Cousins (2002a: 9) also state that, because beneficiaries are obliged to choose from 
whatever land is on offer, they often end up far from their former homes, where they generally had 
some access to such services and benefited from close reciprocal relations with their wider community. 
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Lahiff & Rugege (2002a: 8) state that, “an alternative would be a planned programme of land 
acquisition by the state that deals fairly and efficiently with current owners but also delivers land of the 
scale, quality and location best suited to the intended beneficiaries and allows for the delivery of 
support services in a planned and coordinated manner”. In addition, to this, Hall & Lahiff (2004: 4) 
insist that, “…the decision to pay full market prices is clearly a policy choice, rather than a legal 
necessity, and any departure from this policy, for instance a more interventionist approach which is 
expropriation of state land would certainly have major political implications”. They also declare that 
the market-driven procedure of acquiring land is too expensive, complex and slow and need to be 
reviewed. According to Hall & Williams (2000, cited by Kariuki, 2004: 33), the new land policies such 
as LRAD show the government’s unwillingness to acquire land for the majority of rural South 
Africans. 
 
5.8 Project Planning  
Sustainable development planning is an essential requirement in any redistribution project. Project 
planning in redistribution programmes encounter many problems in South Africa. “Many of the 
problems associated with redistribution projects to date have centred around a mismatch between the 
initial requirements of grant applicants and the projects they end up with” (Cousins 2002a: 9).  This is 
evident both in the size of projects – in terms of land parcel and number of members – and in the nature 
of the agricultural activities carried out.  
 
“The needs of people applying for assistance under the redistribution programme – as well as the levels 
of resources and experience they bring to the projects – are undoubtedly varied” (Cousins 2002a: 9). 
Some want no more than a small patch of land to grow food for household consumption, or land on 
which to graze existing livestock; others have the desire and the resources to engage in much larger 
scales of production for the market. In addition, some have years of experience working their own land 
or as employees on commercial farms; while others have no direct experience of agriculture.  
 
Yet, the DLA officials and the consultants appointed by them have, on the whole, attempted to fit 
applicants to existing agricultural enterprises rather than the other way around. As a result, this has 
added to the complexity of project planning and goes a long way towards explaining the slow pace of 
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implementation. It has also had undesirable consequences for applicants who have made it through the 
lengthy implementation cycle to the point of land transfer, with a growing number of project failures 
being reported (Cousins 2002a: 10). 
 
Agricultural land in South Africa tends to come on the market in the form of entire farms. This is 
related in part to the long-standing legal prohibitions on the subdivision of agricultural land, but also to 
a well-founded belief by landowners that piecemeal sales are both costly and time consuming. Thus, 
planning typically begins with the offer of a whole farm for sale. In many cases, the size of land 
available is not well matched to the needs of would-be beneficiaries or is beyond their price range. 
 
This has typically meant reducing or expanding the size of applicant groups so that the combined value 
of the grant matches the asking price of the farm, with little or no regard to the potential of the land to 
support that number of people. According to Lahiff & Rugege (2002a: 8), “this problems led to the 
formation of larger and unwieldy groups with little internal cohesion (the so-called ‘rent-a-crowd’ 
phenomenon), but also to cases where relatively coherent groups are split, with some receiving land 
and others not”.  
 
The paltry size of the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant has been seen as one part of the problem, 
which may be resolved to some extent through the larger grants available under LRAD. It has been said 
that the failure to subdivide land where appropriate and the insistence by officials and consultants on 
perpetuating the forms of agricultural activities carried out by the former owners are further problems. 
Redistribution beneficiaries can only select land from what is currently available on the market. If this 
happens to be an intensive dairy farm, especially one with sizable fixed capital assets, these activities 
are typically reflected in the business plan drawn up by officials and DLA-appointed consultants, 
regardless of the original intentions of the applicants (Lahiff & Rugege 2002b: 16). 
 
Because these intensive forms of agriculture require sizeable amount of working capital, which cannot 
be met from the DLA grant, such projects typically begin life with a substantial loan from the Land 
Bank or other lender, which borrowers often struggle to repay (Cousins 2002a: 10). At the same time, 
Reed and de Wit (2003: 92-93) make a case that, “the process of land acquisition and transfer implied 
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by the demand-led approach means that land must be acquired farm by farm, involving numerous 
uncoordinated negotiations between landowners, buyers and the state”. Land acquisition under this 
method is not only time consuming and complex, it also allows for little or no overall co-ordination 
over the location and sequencing of land transfers (ibid).  
 
5.9 Access to Land (LRAD) 
The July National Land Summit’s delegates called for the government to promote subdivision of 
farmland so that the poor, and historically disadvantaged as well as other marginalized groups such as 
women, youth and the unemployed can get access to land for farming. The government must also play 
a critical role in terms of identifying unused state and private land for subdivision and redistribution. 
 
There is a need to subdivide agricultural land in order to assist those who lack resources and who are 
struggling to buy large commercial farms. Jacobs et al (2003a: 16) claim that, “without effective 
measures to facilitate the subdivision of agricultural land – ideally prior to it being offered to land 
reform beneficiaries – the size of existing land parcels could severely limit the progress of reform and 
perpetuate the pattern of large groups projects experienced under redistribution to date”. In addition, to 
this, the Subdivision of Agricultural Land Act no 70 of 1970, allows for the subdivision of agricultural 
land only by means of application to government. In practice, getting authorisation for land subdivision 
is time consuming and costly. It has been argued that use of subdivision would be the advantage of land 
redistribution because redistribution applicants are not always able to identify land on the market that 
suit them in terms of price and size (Aliber & Mokoena, 2002 cited by HSRC 2003: 74). There is 
consensus that the issue of subdivision should be promoted in order to meet government’s objective of 
redistributing 30% of agricultural land to black ownership by 2015 (Hall 2005: 13).  
 
The LRAD’s policy document (DLA 2001a: 13) states that, “signature of the repeal of the Subdivision 
of Agricultural Land Act, Act 70 of 1970 is pending, and in the meantime subdivision requires the 
approval of the Minister”. According to some writers, this provision alone cannot be enough to 
overcome the major practical and financial difficulties linked to subdivision of land. Lyne & Roth 
(2004: 1) agree that, “it is not always feasible to partition large commercial farms into smaller more 
affordable units due to indivisible resources and the high cost of surveying, transferring and registering 
subdivisions”. It will be helpful for the State and the DLA to promote the subdivision of commercial 
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land in order to improve delivery of land to beneficiaries. To some extent, it will be also helpful for the 
State to remove all restrictions on the subdivision of land, only to replace them with certain zoning 
restrictions (International Crisis Group 2004: 181).  In addition to this, in, “highly suitable land for 
small-scale farming, the state should involve itself directly in actual subdivision, despite the time and 
cost involved”. It was also anticipated that developers might buy farms and then subdivide them, invest 
in improving infrastructure, and sell off individual units to LRAD beneficiaries at a profit. No evidence 
could be found that either landowners or speculators are doing this on any significant scale. Where this 
has occurred, it would appear to be driven by philanthropic or empowerment motives rather than by 
profit (Jacobs, et al 2003a: 16).  
 
Tongaat-Hullet and Illovo have subdivided many of their large sugar estates for sale to Land 
Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme beneficiaries, both in KwaZulu-
Natal and Mpumalanga. An extension officer was appointed and beneficiaries encouraged to attend a 
six-months training programme before settling on the land (ibid 2003a: 17).  There are some writers 
who believe that the repeal of Act 70 will be helpful for many poor and part-time farmers who will be 
rationed out of the proposed LRAD programme to finance smaller, more affordable farmers (Daroch & 
Lyne 2003: 6-7).  
 
There is an agency agreement between the Department of Land Affairs and Land Bank, whereby 
repossessed properties are first offered to the DLA to meet the demands of the distribution programme 
(Jacobs, et al 2003: 15). According to Ferrer & Semalulu (2004: 8), “In financial year 2001/02, the 
Land Bank received R50 million from the DLA to award LRAD grants contingent upon loan funding. 
In the same period, the Land Bank approved 152 LRAD applications”. According to the LRAD’s 
policy document (DLA 2001a. 12), the LRAD programme is flexible enough to allow beneficiaries to 
use their grants to acquire state land and parastatal agricultural land that is being sold.  In addition, the 
State would have to publicly announce its intentions to dispose of its agricultural land in order to invite 
beneficiary bids for the purchase of such land.  
 
Jacobs, et al  (2003a: 15) say that, “since 2000, the Minister of Land Affairs has prioritised state land 
disposal as a means to make land available for redistribution, and indicated that 669 000 hectares of 
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land will be disposed of in favour of land reform beneficiaries”. The Minister has pointed out in her 
2004 budget speech that, “government has continued to contribute to land reform not only through 
financial resources received out of our budget, but has also contributed with assets from the land that is 
held by the state. To date 772 626 hectares of land have been delivered under the State Land Disposal 
Programme” (DLA 2004b: 4).  
 
The State and DLA are reluctant to publicly announce or identify the State land because they fear that 
the land might be illegally invaded by the public (Jacobs et al 2003a: 15). In 2002 the National 
Department of Agriculture reported that just over half of the targeted land had been disposed of and 
that only 11.8 % of this land went to LRAD beneficiaries. Offices in the Western Cape Department of 
Agriculture contested the accuracy of these figures, suggesting that no state land had been available for 
disposal in the province and that none had gone to LRAD beneficiaries (Jacobs et al 2003a: 15). There 
is consensus that the issue of subdivision should be promoted in order to meet government’s objective 
of redistributing 30 % of agricultural land to black ownership by 2015 (Hall 2005: 13). 
 
5.10 Conclusion  
This section evaluated different views on land policies, particularly LRAD, in South Africa. Many 
writers share similar views regarding the commitment of the South African government to market-
driven land redistribution, which they believe has created many problems in delivering more land to 
beneficiaries. Some writers argued that the market-driven method in land redistribution is not 
sustainable. As a result, many people started to blame this principle as the main contributor to the slow 
pace of delivery of land to beneficiaries. There is also disagreement about the role of the market system 
in the land reform programme. Constraints and problems such as the “willing-buyer, willing-seller” 
principle, lack of post-transfer support to beneficiaries, lack of human resources at government level, 
lack of an adequate budget to land reform, the way the land is acquired and inadequate project planning 
ware also discussed. For the government to meet its well-known objective of transferring 30% of 
agricultural land to black people by 2015, the feeling was that the expropriation mechanism is the best 
strategy. At the National Land Summit, many delegates called for the government to support 
subdivision of agricultural land to fast track the delivery of land to black people. State and private 
unused land are the main priorities to be subdivided, according the Summit’s representatives. The 
preceding discussion illustrated that land reform problems are more complex and will need various 
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interventions, inter alia increasing the budget, better post settlement support, taking better note of the 
needs of beneficiaries and integrated planning. The solution also does not seem to lie in replacing one 
approach with another (such as the willing-buyer, willing-seller approach with expropriation of land), 
but in combining all these various approaches into a workable solution.  
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CHAPTER 6: SUMMARY AND GENERAL 
CONCLUSION 
 
6.1. Key Concerns  
The land issue in South Africa is crucial, and at the same time problematic. It will require thorough 
attention as well as open public debate, where everyone can contribute to speed up land reform. Every 
concerned body must learn the lessons from neighbouring Zimbabwe in dealing with the issue where 
unrealistic land redistribution expectations and settlement targets caused a lag in time in meeting the 
objectives of land reform. The comprehensive but painfully slow land reform programme in South 
Africa shows no sign of picking up speed, despite events North of the Limpopo (SARPN 2003: 2).  It is 
evident that land reform is presently not a priority in the wider macro-economic framework of the ANC 
government (ibid 2003).  Effective policies that will prioritise land reform need to be promoted in 
South Africa. Cousins (2000: 144) points out that the land redistribution programme seeks to draw the 
poor into the productive sector and the mainstream of the country’s economy. 
 
Unrealistic land redistribution expectations and settlement targets will stimulate social unrest and 
become a manipulative factor for political reasons as is happening in Zimbabwe and can lead to local 
land invasions, which has mostly occurred in metropolitan areas in South Africa. Some politicians see 
this issue as a time bomb, as is stated by the then PAC Secretary General Thami ka Plaatjie (Scheepers 
2001: 1). He discarded the willing-seller and willing-buyer market principle, pointing to Zimbabwe’s 
experience, as impracticable. He called, “for a strong land reform programme as the present land 
restitution programme is characterised by nonsensical, out of date and a host of legal requirements and 
procedures”. The present government is not fulfilling its promises while poverty, unemployment, crime 
and diseases are increasing due to the historical landlessness and unfair ownership (Scheepers 2001: 1). 
Importantly, the CDE (2005: 18) contends that our country is not well suited to agriculture and all the 
promises made relating to land reform’s role in poverty alleviation, employment opportunities and 
other issues is questioned. It mentions that white farmers are moving out of farming because it is so 
hard to make a living.  
 
Market-based land reform programmes are not appropriate on its own and it fails to correct the unequal 
distribution of landownership between white and black people in South Africa. The willing-buyer, 
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willing-seller principle as an official weapon to redistribute 30% of agricultural farmland from white 
farmers to black South Africans is no longer appropriate as well. According to the Deputy President 
Mlambo-Ngcuka, reliance or adherence to the willing-buyer, willing-seller principle was slowing down 
land reform in South Africa (Mail &Guardian 2005b). There is therefore a general complaint in South 
Africa that land reform is too slow, and a general call for the expropriation of more land to people 
(ibid). Where market acquisition is slowed down by unwilling sellers, then government’s powers of 
expropriation can be used (or threatened), and procedures such as the designation of blocks of land to 
be acquired for land reform can be considered (Cousins 2005: 11). The expropriation of land by the 
government will not prohibit market transactions and negotiations (Cousins 2005: 11). In other words, 
the intervention of government in land acquisition will not remove the market system approach in land 
reform.  
 
Cousins told the Mail & Guardian (Groenewald 2005) that an alternative to the existing system, backed 
by many land stakeholders, including PLAAS, would take into account the way the land was acquired 
in the past, past government assistance to the landowner, current use of the land, its future earning 
prospects and its current value. Hall, also from PLAAS, told the same newspaper, “Past subsidies 
provided to commercial farmers [under apartheid] could be discounted from the price”.  
 
Cousins (2005: 10-14) identifies five options that can contribute to a sustainable land reform 
programme in South Africa: 
i. A wide-ranging programme of land reform is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the 
resolution of the agrarian question of the dispossessed 
According to Cousins, land reform is required, therefore, to create equitable access to land and 
natural resources, and across the whole country. It must also aim to secure people’s rights to land 
and resources, in both law and in practice, within range of tenure systems (including both group 
and individualized systems as options) that must receive institutional support from government. 
 
ii. A decisive break with market-led approaches to land reform is required and these must be 
replace by an approach premised on the central role of the State, together with progressive 
forces in civil society, in driving processes of land acquisition and redistribution 
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Experience since 1994 suggests that the dichotomy between demand-led (or market-based) and 
supply-led (or State-based) land reform is not particularly useful. Rather, a pro-active State, acting 
in concert with progressive forces in civil society, can make use of the market and other 
mechanisms to drive land reform in regions of emerging opportunity where need (and demand) are 
also found (Aliber & Mokoena 2002; Hart 1996; Lahiff 2001). Expropriation of farmland by the 
State is encouraged in order to accelerate the redistribution process. Expropriation of agricultural 
land will not only help to speed up the process but also to avoid wasting opportunities and saving 
taxpayer’s money.  
 
iii. Area-based land reform is required to create the conditions for agrarian reform 
According to this point, a State-led approach would facilitate planning for area-based land and 
agrarian reform. “Planning for land and agrarian reform should be made central to the processes 
leading to the formulation of Integrated Development Plans by local government bodies (Cousins, 
2005: 12). The integration of the land reform programmes into IDP will ensure that sufficient 
support such as infrastructure and finance is provided to beneficiaries. Integration of the land 
reform programme into IDP will also enhance environmental sustainability in LRAD’s projects. 
The researcher argues that our government and particularly DLA and NDA must take this move 
seriously in order to achieve its objectives. The integration of the Land Reform with Municipal 
Programmes (IDP) is essential and will strengthen public participation, transparency, 
empowerment, decentralisation, co-ordination between government departments, partnerships and, 
monitoring and evaluation of government’s programmes.  
 
“An area-based approach facilitates coherent planning for land transfers on a large scale, the 
securing of land rights, local institutional development, and investment aimed at creating 
conducive conditions for smallholder production and other land-based livelihood strategies” 
(Cousins 2005: 12). In addition, Hall (2004b: 57) calls for a district or area-based approach, which 
involves government proactively matching supply and demand, so that larger blocks of land could 
be acquired at reasonable cost or expropriating where necessary.   
 
iv. Paradigm shifts are required to focus state policies on agrarian reform 
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The first involves policy makers questioning their widespread and deep-rooted scepticism about 
the potential for smallholder production and their consequent bias in favour of large-scale 
commercial production (Lahiff & Cousins 2004 as cited by Cousins 2005: 14).  Secondly, the 
multiple and diverse character of the livelihoods of the rural poor, and emerging opportunities for 
petty commodity production must be a key focus of policy (Andrew et al 2003 as cited by Cousins 
2005: 14).  Thirdly, government must recognise its central role in land and agrarian reform, and 
allocate sufficient resources to the relevant sub-programmes. An adequate budget for 
implementing these policies must thus be secured from Treasury. Fourthly, the active participation 
of the “beneficiaries” of agrarian reform in processes of policy-making, planning and 
implementation must be secured. Cousins (2005: 14) insists that the notion of community 
participation in agrarian reform is not happening, it is just lip service. Sustainable land reform will 
take place in South Africa when community participation in strategic planning of agrarian reform 
is taken seriously.  
 
v. Land and agrarian reform require a major investment in capacity building as well as innovative 
institutional arrangements 
Capacity building can strengthen sustainability in land reform projects. Capacity building can also 
promote the sharing of ideas and responsibility between the different levels of government, 
departments, NGOs, private sector and civil society organisations to achieve sustainable 
development in land reform. Cousins (2005: 15) contends that, co-ordination between government 
departments and programmes is a major problem. He also does not believe that the solution lies in 
simply requesting local governments to include land reform projects in their Integrated 
Development Plans. According to Cousins (2005: 15), new forms of institutional arrangement are 
required which integrate land acquisition and tenure reform with diverse forms of land 
development, including but not limited to, agricultural production.  
 
A land tax is seen as an intervention into land markets that could improve the availability of land 
for redistribution (Hall 2004b: 56). Ntsebenze (as cited by Hall, 2005: 1) highlights seven points 
which will help the South African government to achieve its objective of redistributing 30% of 
agricultural land from whites to black people by 2015: 
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• Government should be given a right of first refusal to purchase land before it is offered for 
sale on the market. 
• The State should not be limited to paying market prices for land, but there must be a 
mechanism to arrive at a price for land that is not market-related.  
• The State should reclaim unused and underutilised land for redistribution. 
• A land tax on agricultural land should be imposed, in order to bring more land onto the market 
for redistribution. 
• LRAD does not work and should be urgently reviewed.  
• The target of 30% by 2014 is not enough. Together with the 13% of the Bantustans, by 2014 
only 43% of the land will have been transferred., which leaves more than half the land still in 
white hands. 
• The willing-buyer, willing-seller principle must be scrapped. Some people suggests that the 
principle that should prevail be ‘one farmer, one farm’ (‘een boer, een plaas’); and 
• Expropriation should be used and should be used effectively. 
 
An alternative proactive approach would take local people’s land needs as its starting point and then 
identify appropriate public or private land that could address these needs, either available State land, 
land available through the open market, or through negotiated sale or expropriation (Hall 2004b: 57). 
An alternative proactive approach in land reform will encourage the participation of local people in 
decision-making and also in implementation. A proactive land redistribution programme will promote 
close working relationships with both landowners and the landless (Lahiff 2005a: 4). It will allow local 
governments to take significant steps in implementing land reform in South Africa. The promotion of 
cooperatives will allow for the organization of the ordinary to share common goals as well as to reach 
economic growth (David 2005: 28). There must be a land audit. This will address private as well as 
State land, so that both can be subdivided and redistributed (Hall 2005: 13). Subdivision of commercial 
land must be promoted to improve the delivery of land beneficiaries.  
 
“Local solutions will be important in decision-making because they ensure a balance between resources 
and groups of people in need” (David 2005: 33). In this regard, participation of ordinary people in 
decision-making is meaningful and useful in land reform. Sustainable development is easy to be 
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achieved when local people are involved in decision-making. Building capacity is key to the success of 
the LRAD programme. Building capacity within the DLA, NDA will strengthen sustainable 
development in LRAD’s projects. NGOs, local sectors, private sectors, community-based organisations 
and government departments and spheres need to be capacitated in order to promote partnership in 
development. 
 
The following aspects are essential requirements in order to contribute to sustainability in the LRAD 
programme: 
• The devolution of resources to provincial, district and particularly to local authorities  
• The participation of land redistribution beneficiaries in decision-making, implementation and 
monitoring and evaluation  
• The inclusion of land reform in integrated development planning  
• Co-operation, co-ordination and integration of efforts between the different sectors  
• The budget for land reform needs to be increased 
• Technical assistance availability  
• Public education and information programmes  
• A programme for infrastructure support 
• Proper food security mechanism to support people in rural areas 
• Financial resources to invest in agricultural production 
 
6.2 LRAD and Sustainable development  
In this section LRAD will be compared with a sustainable development approach. Sustainable 
development can be defined in technical terms as a development path along which the maximisation of 
human well-being for today’s generations will not lead to a decline in the well-being of future 
generations (OECD 2001:2). Sustainable development stresses the importance of institutions that are 
willing to integrate economic, social and environmental objectives at each level of policy development 
and decision-making (ibid 2001: 4). Our South African Land Reform Programme presently seems to 
focus on both social and economic improvement at the expense of the environment. Van Zyl & Others 
(1996: 3&461) agree that the most obvious motivation for land reform is the un-sustainability- from a 
political, social, economic and equity point of view- of the present distribution of the ownership of 
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agricultural land where 86 % of South Africa’s agricultural land, which accommodates 5.3 million 
people, is owned and operated by small number of people, (almost 67 000), or companies as a result of 
a history of distortion. 
 
In order for sustainable development to be achieved in the Land Reform Programme, integration of 
economic, social and environmental factors needs to be promoted and incorporated in the programme. 
Land reform beneficiaries need to be empowered and capacitated and projects should also be 
economically, socially and environmentally viable. 
 
Participation permits the strengthening and sustainability of the programmes (David 2005: 28-29). 
Participation by the poor in land reform can ensure sharing of power and ownership, which can lead to 
the control of natural resources by the poor themselves. Participation of the poor in land reform can 
also give them a chance to participate in the implementation process. Sustainable land reform 
programmes need to be discussed with affected people. These affected people (the poor) need to be the 
main beneficiaries in LRAD programmes. The Department of Land Affairs in theory promotes 
opportunities for participation of marginalized communities in economic activities that will contribute 
to improve the poor’s quality of livelihoods (DLA, 2005a: 14). The participation of different types of 
stakeholders in the land reform programme is also necessary to influence the pace of the process.   
 
Sustainable development planning encourages popular participation in development. Popular 
participation has been identified as a key objective of the land reform programme; however, up to now 
it has not been adequately achieved in practice (Levin 2000: 72). Empowerment of people, particularly 
the land reform beneficiaries need to be promoted. The would-be beneficiaries need to be trained 
before they are given a mandate to farm the land. According to De Beer & Koch (2000: 189), 
“empowerment requires that communities take an effective part in decision making about their future 
and the use of theirs assets”. 
 
Empowerment of people can also help the redistribution process to move faster in South Africa. 
Empowerment requires the creation of institutions and the acquisition of skills, which will allow 
communities to make sound and independent choices about the management of their resources and 
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achieve an independent livelihoods (De Beer & Koch 2000: 190). Empowerment of beneficiaries can 
ensure a holistic approach to land reform. Public education is important in making sure that land reform 
is sustainable.  
 
The participation of the private sector is also critical. NGO’s and the private sector can play a pivotal 
role in terms of providing education and training to beneficiaries (David 2005: 31). The private sector 
can also contribute to technology transfer to the inexperienced new farmers (ibid 2005). According to 
the DLA’s Strategic Plan (2005a: 14), “we will also improve our level of engagement with the private 
sector as well as Non-Governmental Organisations operating within the land sector. This is crucial to 
address the problem relating to the sustainability of land reform projects”. To ensure sustainability in 
land reform, government must be involved and provide leadership and allocate financial resources 
(OECD 2001:5). 
 
To ensure the success of the reform and productive use of the land, land reform needs to be combined 
with other programmes at the government’s disposal (Deininger 2003: xi). Those benefiting from land 
reform need to be able to access output markets as well as credit, the selection of beneficiaries needs to 
be transparent and participatory, and attention needs to be paid to the fiscal viability of land reform 
efforts.  The Land Reform Programme is not doing well in this regard. In order to achieve its own 
target by 2015, land reform needs to be integrated with other government programmes and policies.  
 
Government is likely to meet these challenges if they use the mechanisms at their disposal in concert 
and with the objective of maximizing synergies between them. This also implies a need to integrate 
land reform into the broader context of economic and social policies, aimed at development and 
poverty reduction, and to implement programmes in a decentralized way with maximum participation 
by potential beneficiaries and at least some grant element (Deininger 2003: xi). The CDE (2005: 21) 
contend that, “decentralisation of delivery ensures proper implementation’ and can help to pull the 
many diverse achievements together, so that the government can claim all the changes taking place 
(through the market, private sector initiatives, and its own efforts) as successes achieved under the new 
land reform programme”.   
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Delegation of tasks can motivate people on the ground to mobilise themselves so that they can 
participate in integrated land reform. To make reforms feasible, strong local capacity, an open and 
broad based policy dialogue, carefully chosen and evaluated pilot projects, and the sharing of 
experiences across countries will be essential, and can also help build capacity for policy formulation 
(Deininger 2003: xiv). This is vital for the Land Reform Programme to promote delegation of powers 
and responsibilities in a sustainable manner that will ensure sustainable results. The Strategic Plan 2005 
– 2010 of DLA (2005a: 13) has realised the importance of devolving functions to local government to 
ensure successful land reform.  
 
In addition, the CDE (2005: 22) states that, “it is clear that effective implementation will require 
enhanced capacity in both government and the private sector in strategic policy design; urban and rural 
programme management; problem-solving; information collection and monitoring progress; and 
ongoing communication to diverse audiences”. The Land Reform Programme so far does not seem to 
perform adequately in this regard. According to David (2005: 33) a lack of capacity has had a very 
negative impact on the land reform process. Capacity can also strengthen partnerships between 
different stakeholders. Effective partnerships will help to ensure successful delivery of enough 
agricultural land to black people. According to the CDE (2005: 22) successful delivery requires, “an 
effective public-private partnership in which the roles of both public and private sector actors and 
market forces should be clearly defined and mutually agreed”. Adequate co-ordination specifically 
between the National Departments of Agriculture and Department of Land Affairs is crucial for the 
success of land reform. David (2005: 33) beliefs that, “the government must empower the local, 
provincial departments developing on the needs of each region”.   
 
A holistic and integrated approach to the land reform programme, which is prioritising the needs or 
interests of the poor, landless and women is essential and must take place. The land reform process 
should be people-driven in order to ensure sustainable development in its projects. For example, Levin 
(2000: 72) states that, “in order to improve and expand the delivery of land reform, we need to 
strengthen popular participation in project implementation”. The so-called “beneficiaries” of land 
reform should not be the passive recipients of services delivered in a top-down way by government 
(ibid). The Land Reform Beneficiaries need to be key drivers of their own projects. The government 
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must provide sustainable options with which people must match theirs needs rather than a situation in 
which the State tries to determine and “manage” people’s needs (Levin 2000: 72). Sustainable land 
reform must be promoted, which achieves justice, equity and efficiency in both urban and rural sectors. 
For instance, the White Paper on Land Policy (DLA, 1997) does mention gender equity adequately but 
the policy has failed to implement this equity in practice so far. However, sustainable land reform 
considers gender equity in terms of land acquisition.  
 
Long-term secure rights to land by poor and landless are important. Long-term secure rights can also 
encourage people to take care of their own resources.  Since environmentally responsible behaviour is 
now becoming part of the economic approach toward land, secured long-term access to land by the 
poor must be promoted in the Land Reform Programme (Dekker 2003: 15). In addition to that 
environmentally responsible farming can be expected in turn (ibid 2003). LRAD is still struggling to 
ensure that the poor have secured long-term access to land for agricultural purposes.  
 
Monitoring and evaluation of the DLA’s Land Reform Programme is also crucial for the successful of 
the programme. One issue that needs attention, is the collection of statistics on projects by the 
Department of Land Affairs. Presently the figures made available by them often contradict previous 
figures and these figures are usually queried by researchers.  
 
The researcher would like to conclude that if the South African Land Reform Programme is still trying 
to cope with the same problems that were seen by Minister Didiza in 2000, it might not meet its 
objectives of redistributing 30 % of commercial agricultural land from white farmers to black South 
African people by 2015. If there is no equality in terms of land distribution, there will be no need for 
many South Africans, especially the previously disadvantaged, to celebrate the 11th year of democracy.  
If the poor and landless are excluded from the Land Reform Programme under the present macro-
economic framework, sustainable land reform will not be achieved. If the Land Reform Programme 
wants to achieve its target by 2015, sustainable development principles need to be incorporated in the 
programme. The resolutions that were agreed upon by different individuals and stakeholders from the 
Land Summit should be implemented. If they are successfully implemented, land reform may achieve 
its objectives by 2015.   
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6.3 Proposed Policy Changes  
The key change emphasis came about with the adoption of the new Land Redistribution and 
Agricultural Development (LRAD) policy in November 2000 in place of the pro-poor Settlement of 
Land and Acquisition Grant programme (SLAG). Many commentators argued that the policy shift from 
SLAG to LRAD undermined the needs and interest of the poor and landless people in South Africa and 
prioritised the needs and interests of the rich people, for example, the People’s Budget Campaign 
(2005: 19) states, “there has been a clear shift away from meeting the needs of the rural poor and 
landless to creating a new class of commercial farmers”.  
 
Under the earlier SLAG redistribution programme, black households with an income below R 1 500 
could apply. However, this allowed poor people to access land largely for subsistence purposes. The 
Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) programme has removed the requirement 
that applicants must be poor to be eligible for State support and makes available larger grants to 
individuals able to contribute to the cost of land and investments in production (Kariuki 2004: 27). 
Ostensibly the LRAD policy provides for a range of commercial and subsistence uses, but in practice 
the programme has favoured commercial agricultural uses of land by those able to make substantial 
investments”  (ibid 2004: 27). 
 
As a consequence of these changes in land policy, programmes specifically aimed at the poor have 
been severely curtained, as in the case of the Settlement/Land Acquisition Grant (SLAG) and 
municipal commonage (People’s Budget Campaign 2005: 19). Others, such as the food safety-net 
programme promised under the LRAD programme have simple failed to materialise (ibid). Those who 
were supposed to benefit from the redistribution programme are no longer a priority under LRAD. The 
People’s Budget Campaign (2005: 19) shows that, “targets for the inclusion of marginalized groups 
such as women, the youth and the disabled are being widely ignored”.  In addition, Hall (2004a: 220) 
asserts that the shift from SLAG redistribution programme to LRAD in 1990s brought land reform in 
line with GEAR’s emphasis on entrepreneurship as a means of building a black middle class, with 
limited direct involvement in the economy by the State and reliance on partnerships with the private 
sector. However, this shift from SLAG to LRAD has strengthened inequality in land distribution in 
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South Africa while the State seemed to have lost its right of involvement in the economy and 
development.  
 
The many changes in land policy, has in the researcher’s opinion failed to address the skewed 
landownership pattern, which is one of the most pressing problems in South Africa. Peart & Rich 
(2000: 137) contend that, “a policy shift which occurred in mid-1996 indicates a weakening of 
commitment to sustainable development in response to the need for more rapid development delivery”. 
To some extent, this shift could ultimately undermine the redressing of social imbalances as the 
foundations of sustainable development require an approach that integrates social, economic and 
biophysical action (Patel, 1999, as cited by Peart & Rich 2000: 137). This shift has not served the needs 
of the poor, landless, homeless, women and the unemployed particularly. Policies that are more pro-
poor need to be promoted, to serve the needs and the interest of the previous disadvantaged groups in 
South Africa.  
 
Therefore, the following proposed policy changes are required if government wants to achieve its 
targets by 2015.  
 
Strong linkages between land policies and programmes with other government policies or programmes 
should be promoted to produce positive results. There should be a strong co-operation between all 
existing land related stakeholders such as government departments, spheres of government, the private 
sector, NGOs, community organisations, church organisations, the homeless, the landless, the poor 
people, the unemployed, people with HIV/AIDS, unions, political parties, and academics.  Co-
ordination between governments departments and spheres of governments must not only be promoted 
but should be made to happen in practice. Government must intervene and be the driver of the Land 
Reform Programme.  
 
Land reform policies, especially LRAD, need to be mostly pro-poor in order to prioritise the needs and 
interests of the poorest of the poor. The plight of the historically disadvantaged people and the 
marginalized groups such as women, youth and the disabled should be prioritised in the land 
redistribution policy.  Programmes that enhance food security to the poor should be priority number 
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one. Partnership between the DLA and the private sector and business sector will also be helpful to the 
success of LRAD. This partnership can ensure adequate allocation of budgets and other technical 
support to LRAD. There should be strong recognition of local and district authority’s responsibilities to 
the implementation of land reform, and their engagement in land reform can be very important for the 
success and sustainability of LRAD and other government programmes. More resources, such as 
money, highly qualified people and infrastructure should be required to ensure the success of land 
reform. Although programmes such as AgriBEE, CASP and MAFISA have been implemented by the 
DLA and DoA, more programmes that will promote agricultural empowerment opportunities needs to 
be expanded and implemented.  
 
More training skills should be provided to the new black farmers in order to achieve sustainable 
development in LRAD. Transfer of agricultural skills from white farmers to black farmers should be 
compulsory to strengthen the sustainability of their farms. The government needs to establish 
programmes or institutions that look after new commercial farmers and make sure that adequate 
training and support to beneficiaries are provided. There should also be special government 
programmes that assist new black farmers to gain financial aid to achieve sustainable development on 
their farms. These programmes need to be aligned with other government and private sector 
programmes to ensure the availability of more resources in the programme. Bank institutions should be 
part and parcel of these programmes so that they can assist with technical support. Inclusiveness and 
integration of the LRAD’s projects to other government’s anti-poverty programmes can assist our land 
reform to meet its target by 2015.   
 
To conclude, the original main purpose of land redistribution in South Africa has changed drastically 
away from the original intention to promote equity. There is an urgent need to move back to the 
original purpose through the policy changes mentioned above. 
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6.4 General Conclusion  
Since 1994, the South African government has put in place an ambitious and potentially far-reaching 
programme of land reform, in order to meet the requirements of the Constitution (1996) and deal with 
the legacy of race-based dispossession and oppression. While some progress has been made, all aspects 
of the programme have suffered from major delays in delivering land and securing rights for the 
previously dispossessed (Lahiff & Rugege 2002a: 10). The Land Reform Programme has been blamed 
for its limited impact on the racially skewed distribution of land in South Africa.  
 
According to Lahiff & Rugege (2002a: 10), this situation raises questions about the design of the Land 
Reform Programme, the resources allocated to it, the mechanism used and the ability of the State to 
implement it. In addition, this raises question about the commitment of the government and the wider 
society to land reform (ibid).  More work needs to be done to overcome the shortcomings of the land 
reform process.  
 
It has been shown in this study that it is the consensus of most writers that redistribution of large-scale 
agricultural land under the market-driven method will not happen and LRAD will not meet its well-
known target of redistributing 30 % of commercial agricultural land from white landowners to black 
South Africans by 2015, unless radical steps are taken. Expropriation of land by the State, a land tax, 
proactive land redistribution and subdivision of commercial and State land are the main alternatives 
that need to take place in order to speed up the redistribution process.  
 
Many people agree that the “willing-buyer, willing-seller” principle will not solve the land question. 
Furthermore, they call for the State to intervene in redistribution process to facilitate the land reform 
process. On the other hand, AgriSA opposes this view and argues that the principle is the best way to 
handle land reform and it should not be scrapped. Agri-SA complains that lack of enough money in 
DLA is the core reason for the slow pace of the redistribution programme (Hall 2005:7).  It is true but 
in reality there are also those white farmers who do not want to work together with the government to 
accelerate the pace of delivery of land to black people.  
 
Post-transfer support to land reform beneficiaries is seen as the essential components for the success of 
LRAD. Since the introduction of the new LRAD policy in 2001, the DLA has taken it very seriously. 
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The implementation of the Comprehensive Agricultural Support Programme (CASP) started during 
2004 to provide support to new farmers in South Africa. Lahiff (2005b: 4) points out that, “…the 
budget for redistribution has been allowed to stagnate and, regardless of the methods of land 
acquisition to be used in future, will need to be increased”, and the promises to increase the budget 
allocation for land reform is therefore a positive change, but strong co-ordination between DLA and 
NDA to enhance support to beneficiaries is also important.  Co-operation between government 
departments and spheres of government in land reform is imperative in order to achieve sustainability 
in LRAD’s projects. The study also found that the lack of capacity has had a negative effect on the 
Land Reform Programme. An increased budget will also require more capacity. 
 
The inclusion of planning for land reform in the municipal integrated development planning process is 
another important factor that can contribute to the success of the land reform process. Since 1994, 
redistribution delivered about 1,7 million hectares, and tenure reform contributed 171 554.72 hectares, 
while 772 626 hectares of State land was delivered (DLA 2005).  This delivery, according to various 
authors, is not appropriate as it symbolises that our Land Reform Programme still face chronic 
problems. On the other hand, the land that was delivered through the redistribution programme is equal 
to about 2 % of commercial agricultural land (CDE 2005). David (2005) maintains that only 4, 2 % of 
land has been redistributed in terms of all other land reform programmes. This lack of achievement, 
according to David (2005: 11), demonstrates that the land reform process still has a large number of 
people to benefit. The CDE warn that the delivery will have to be increased fivefold to meet the 2015 
target. More steps need to be taken in order to fast track the pace of the redistribution process. Broader 
steps such as, “a quite extraordinary increase in budget, official capacity, interdepartmental co-
ordination, and political consensus will be required to achieve government targets” (CDE 2005: 11).  
 
According to the draft recommendation on the principle of “willing seller-willing buyer” and 
government’s approach to land reform (DLA 2005c: 1), the international experience of land reform 
programmes demonstrates that the market on its own is unable to effectively alter the pattern of 
ownership in favour of equity for the targeted beneficiaries of land reform, as well as in favour of 
broader goals of job creation and poverty reduction. South Africa’s own experience over the last eleven 
years confirms this international experience in that the pace of redistribution to the targeted groups has 
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not been sufficient to realise the 2015 objective (ibid 2005c). The effective engagement between 
government departments and spheres, NGOs, farm workers, Agricultural Unions (NAFU and Agri-
SA), the landless, unemployed, women, youth and civil society organisations will also be essential in 
the implementation of land reform strategies.  
 
In addition, the Land Summit, adopted a wide range of resolutions that will, if implemented, create a 
dramatically different and improved Land Reform Programme in South Africa. According to the 
Alliance of Land and Agrarian Reform Movements (ALARM), the Land Summit adopted, despite 
opposition from such organisations as Agri-SA, a wide range of resolutions that civil society 
organisations have called for, including: 
• “The rejection of the willing-buyer, willing-seller principle as the basis for land reform; 
• The proactive acquisition of land that is required using expropriation when necessary; 
• A moratorium on the eviction of farmers dwellers; 
• The insertion of a “social obligations clause” in the Constitution to protect those who 
occupy underutilised land; 
• A needs-based people-centred approach to land needs identification and land acquisition; 
and  
• A pro-active role for the State in driving land reform and providing the other support 
services that will enable people to succeed on the land (ALARM 2005: 1).  
The government also needs to ensure that these resolutions are implemented in a sustainable manner in 
order to achieve its targets. Participation of all sectors in land reform issues, inclusivity, transparency, 
monitoring and evaluation of LRAD also need to be considered and promoted  
 
These resolutions, if they are implemented effectively, may contribute to land redistribution meeting its 
target by 2015. In addition, effective and well-designed land reform policies and strategies are essential 
to avoid the disruption of the country’s economy, conflict among classes, communities and huge 
inequalities in society (David 2005: 1). David further points out that effective land reform policies will 
not only promote agricultural development but other sectors of the economy as well.  
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